Balochistan CM dismissed after Shia protests throughout Pakistan



Governor’s rule imposed in Balochistan
Dawn, Jan 14, 2013
http://dawn.com/2013/01/14/constitutions-article-234-invoked-to-defuse-tension-in-quetta-governors-rule-imposed-in-balochistan/

QUETTA: The PPP government finally yielded to the protests that had enveloped the entire country over the weekend and Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf announced in front of a gathering of representatives of Hazara Shia community late on Sunday night that the provincial government was being dismissed forthwith and governor’s rule was being imposed in the whole of Balochistan.
“After holding consultations with all the stakeholders, we have decided to invoke Article 234 of the Constitution. Governor’s rule is being imposed in the province and the provincial government is being dismissed,” Mr Ashraf announced in front of the Hazara representatives.

His announcement was welcomed by thousands of Hazara Shias who had been staging a sit-in in freezing cold on Alamdar Road for the last three days along with the bodies of dozens of people killed in bombings on Thursday.

The prime minister took a bold but extremely necessary step of visiting the place in the middle of the night to make the announcement.

Earlier in the day, leaving Interior Minister Rehman Malik to deal with the Qadri march on Islamabad, Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf rushed to Quetta as the government braced itself against countrywide protests.

As night fell the protests had gained so much momentum that when media reports came that the prime minister was considering dismissing the provincial government, they seemed believable.

Protesting the carnage caused by three blasts in the provincial capital on Thursday, Hazaras, along with the unburied bodies of the victims, took to the streets on Friday, saying that the sit-in would not end and the funerals would not take place till the government called in the military to put an end to the attacks.

By Saturday, parallel protests had begun in major cities such as Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad — organised by Shia groups and parties as well as civil society.

On Sunday, these protests seemed to have enveloped the entire country, reducing the long march, which had dominated the political scene for the past few weeks, to a side story.

From Lahore to Karachi to Islamabad to Multan in the south and Skardu in the snow-covered north, the protests drew in more and more people. From religious leaders to women and children, the Pakistanis were united in condemning the targeted killing of an ethnic community and a sect, whose deaths had dominated the stories of violence and mayhem coming out of Pakistan in 2012.

Slogans such as “End to the killings of Shias” reverberated in every city and placards that read “Am I the next victim” were pictured in the hands of men, women and small children.

In Islamabad, the civil society protest continued overnight.

The Shia groups and parties, which had dispersed late on Saturday night, re-appeared and blocked a major road connecting the twin cities. Another protest by the parties also blocked part of the Islamabad-Lahore motorway.

In the opposite end of Pakistan, one group of protesters headed for the heavily protected Bilawal House where President Asif Ali Zardari has been ensconced for weeks. Despite being threatened by water canons — a favoured SOP of the Karachi police — the protest continued.

Other protests in the city were at Malir, M.A. Jinnah Road, Ancholi in Federal ‘B’ Area and North Nazimabad. At most of the protests, women were present in large numbers.

These were not protests that were limited to a particular political party or a particular social class.

Lahore too witnessed protests.

The demonstrations and the anger behind them were so palpable that the political leadership was forced to react in an unprecedented manner. The barrage of criticism directed at the PPP at the centre and in Balochistan had sent the party leadership into feverish activity by Sunday morning.

The prime minister flew into Quetta and was holed up in the Governor’s House all day, accompanied by Information Minister Qamar Zaman Kaira.

There was no news on when he planned to return but there were multiple reports that the PPP was now going to do something it had refused to do earlier when the Supreme Court had observed in its order on the Balochistan security situation case that the
 provincial government had lost its constitutional authority to rule.

The federal government had then refused to touch the provincial government but on Sunday it could no longer hold firm.

Prime Minister Raja Ashraf met provincial ministers, conferred with the governor and Law Minister Farooq Naek on the various options available which included, reportedly, the dismissal of the government and imposition of governor’s rule.

Phone calls went back and forth.

But despite all the activity, the Balochistan chief minister, who is probably the most criticised politician in the country at the moment, and a PPP member, did not return to Pakistan.

By the evening, even politicians were echoing the protesters’ demand to remove him. The MQM, ANP chief Asfandyar Wali and PML-Q leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain demanded that he be removed.

The political leadership was also forced into action by the growing protests.

Imran Khan, the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf chief, turned up at the Quetta protest early on Sunday morning, while the rest of the political leaders also headed for protest destinations in various cities later. Some PML-N leaders showed up at a protest in Lahore while the MQM joined the protesters in Karachi. Even the local Jamaat-i-Islami representative in Islamabad spoke at the civil society protest.

Others were forced to provide sound bites to the media in a bid to show they cared. General (retd) Pervez Musharraf also spoke to news channels on the issue.

All eyes are now on the Bilawal House in Karachi and the Governor’s House in Quetta — only they can now end this wave of anger that has swept the entire country.

— Additional reporting by our correspondents in Quetta, Karachi and Lahore

Same weapons being used in Karachi violence

Same Weapons Being Used in Karachi Violence
Imran Ayub, Dawn, December 28, 2012 http://dawn.com/2012/12/28/forensic-examination-same-weapons-being-used-in-tit-for-tat-sectarian-killings/

KARACHI: As the city descends into fear amid a renewed wave of killings, the police authorities see one or more organised groups behind what was earlier being called ‘tit-for-tat sectarian attacks’ as forensic investigations into nearly 90 cases found that same weapons had been used in targeting people from different sects and political parties, it emerged on Thursday.

A top police official confirmed to Dawn that under forensic findings it seemed ‘crystal clear’ that the recent wave of killings had nothing to do with sectarian rivalry rather it was an attempt to ‘destabilise the city peace’ to achieve ‘certain targets’.

However, the real face of a ‘third force’ still remains a mystery for both the authorities and police investigators.

“There is definitely a third force,” Sindh IG Fayyaz Ahmed Leghari told Dawn. “It’s not yet ascertained that it’s external or internal as no major arrest has been made on these lines.”

He said: “But it has nothing to do with sectarian differences. If they were the cause, you would have been witnessing violence in every street of the country.”

Asked about reasons for his confidence about the ‘third force’ involved in the killings, he based his conclusion on findings of forensic investigations into a number of recent incidents that had earlier been described as sectarian killings.

“For instance, we have found that the weapon used in one targeted attack was also used in another,” said IG Leghari.

He explained that on Nov 29, a young couple, Iqbal Hussain and Dilshad Fatima who were employees of the Karachi Institute of Radiotherapy and Nuclear Medicine (KIRAN), was gunned down near Safoora Goth and the following day another man, Nazar Abbas, was killed on Shaheed-i-Millat Road whose 12-year-old daughter, Mehzar Zehra, was wounded in the attack.

