Nasrallah charges the STL with using faulty evidence and neglecting Israel's role

For a background analysis of the situation, see here . To watch the full speech with translation, see here.



Further,

'Israel spies waging war on Hezbollah'
PressTV, Nov 28, 2010
Source

Hezbollah has accused the US-backed UN tribunal, investigating the assassination of the country's former premier, of disregard for Israel's role in the murder.

On Sunday, the Lebanese resistance movement's Secretary General Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah delivered a speech, accusing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon of using faulty procedures, including issuing convictions in absentia and hiding witness identities.

"In international tribunals, we never have sentences made in absentia. Indictments are made, but they never hold a trial until the accused comes [and is] present in front of the judge," he said.

Withholding the identity of the witnesses, Nasrallah said, means "those who are accused can never question the witness. They can never ask the witness "where did you see me? What are accusing me [of]? Based upon what?"

The former Lebanese leader Rafiq Hariri was killed alongside more than 20 other people in a massive car bombing in the Lebanese capital, Beirut on February 14, 2005.

Nasrallah said in July, 2010 that he