The police investigators and the media then suspected sectarian motives for both attacks as all the victims belonged to the Shia sect, he said.

However, he added, the Dec 3 killing of a seminary teacher off Abul Hasan Ispahani Road and forensic analysis of spent bullet casings one after another incident told a different story.

“On Dec 3, Maulana Mufti Mohammad Ismail of Madressah Ahsan-ul-Uloom was shot dead, off Abul Hasan Ispahani Road. Interestingly, the forensic examination in all these cases suggested that the same weapon was used in all three shootings,” said IG Leghari, reiterating that it was for this reason that the police believed “it’s not the sectarian violence or shooting on an ideological basis”.

Violence returned to the city mainly in the second quarter of 2012 with frequent killings and targeted attacks apparently on sectarian grounds after a gap of some months when Karachi started limping back to normality after the Supreme Court of Pakistan had taken suo motu notice of series of killings.

Many people belonging to the Shia sect — with a significant number of them from same families — lost their lives to the menace. Similarly, a number of men belonging to the Sunni sect, including seminary students and teachers, were killed in incidents of firing in different parts of the city.

While no serious effort from government quarters was witnessed to track the attackers and expose their motive, the Sindh police forensic division has made some progress on these lines.

“We have digital images of over 7,000 empties [spent bullet casings],” said Additional IG forensic division Muneer Sheikh. He said: “After a forensic analysis so far in some 90 cases this year we have found weapons of different calibers used in the multiple killings. Modern technology is being used for the analysis of every spent bullet casing according to global standards of forensic investigations,” he added.

Fisk: How many have been killed in Syria?

Another reminder that we can't take "evidence" at face value in the Syrian case even if it comes from the UN. It is not just the question of accuracy, but also the narrative that this evidence is embedded in and its assumptions and politics. The so-called "international community" and its institutions are not neutral actors in this case. Their very choice of the terms, such as "rebels" vs. "terrorists", is political.

Why the numbers game doesn’t add up in the killing fields of Syria
Are the dead from Assad's army even counted in these statistics?

Robert Fisk, The Independent, Sunday 6 January 2013

Notice how Syria’s civil war casualty figures shot up by 15,000 overnight last week? The world’s press had happily settled into the “Syrian Observatory for Human Rights” statistic of 45,000 dead in almost three years.

But then at New Year’s the UN’s Human Rights Commission tells the world that the real figure is close to 60,000. Come again? Did 15,000 Syrians climb into a mass grave on 1 January, 2013?

First, however, a health warning. No-one disputes the carnage in Syria. But figuring out just how many souls die in a civil war – and whose “side” they were on when they expired – is a mighty dangerous game.

News desks beware, for history suggests that the “bad guy” must always be held responsible for the greatest number of deaths – at least in the Middle East – and that civilians who become “fighters” end up in civilian death lists, while men and women killed by the “good guys” don’t get on lists at all. It’s not just a question of lies, damned lies and statistics; in a war, each side produces its own rules for the dead. And none of them tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Government dead

For example, how many Syrian soldiers, pro-government militiamen, pro-government supporters and civilian sympathisers are counted among the statistics. SANA, the Syrian government news agency, once spoke of 2,000 dead among Assad’s military. Assad’s own officers suggested to me in Damascus last year that this figure had reached at least 6,000. I suspect it may be nearer to 10,000 pro-Assad soldiers who have now been killed. So does this mean that at least one sixth of the UN figures actually comprise the army which is accused by the West of committing atrocities? And if this is true, how many more “pro-Assad” civilians should be added to the list; hundreds of recent victims of the Syrian war have been Christians – who could scarcely rank among the insurgents. Does this account for one figure, which puts pro-government dead as more than 13,000?

One reason, of course, why the pro-opposition “Syrian Observatory” suspects the UN figure is inflated, is that the ladies and gentlemen of the Human Rights Commission want to heap more coals of derision upon the slumbering – and certainly impotent – UN Security Council. The UN, after all, is not a committee of wise men, but a monumental political beast, not unlike a giant donkey. Give it the carrot of a bigger mass grave and it might plod a little faster.

So how many rebels have been killed in Syria? We are told that almost 5,500 military defectors are among the dead. So are 372 Palestinians, killed in inter-Palestinian fighting around the largest refugee camp in Damascus.

Who to count?

It’s sobering to remember how we have wrestled with the same kind of statistics in the past. In “our” Iraq war from 2003-2009 – note how we assume the conflict ended when “we” abandoned the country, although another 4,500 Iraqis were killed in 2012 alone – every blue-eyed Western casualty was meticulously listed. But the Western occupation authorities went along with General Tommy Franks’ obscene invention about the Iraqi dead, that “we don’t do body counts”. The Pentagon was later revealed to have kept a list of civilian dead up to 2005 – the total was 25,902 – but these figures were slyly contrived. They listed only civilians killed by insurgents: unarmed Iraqis killed by Western military forces found no place in the Pentagon’s figures.

But you can go further back. Armenians claim – with good reason – that a million and a half of their people were victims of the 1915 Turkish genocide. But the Turks still peddle the myth that these figures were falsified, and that Armenians died in the “chaos” of internal conflict during the First World War.

And what about the Second World War? Did 40 million die, as we used to believe, or was it 70 million (more likely if you include the Sino-Japanese war)? Against this hecatomb, a 15,000 discrepancy in the killing fields of Syria is hardly surprising.  

Is this a Sunni-Shia conflict in Pakistan?

Much has been written on this blog as to why the attacks on the Shias, Barelwi Sunnis, Sufi/Shia/Sunni shrines, imambargahs, muharram processions, and mosques must not be thought of as a "Sunni-Shia" conflict. For one, often the same sectarian groups are behind these attacks. Moreover, there are broader political interests attached to these militant activities (consider for instance the factors involved in 2009 Karachi Ashura bombing; see here and here). Some of these sectarian groups are also linked to the anti-Pakistan Taliban groups, which have also attacked the military and police bases in Pakistan. They are said to have been involved in attacks on political parties as well. While other Taliban groups -- the "good" Taliban -- are still protected by the rogue elements of the state's security agencies. These groups have also aligned themselves with other sectarian outfits.

Within the above context, consider these two pieces of evidence.

1. An Ahle Hadith Cleric Gunned Down; One Militant Caught

This militant was not Shia. Yet in the simplistic numerical aggregations of some journalistic accounts, the killed cleric, belonging to the Sunni Ahle Hadith school, would be categoried as a "Sunni" and the event as a "Sunni-Shia" conflict. Too often this is how the so-called "sectarian" violencde has been viewed. See in this previous post how the 2006 Nishtar Park bombing was blamed on the Shias by a foreign journalist.



http://tribune.com.pk/story/475750/deserted-by-friends-fleeing-suspect-caught-by-mob/

KARACHI (Dec 6, 2012): A target killer was caught red-handed by seminary students after his accomplices escaped but his motorcycle stalled as he tried to flee after killing a cleric in New Karachi.

The prayer leader-cum-seminary teacher of Jamia Masjid-o-Madressa Islamia, Qari Ahsanullah Rasheed, was shot dead on Wednesday evening while he was teaching Quran to the students, Bilal Colony police said.

Three armed men came to the mosque on a motorcycle, witnesses said. One of the three entered the mosque and shot the victim in the head, killing him on the spot. When he went outside, he saw his accomplices had already escaped. He tried to kick-start the motorcycle but as a mob approached him, he started running. He also fired at the crowd, injuring a man in the shoulder, SP Salman Hussain, the New Karachi division police chief, told The Express Tribune. The killer was then handed over to the police.

The accused was later identified as Kashif Shakoor alias Bilal, who lives in Quaidabad. During interrogation, the assassin said he was associated with a militant outfit. “He was directed by someone from Waziristan to kill the victim on suspicion of being a police informer,” said the SP citing the suspect.

The victim, Qari Rasheed, had been associated with the mosque for the past 15 years. The killer and his victim both were from the Ahle Hadith sect, said SP Hussain.

Unconfirmed reports suggested they were also associated with the Jamaatud Dawa but its spokesperson denied, saying the organisation had no links with the mosque, its administration or the men.

Earlier, a young man was shot dead at his car showroom on Shaheed-e-Millat Road, Ferozabad police said. Two armed men on a motorcycle shot Tanvir Hussain Bangash, 28, twice, killing him on the spot, said ASP Ghulam Murtaza Malik. The victim, father of one, lived in PECHS and belonged to the Shia sect.

Suspected militants arrested

A potential attack on an imambargah in Gulshan-e-Iqbal was averted as two suspects allegedly associated with the banned religious outfit, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), were arrested on Tuesday night, Azizabad police said.

Five men in a high-roof vehicle were asked to stop by police in Block-2, Federal B Area but they started firing. After an encounter, Hafiz Hanif and Qari Chiraghuddin were arrested while three of their accomplices escaped, the police said.

The police have identified the other suspects as Qari Ghulam Mohammad, Qari Ghulam Akbar and Riaz. The law enforcers are conducting raids in different neighbourhoods in search of the other alleged militants.

During interrogation, the men admitted they were associated with the LeJ as well as Harkatul Mujahideen and were planning to attack an imambargah in Gulshan-e-Iqbal through an explosives-laden vehicle, said DSP Saleem Akhtar Siddiqui. The suspects were trained in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

The suspects were also involved in collecting funds for their organisations through donations and selling skins of sacrificial animals.

Published in The Express Tribune, December 6th, 2012.

2. A Sectarian Militant Killed in Quetta; belonged to the Levies Force

On September 30, 2012, two gunmen attacked a jewelry shop owned by a Shia Muslim, Abdul Khaliq, in Quetta’s Liaquat Bazar. Khaliq was injured in the attack. The shop's private security guard returned fire and killed one gunman, while the other escaped. The gunman was identified as Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, a sepoy in Balochistan Levies, a paramilitary force, who was posted in Balochistan's Sherani district. In another case, a gunned down attacker turned out to be a part of an anti-terrorism task force. It is rare that an attacker would be killed or captured. But these two cases are sufficient to consider that the anti-Shia outfits have deep penetration and connections. At times, those captured have also been able to "escape" from jail. For instance, two high profile militants, Usman Saifullah Kurd and Shafeeq Rind, had escaped from a tightly secured jail of Anti-Terrorist Force in the Quetta Cantonment area.

Abdul Khaliq, the shop owner in the above case, was a Qandhari Shia. In the last few years, the sectarian outfits have indiscriminately killed hundreds of Shias from Hazara, Qandhari, Punjabi, Saraeki, and other ethnic backgrounds in Balochistan. Over 100 Shias have been killed in 2012 alone.
 

Muharram and Lahore

Karbala and how Lahore was involved
November 26, 2012 by Majid Sheikh
http://dawn.com/2012/11/26/karbala-and-how-lahore-was-involved/print/

IN our school and college days we all loved to assist friends set up ‘sabeels’ alongside Lahore`s traditional ‘Ashura’ procession, providing cold drinks to the thousands who mourned. Sects and beliefs never mattered then. But then neither did one`s religion.

For well over 1,332 years, the tragedy of Karbala moves everyone who hears about it, be they Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Sikh or any other religion. This is one incident that brings out the need to support those with a moral position.

As children we attended the ‘sham-i-ghareeban’ with our Shia friends, and learnt the lesson of supporting those in the right. Everyone respected the beliefs of others. Yes, there were always a few silly chaps who wanted attention, but they were at best ignored.

The ancient city of Lahore is connected to the tragedy in no uncertain terms.

Historical accounts say seven brave warriors from Lahore died while fighting in the Battle of Karbala. It is said their father Rahab Dutt, an old man who traded with Arabia in those days, had promised the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him) to stand by his grandson in his fight to uphold the truth.

That pledge the brave Rajput Mohiyals of the Dutt clan from Lahore upheld.

Today they are known as Hussaini Brahmins, who lived in Lahore till 1947.

Then there is the fact that besides the Hindu Rajputs of Lahore, in the battle also fought John bin Huwai, a freed Christian slave of Abu Dharr al-Ghafari, whose `alleged` descendents, one researcher claims, still live inside the Walled City of Lahore.

I have been on the track of these ancestors for quite some time and have been able to trace one Christian family living inside Mori Gate. They claim to have a connection with a `Sahabi` whose name they cannot recollect. M. A. Karanpikar`s `Islam in Transition`, written over 250 years ago, made this claim, but I do not think it is a claim worth pursuing.

But the most powerful claim of Lahore as the place where the descendents of Hussain ibn All came lies in the Bibi Pak Daman graveyard, where the grave of Ruquiya, sister of Hussain ibn Ali and wife of Muslim ibn Ageel, is said to exist.

Also graves here attributed to the sisters of Muslim ibn Ageel and other family members. Many dispute this claim.

But then no less a person than Ali Hasan of Hajweri, known popularly as Data Sahib, came here every Thursday to offer ‘fateha’ at the grave, informing his followers that this was the grave of Ruquiya. The place where he always stood to offer `fateha` has been marked out, and his book also verifies this claim. Mind you detractors exist, of this have no doubt, but the supporting evidence is quite strong.

Let me begin the story of the Dutts by going through the record of the Shaukat Khanum Hospital and the recorded fact that Indian film star Sunil Dutt, who belonged to Lahore, made a donation to the hospital and recorded the following words: ‘For Lahore, like my elders, I will shed every drop of blood and give any donation asked for, just as my ancestors did when they laid down their lives at Karbala for Hazrat Imam Husain.

Makes you think -but then there is this account which says that the seven sons of Rahab Dutt lost their lives defending the Imam at Karbala. The Martyr’s List at Qum verifies this. History records when the third thrust by Yazid’s forces came, the Dutt brothers refused to let them pass. The seven Punjabi swordsmen stood their ground till they were felled by hundreds of horsemen. In lieu of the loyalty of the Dutt family to that of the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him) was coined the famous saying: ‘Wah Dutt Sultan, Hindu ka dharm, Musalman ka iman, Adha Hindu adha Musalman.’ Since then, so the belief goes, Muslims were instructed never to try to convert the Dutts to Islam.

A grieving Rahab returned to the land of his ancestors, and after staying in Afghanistan, returned to Lahore. I have tried my very best to locate their ‘mohallah’ inside the Walled City, and my educated guess is that it is Mohallah Maulian inside Lohari Gate. Later they moved to Mochi Gate, and it was there that the famous Dutts lived before 1947 saw them flee from the hate of the people they gave everything for.

The most interesting thing about the Hussaini Brahmins is that they are highly respected among Hindus, and even more amazingly it is said that all direct ancestors of Rahab Dutt are born with a light slash mark on their throat, a sort of symbol of their sacrifice. I was reading a piece by Prof Doonica Dutt of Delhi University who verified this claim and said that all true Dutts belong to Lahore.

I must point out to an amazing version of these events that an Indian historian, Chawala, has come up with. It says that one of the wives of Hazrat Imam Husain, the Persian princess Shahr Banu, was the sister of Chandra Lekha or Mehr Banu, the wife of an Indian king Chandragupta. We know that he ruled over Lahore. When it became clear that Yazid ibn Muawiya was determined to eliminate Hussain ibn Ali, the son of Hussain (named Ali) rushed off a letter to Chandragupta asking for assistance. The Mauriyan king, allegedly, dispatched a large army to Iraq to assist. By the time they arrived, the Tragedy of Karbala had taken place.

In Kufa in Iraq a disciple of Hazrat Imam Husain is said to have arranged for them to stay in a special part of the town, which even today is known by the name of Dair-i-Hindiya or ‘the Indian quarter’ The Hussaini Brahmins believe that in the Kalanki Purana, the last of 18 Puranas, as well as the Atharva Veda, the 4th Veda, refers to Hazrat Imam Husain as the avatar of the Kali Yug, the present age. They believe that the family of the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him)is Om Murti, the most respected family before the Almighty.

All these facts bring me back to our days as school children working hard to provide relief to the mourners on Ashura. Reminds me of our neighbour Nawab Raza Ali Qizilbash, who invited us to his ‘haveli’ every year to see the preparations before the event. Raza Bhai is no more, and neither is the tolerance that we all enjoyed so much.

Maryam al-Khwaja: Bahrain's struggle is not a Shia-vs-Sunni conflict

Beneath Bahrain's Shia-versus-Sunni narrative, only the tyrants benefit

Through its repressive policies, the regime's long-term goal is to shift Bahrain's demographics: diluting the Shia majority

 

Maryam al-Khawaja, Guardian.co.uk, October 27, 2012

 

 

When you pick up the day's newspaper, it is not likely that you will find much coverage of the ongoing popular revolt in Bahrain. But on the off chance that Bahrain is mentioned, it is almost certain that two words will jump at you: Sunni and Shia. It is even more likely you will see some mention of a Shia revolt against a Sunni monarchy.

This is unfortunate; a very complicated situation is expediently packaged into a soundbite-like myth. That narrative is ahistorical and dangerous because, like all myths, there is a grain of truth to it.

Last year, when Bahrain's revolution began, it was not about sects. Sunnis, Shia along with Bahrain's "sushis" (people of mixed background), non-Muslims, atheists; all came together in Bahrain's version of Tahrir – Pearl Square. Their unifying demand was for a constitutional monarchy to be established in Bahrain. The people were demanding that the king honour his lofty reform promises made when he inherited the position from his Emir father.

This was the third act in a struggle predating the so-called Arab spring. It had started in the 1990s when the people of Bahrain had their own uprising largely forgotten in the west. Then, their demand was a return to Bahrain's more democratic 1973 constitution that gave people a real parliament. Instead, thousands of citizens were arrested and imprisoned. Dozens were killed, many under torture.

In 1999 that cycle was interrupted as Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa inherited power from his late father amid soaring hopes of reconciliation and reform. His first act was to announce a referendum promising to establish a constitutional monarchy.

Initially, the people celebrated Hamad's break with his repressive father's legacy as many voted in favour of the referendum. They were encouraged by the release of all political prisoners, and the return of political exiles back to Bahrain, and a halt of state-sanctioned torture.

In 2002, borrowing a page from Napoleon Bonaparte's playbook, "Hamad the Reformer" engineered his own monarchic putsch. He amended the constitution, granting himself absolute unchecked powers. A rubber-stamp parliament was then created – half appointed by him and the other half "elected", but with no legislative or monitoring powers.

The farce extended to elections as electoral districts were set up to prevent the opposition from ever making significant gains. As a result, if the leading opposition group got 60% of all votes, the new re-districting made it so that they would win only 18 out of 40 seats in the parliament. These measures were at the heart of a comprehensive effort to marginalise and discriminate against the country's majority population: Shia Muslims.

Bahrain's unwritten laws insidiously establish a quasi-apartheid regime preventing Shias from state-owned housing and many government jobs. For instance, there are entire areas like Riffaa, where Shia are not allowed to rent, buy homes or land.

Ironically, the country's largest employer is none other than the interior ministry and the security forces in charge of protecting the regime. Shia Muslims who, according to the latest numbers provided are about 70% of the population, are not allowed to be employed in them. They justify this through what Bahrainis call "political naturalisation".

For two decades, tens of thousands of people from places like Syria, Jordan, Yemen and Pakistan were expediently granted citizenship in Bahrain. All of them are Sunnis.

The regime is thus resolving two problems. A short-term need is filling the security services with politically reliable elements beholden to the monarchy and not to the nation. The long-term goal is to artificially shift the country's demographics: diluting the Shia majority.

Consequently, newly built government houses go to the politically naturalised, while a regular Bahraini family (Sunni or Shia) has to wait up to 20 years to receive housing. Many Bahrainis sit at home unemployed, while politically naturalised people receive a job immediately upon arrival.

These policies are not fortuitous but part of a deliberate attempt to foment sectarian tensions in society, and to play on the region's geopolitical and sectarian fault lines.

In the past, Bahrain's opposition was "Nasser-socialists before they were dubbed communists". Today they are regarded as Iranian agents and terrorists.

Aided by more than 13 different European and American public relations companies at times, the regime aims to turn its blatant repression into a net asset by capitalising on the fear of the enemy du jour: Shia Iran. At the end of the day the fact remains the same: you can be Shia and loyal to the regime, like Sameera Rajab who is minister of information; and you can be Sunni, sentenced by a military court, tortured and serving time in prison, like Ebrahim Sharif.

Next time you pick up a newspaper remember that the sectarian Shia-versus-Sunni narrative only serves Bahrain's tyrants. That is, of course, if Bahrain is written about at all.

When you pick up the day's newspaper, it is not likely that you will find much coverage of the ongoing popular revolt in Bahrain. But on the off chance that Bahrain is mentioned, it is almost certain that two words will jump at you: Sunni and Shia. It is even more likely you will see some mention of a Shia revolt against a Sunni monarchy.

This is unfortunate; a very complicated situation is expediently packaged into a soundbite-like myth. That narrative is ahistorical and dangerous because, like all myths, there is a grain of truth to it.

Last year, when Bahrain's revolution began, it was not about sects. Sunnis, Shia along with Bahrain's "sushis" (people of mixed background), non-Muslims, atheists; all came together in Bahrain's version of Tahrir – Pearl Square. Their unifying demand was for a constitutional monarchy to be established in Bahrain. The people were demanding that the king honour his lofty reform promises made when he inherited the position from his Emir father.

This was the third act in a struggle predating the so-called Arab spring. It had started in the 1990s when the people of Bahrain had their own uprising largely forgotten in the west. Then, their demand was a return to Bahrain's more democratic 1973 constitution that gave people a real parliament. Instead, thousands of citizens were arrested and imprisoned. Dozens were killed, many under torture.

In 1999 that cycle was interrupted as Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa inherited power from his late father amid soaring hopes of reconciliation and reform. His first act was to announce a referendum promising to establish a constitutional monarchy.

Initially, the people celebrated Hamad's break with his repressive father's legacy as many voted in favour of the referendum. They were encouraged by the release of all political prisoners, and the return of political exiles back to Bahrain, and a halt of state-sanctioned torture.

In 2002, borrowing a page from Napoleon Bonaparte's playbook, "Hamad the Reformer" engineered his own monarchic putsch. He amended the constitution, granting himself absolute unchecked powers. A rubber-stamp parliament was then created – half appointed by him and the other half "elected", but with no legislative or monitoring powers.

The farce extended to elections as electoral districts were set up to prevent the opposition from ever making significant gains. As a result, if the leading opposition group got 60% of all votes, the new re-districting made it so that they would win only 18 out of 40 seats in the parliament. These measures were at the heart of a comprehensive effort to marginalise and discriminate against the country's majority population: Shia Muslims.

Bahrain's unwritten laws insidiously establish a quasi-apartheid regime preventing Shias from state-owned housing and many government jobs. For instance, there are entire areas like Riffaa, where Shia are not allowed to rent, buy homes or land.

Ironically, the country's largest employer is none other than the interior ministry and the security forces in charge of protecting the regime. Shia Muslims who, according to the latest numbers provided are about 70% of the population, are not allowed to be employed in them. They justify this through what Bahrainis call "political naturalisation".

For two decades, tens of thousands of people from places like Syria, Jordan, Yemen and Pakistan were expediently granted citizenship in Bahrain. All of them are Sunnis.

The regime is thus resolving two problems. A short-term need is filling the security services with politically reliable elements beholden to the monarchy and not to the nation. The long-term goal is to artificially shift the country's demographics: diluting the Shia majority.

Consequently, newly built government houses go to the politically naturalised, while a regular Bahraini family (Sunni or Shia) has to wait up to 20 years to receive housing. Many Bahrainis sit at home unemployed, while politically naturalised people receive a job immediately upon arrival.

These policies are not fortuitous but part of a deliberate attempt to foment sectarian tensions in society, and to play on the region's geopolitical and sectarian fault lines.

In the past, Bahrain's opposition was "Nasser-socialists before they were dubbed communists". Today they are regarded as Iranian agents and terrorists.

Aided by more than 13 different European and American public relations companies at times, the regime aims to turn its blatant repression into a net asset by capitalising on the fear of the enemy du jour: Shia Iran. At the end of the day the fact remains the same: you can be Shia and loyal to the regime, like Sameera Rajab who is minister of information; and you can be Sunni, sentenced by a military court, tortured and serving time in prison, like Ebrahim Sharif.

Next time you pick up a newspaper remember that the sectarian Shia-versus-Sunni narrative only serves Bahrain's tyrants. That is, of course, if Bahrain is written about at all.

Saudis continue to bulldoze Islam's history

The Saudi sacrilege and destruction of Islam's historical and sacred sites have a long history and they continue to this day as the following two stories (also) point out. Following these links are some bits from history.

NYTimes (2002): Where the Prophet Trod, He Begs,Tread Lightly: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/15/international/middleeast/15SAUD.html

The Independent (2012): Saudis take a bulldozer to Islam's history (quoted below): http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/medina-saudis-take-a-bulldozer-to-islams-history-8228795.html

 

The Baqi cemetery years before the Saudi demolition

The Baqi cemetery after the 1925 Saudi demolition

Jannat al-Baqi is a cemetery in Medina, adjoining the Prophet's Mosque. Buried there are "Wives and Companions of the Prophet, several Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt [the noble progeny of the Prophet Mohammad], and a host of lesser luminaries from the spiritual and intellectual history of Islam." (Algar 2002:27). This was done by the forces of King Abdul Aziz al-Saud in the year 1345 AH (April 21, 1925)" (p. 43).

This was the second time the Saudi-Wahhabis engaged in the sacrilege of the two holy cities. From 1806 to 1812, for about six and a half years of their short-lived rule in the Mecca and Medina, the Saudi-Wahhabis alliance "engaged in their signature activity of dome demolition. In Mecca, the domes over the houses reputed to have been the birthplaces of the Prophet, Khadijat al-Kubra, Imam Ali, and Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, were destroyed, and the tombs and mausolea in the historic cemetery of al-Ma'la were levelled to the ground. In Medina, the treasury of the Prophet's Mosque was plundered but attempts to demolish the dome surmounting the grave of the Prophet were abandoned when several of the zealots entrusted with the task fell providentially to their deaths" (p. 27). About four years before, in 1802, Saudi-Wahhabi forces had similarly pillaged the holy city of Karbala in southern Iraq, the place of martyrdom and burial of Imam Husayn, the grandson of the Prophet (p. 24).

In 1925, numerous historic sites that had survived the previous Wahhabi occupation were demolished (p. 43).

Source: Hamid Algar. 2002. Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Islamic Publications International.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Independent story

Saudis take a bulldozer to Islam's history

Authorities are building a mosque so big it will hold 1.6m people – but are demolishing irreplaceable monuments to do it

 

Jerome Taylor, The Independent, Friday, 26 October 2012 

 

Three of the world’s oldest mosques are about to be destroyed as Saudi Arabia embarks on a multi-billion-pound expansion of Islam’s second holiest site. Work on the Masjid an-Nabawi in Medina, where the Prophet Mohamed is buried, will start once the annual Hajj pilgrimage ends next month. When complete, the development will turn the mosque into the world’s largest building, with the capacity for 1.6 million worshippers.

But concerns have been raised that the development will see key historic sites bulldozed. Anger is already growing at the kingdom’s apparent disdain for preserving the historical and archaeological heritage of the country’s holiest city, Mecca. Most of the expansion of Masjid an-Nabawi will take place to the west of the existing mosque, which holds the tombs of Islam’s founder and two of his closest companions, Abu Bakr and Umar.

Just outside the western walls of the current compound are mosques dedicated to Abu Bakr and Umar, as well as the Masjid Ghamama, built to mark the spot where the Prophet is thought to have given his first prayers for the Eid festival. The Saudis have announced no plans to preserve or move the three mosques, which have existed since the seventh century and are covered by Ottoman-era structures, or to commission archaeological digs before they are pulled down, something that has caused considerable concern among the few academics who are willing to speak out in the deeply authoritarian kingdom.

“No one denies that Medina is in need of expansion, but it’s the way the authorities are going about it which is so worrying,” says Dr Irfan al-Alawi of the Islamic Heritage Research Foundation. “There are ways they could expand which would either avoid or preserve the ancient Islamic sites but instead they want to knock it all down.” Dr Alawi has spent much of the past 10 years trying to highlight the destruction of early Islamic sites.

With cheap air travel and booming middle classes in populous Muslim countries within the developing world, both Mecca and Medina are struggling to cope with the 12 million pilgrims who visit each year – a number expected to grow to 17 million by 2025. The Saudi monarchy views itself as the sole authority to decide what should happen to the cradle of Islam. Although it has earmarked billions for an enormous expansion of both Mecca and Medina, it also sees the holy cities as lucrative for a country almost entirely reliant on its finite oil wealth.

Heritage campaigners and many locals have looked on aghast as the historic sections of Mecca and Medina have been bulldozed to make way for gleaming shopping malls, luxury hotels and enormous skyscrapers. The Washington-based Gulf Institute estimates that 95 per cent of the 1,000-year-old buildings in the two cities have been destroyed in the past 20 years.

In Mecca, the Masjid al-Haram, the holiest site in Islam and a place where all Muslims are supposed to be equal, is now overshadowed by the Jabal Omar complex, a development of skyscraper apartments, hotels and an enormous clock tower. To build it, the Saudi authorities destroyed the Ottoman era Ajyad Fortress and the hill it stood on. Other historic sites lost include the Prophet’s birthplace – now a library – and the house of his first wife, Khadijah, which was replaced with a public toilet block.

Neither the Saudi Embassy in London nor the Ministry for Foreign Affairs responded to requests for comment when The Independent contacted them this week. But the government has previously defended its expansion plans for the two holy cities as necessary. It insists it has also built large numbers of budget hotels for poorer pilgrims, though critics point out these are routinely placed many miles away from the holy sites.

Until recently, redevelopment in Medina has pressed ahead at a slightly less frenetic pace than in Mecca, although a number of early Islamic sites have still been lost. Of the seven ancient mosques built to commemorate the Battle of the Trench – a key moment in the development of Islam – only two remain. Ten years ago, a mosque which belonged to the Prophet’s grandson was dynamited. Pictures of the demolition that were secretly taken and smuggled out of the kingdom showed the religious police celebrating as the building collapsed.

The disregard for Islam’s early history is partly explained by the regime’s adoption of Wahabism, an austere and uncompromising interpretation of Islam that is vehemently opposed to anything which might encourage Muslims towards idol worship.

In most of the Muslim world, shrines have been built. Visits to graves are also commonplace. But Wahabism views such practices with disdain. The religious police go to enormous lengths to discourage people from praying at or visiting places closely connected to the time of the Prophet while powerful clerics work behind the scenes to promote the destruction of historic sites.

Dr Alawi fears that the redevelopment of the Masjid an-Nabawi is part of a wider drive to shift focus away from the place where Mohamed is buried. The spot that marks the Prophet’s tomb is covered by a famous green dome and forms the centrepiece of the current mosque. But under the new plans, it will become the east wing of a building eight times its current size with a new pulpit. There are also plans to demolish the prayer niche at the centre of mosque. The area forms part of the Riyadh al-Jannah (Garden of Paradise), a section of the mosque that the Prophet decreed especially holy..

“Their excuse is they want to make more room and create 20 spaces in a mosque that will eventually hold 1.6 million,” says Dr Alawi. “It makes no sense. What they really want is to move the focus away from where the Prophet is buried.”

A pamphlet published in 2007 by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs – and endorsed by the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdulaziz al Sheikh – called for the dome to be demolished and the graves of Mohamed, Abu Bakr and Umar to be flattened. Sheikh Ibn al-Uthaymeen, one of the 20th century’s most prolific Wahabi scholars, made similar demands.

“Muslim silence over the destruction of Mecca and Medina is both disastrous and hypocritical,” says Dr Alawi. “The recent movie about the Prophet Mohamed caused worldwide protests... and yet the destruction of the Prophet’s birthplace, where he prayed and founded Islam has been allowed to continue without any criticism.”

Mecca and Medina in numbers

12m The number of people who visit Mecca and Medina every year

3.4m The number of Muslims expected to perform Hajj (pilgrimage) this year

60,000 The current capacity of the Masjid an-Nabawi mosque

1.6m The projected capacity of the mosque after expansion

1990 Election Rigged, Rules Pakistan's Supreme Court

For some background, see here

1990 Election was Rigged, Rules SC
October 19, 2012, Dawn.com
http://dawn.com/2012/10/19/asghar-khan-case-sc-resumes-hearing-3/

ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court on Friday ordered legal proceedings against a former head of intelligence and former army chief over allegations that politicians were bankrolled to stop the current ruling Pakistan People’s Party from winning the 1990 election.

It was a landmark ruling from the Supreme Court 16 years after retired air marshal Asghar Khan filed a case, accusing the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency of doling out money to a group of politicians in the 1990s.

A three-judge bench comprising the chief justice, Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja and Justice Khilji Arif Hussain issued the short order after hearing a petition filed in 1996 by Khan requesting the court to look into allegations that the Inter-Services Intelligence had financed many politicians in the 1990 election by dishing out Rs140 million to create the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) and stop Benazir Bhutto’s PPP from coming to power. The petition was based on an affidavit of Durrani.

The Supreme Court in its short order ruled that there was ample evidence to suggest that the 1990 election was rigged and that a political cell maintained by the then president Ghulam Ishaq Khan supported the formation of the IJI to stop a victory of the PPP. The ruling said Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Baig and Durrani violated the Constitution.

The Supreme Court ruled that “the general election held in the year 1990 was subjected to corruption and corrupt practices.” Moreover, “it has been established that an “Election Cell” had been created in the Presidency, which was functioning to provide financial assistance to the favoured candidates, or a group of political parties to achieve desired result by polluting election process and to deprive the people of Pakistan from being represented by their chosen representatives.”

“Late Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the then President of Pakistan, General (R) Aslam Baig and General (R) Asad Durrani acted in violation of the Constitution,” said the apex court, adding the federal government should take “necessary steps under the Constitution and Law against them.”

Stating that corruption was carried out in the 1990 election, the ruling said that the president, the army chief and the ISI’s director-general were not authorised to constitute an election cell. It added that the state should implement its authority through the elected representatives of the people.

The election cell “was aided by General (R) Mirza Aslam Baig who was the Chief of Army Staff and by General (R) Asad Durrani, the then Director General ISI and they participated in the unlawful activities of the Election Cell in violation of the responsibilities of the Army and ISI.”

The apex court moreover ruled that political cells of the ISI and the President House should be abolished and ordered the government to take legal action against former retired generals involved in the corruption as well as against Younus Habib, former president of the now defunct Mehran Bank.

The court further ordered that money that was illegally disbursed among the politicians by the then president and the ISI should be recovered and deposited in the Habib Bank along with the accumulated interest on it. Adding to that, the short order said that legal action should also be taken against the politicians who received the money.

The order adds that “legal proceedings shall be initiated against the politicians, who allegedly have received donations to spend on election campaigns in the general election of 1990”, and a “transparent investigation on the criminal side shall be initiated by the FIA against all of them.”

“Mr. M. Younas A. Habib, the then Chief Executive of Habib Bank Ltd…arranged/provided Rs.140 million belonging to public exchequer, out of which an amount of Rs.60 million was distributed to politicians,” added the short order.

The ruling further said that Federal Investigation Agency should investigate into the matter, adding that, if evidence was found against anyone, action should be taken against them.

Moreover, the Supreme Court said that political activism was not the domain of the military and the intelligence agencies. Their job is to cooperate with the government, the judgment said.

Friday’s proceedings

During the hearing, Attorney General Irfan Qadir began presenting his arguments.

Qadir said he was representing the federation and the defence ministry.

Responding to which, Chief Justice Iftikhar directed Qadir to produce the document enabling him to represent the defence ministry.

The attorney general said he would try to assist the court to the best of his abilities “in the short time that was available” to him.

Qadir criticised the judiciary upon which the bench expressed its displeasure.

The attorney general said he had reservations over comments alleged to have been made by Justice Khawaja.

“Justice Khawaja said the Pakistan People’s Party government had failed to perform in the past four years,” Qadir said.

Upon which, Justice Hussain said: “You should not name a particular judge. Those were the remarks of the bench.”

The attorney general requested the bench to exclude the concerned remarks from the record of the case.

Qadir added that judges had taken oaths under the PCO in the past and had also allowed the military to step in, in violation of the Constitution.

The attorney general moreover said that the Asghar Khan case had been pending for the past 15 years and blamed the judiciary for the delay.

He further alleged that “the present judiciary” wanted to “destabilise the government”.

The chief justice remarked that Rs140 million had been given out by Younus Habib and asked as to who was responsible for that.

He further said that evidence suggested that the money was distributed at the behest of the presidency, adding that, prima facie the President House was involved in the operation.

The chief justice reiterated that the president should be impartial and should not partake in political activity.

Responding to which, the attorney general said that the president’s oath does not restrict him from partaking in politics, adding that, the office of the president was also a political position.

The president’s oath is not any different from the oaths administered to the prime minister and the ministers, Qadir said.

Upon which, the chief justice said that the Constitution entitles the president, not the prime minister, as the head of state.

The attorney general added the parliament had on several occasions saved the judiciary from embarrassment.

Chief Justice Iftikhar said the judiciary would not allow derailment of democracy in the country.

He further said that former interior minister Lt-Gen (retd) Naseerullah Babar had also revealed that money was distributed to politicians to manipulate the country’s politics, adding that, it was allegedly done in the greater national interest.

The attorney general said those involved in the decisions of the past were important personalities, adding that, the individuals who were accused of receiving the money should also be heard.

Zia personally supported sectarian outfits in Pakistan

Yet another piece of evidence:

"Tariq Khosa, a former director-general of FIA, recalled how sectarian groups like the Sipah-i-Sahaba received official patronage at the highest level in the 1980s.

Reminiscing about his early days in police force, he said when he was an ASP in Jhang district, he apprehended Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of the SSP, for delivering a provocative speech. But the then president Ziaul Haq himself intervened for his release, Mr Khosa added.

Similarly, in another incident he had hauled up a cache of weapons, but was asked to release that on directives from none other than Gen Zia."


Senate body’s rare foray into military matters
DAWN,September 29, 2012
http://dawn.com/2012/09/29/senate-bodys-rare-foray-into-military-matters/

ISLAMABAD, Sept 28: The Senate’s defence committee broke fresh ground in the country’s parliamentary history on Friday by holding a public hearing on issues of national security that were long kept shrouded in excessive secrecy.

Predictably enough, the first hearing caused considerable excitement among the participants. The speakers’ candid remarks didn’t disappoint the audience either.

Hearing experts’ views about changing nuances of the country’s nuclear doctrine, official patronage of sectarianism and how drones had been more effective than counter-militancy operations in Fata was a refreshing experience in the chambers long dominated by official narrative.

The standing committee on defence and defence production is holding a series of public hearings in the lead-up to preparation of a national defence strategy document that the committee’s chairman, Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed, intends to compile by the start of next year.

Those who testified at the committee included defence analyst Shireen Mazari (nuclear program), retired police officer Tariq Khosa (counter-terrorism) and journalist Saleem Safi (Afghanistan).

The committee’s initiative to hold public hearings comes after parliament got a say in matters related to foreign policy and defence, two areas dominated by the military establishment, earlier this year following the unfortunate Salala incident of November last year.

Public hearings by parliamentary committees, among other purposes, serve to get the opinions of experts in a particular field to supplement government-furnished reports.

The information obtained through the hearings helps parliamentarians to make informed analyses and decisions.

The National Assembly rules allow for public hearings, while Senate regulations are a bit ambiguous.

While there is no explicit provision for public hearing in Senate rules, one of the sections of the rules indirectly allows for it: “A committee may invite or summon any person or member having a special knowledge to give an expert opinion…”

Senator Mushahid, the driving force behind the new tradition, said: “We’ll all go back wiser.”

Marvi Sirmed, project manager for UN-funded project ‘Strengthening Democracy through Parliamentary Development’ (SDPD), whose organisation works for capacity building of parliamentarians and has long advocated openness in working of parliament, said the holding of first public hearing was a dream come true.

NUCLEAR PROGRAM: Ms Mazari, who recently parted ways with the Tehrik-i-Insaaf, said there were perceptible changes in the nuclear doctrine that had been necessitated by the evolving situation in the region, especially India’s cold start doctrine and development of an anti-ballistic missile shield.

Rejecting the criticism surrounding the testing of tactical short range NASR missile, she said the weapon was “strategic for us given our geographic proximity to India”.

Ms Mazari called for sustaining the position on the fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) warning that any compromise would undermine Pakistan’s deterrence capacity.

Senator Farhatullah Babar recalled how Pakistan’s doctrine transformed from deterrence to that of minimum deterrence and now credible deterrence.

He called for a debate on effectiveness of the nuclear doctrine.

TERRORISM: Tariq Khosa, a former director-general of FIA, recalled how sectarian groups like the Sipah-i-Sahaba received official patronage at the highest level in the 1980s.

Reminiscing about his early days in police force, he said when he was an ASP in Jhang district, he apprehended Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of the SSP, for delivering a provocative speech. But the then president Ziaul Haq himself intervened for his release, Mr Khosa added.

Similarly, in another incident he had hauled up a cache of weapons, but was asked to release that on directives from none other than Gen Zia.

After 9/11, Mr Khosa said, dealing with Al Qaeda and Taliban became an exclusive domain of ISI’s counter-terrorism wing.

He disclosed that a survey had revealed that 25,000 young men hailing from Punjab had been trained in Afghanistan.

Based on the findings, Mr Khosa had recommended their de-radicalisation, but during his testimony he regretted that not much had been done in that direction. The mastermind of last month’s Kamra attack was also someone who had fought in Afghanistan, the former FIA chief said.

He called for peaceful resolution of the Balochistan crisis, putting the national counter-terrorism agency under the control of prime minister, giving legal cover to ISI’s counter-terrorism wing and review of anti-terrorism laws.

AFGHANISTAN: Saleem Safi said the much criticised drone attacks were actually effective in breaking the backbone of militants in tribal areas.

He said only an all-inclusive reconciliation process would work to Pakistan’s advantage. Mr Safi said Al Qaeda had lost influence in Afghanistan, but was gaining ground in Pakistan.

PML-N's appeasement to sectarian outfits continues

PML-N's policy of appeasement toward sectarian outfits is well known. PML-N's top leader Shahbaz Sharif even extended this appeasement to the Pakistani Talibans, imploring them to spare Punjab (see here and also Ayesha Siddiqa's comments on this controversy). In the past, PML-N's Rana Sanaullah Khan, Punjab's Law Minister, also made a public appearance with a leader of one sectarian outfit in an election rally (see below image). However, this kind of public appearance or the elections deal that the following story speaks of is beyond just a policy of appeasement. 

The below story was later removed from the Express Tribune's website.

Election season: PML-N, ASWJ reach consensus
By Abdul Manan
Published: September 30, 2012

Opposition party will give the go-ahead to ASWJ to contest the election for three NA seats.

LAHORE:A covert understanding between the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) and Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat (ASWJ) is said to have reached a consensus on seat adjustments in the Punjab and National Assembly in the upcoming general elections, well placed sources told The Express Tribune.

According to the sources, PML-N’s Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah Khan met with ASWJ chief Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi to discuss the seat adjustments, particularly in South Punjab.

ASWJ, which formerly operated as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, has a strong vote bank in many constituencies of Punjab, particularly in South Punjab, which forced the PML-N’s think tank to strike a deal with it over seat adjustments.

According to the deal, the PML-N will give the go-ahead to ASWJ to contest the election for three NA seats with the PML-N’s support, while in exchange the ASWJ will withdraw its candidates from contesting around 12 NA seats across Punjab whose votes often play a vital role in helping candidates win.

The sources also said that the head of the banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Malik Ishaq, who recently joined the ASWJ, could possibly be one of the candidates fielded by the ASWJ to contest the election for any NA seat that could be vacated in South Punjab.

However they added that if Malik Ishaq was not allowed to contest the election, then his son Malik Usman will be fielded as a candidate for either the provincial assembly or the NA.
Expected seat adjustments

Sources said the PML-N will not field its candidate from the NA-89 constituency of Jhang as Ludhyanvi will contest that seat, which is currently occupied by PML-Q’s Sheikh Waqar Akram. It will not field its candidate for the NA-184 constituency which will be contested by ASWJ’s Rao Javeed. Currently PPP’s Khadija Aamir Yar Malik occupies the seat.

In exchange, in Bahawalpur division, ASWJ will support PML-N’s Mian Imtiaz from the NA-196 constituency which is occupied by Javed Iqbal Warraich of the PPP. ASWJ will not field a candidate for the NA-186 constituency, which will be contested by PML-N’s Riaz Hussain Pirzada, who recently switched allegiances from the PML-Q. ASWJ will also try its best to convince Maulana Moeen Wattoo to let MNA Mian Khadim Hussain contest the NA-188 constituency.

Sources said that if PPP MNA Jamshed Dasti decides to contest the NA-177 constituency, then ASWJ might field Malik Ishaq or his son Malik Usman for the seat. ASWJ will support PML-N’s candidate for the NA-156 constituency. ASWJ will also support PML-N candidates for all seats of Faisalabad, Sheikhupura, Gujranawala, Sheikhupura divisions and some areas of Sargodha.

Speaking to The Express Tribune, Ludhyanvi confirmed the talks between PNL-N and ASWJ and said the recent support and cooperation between the two would continue. “Both parties could not do without each other and history shows that our voters are willing to see us united,” he added.

Malik Usman told The Express Tribune the decision on which constituencies the ASWJ will contest will be taken by the party itself.

PML-N’s Central Information Secretary Mushahidullah Khan said that although the party was in talks with religious parties, he could not share details of the talks with ASWJ as its discussions were still ongoing.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 30th, 2012.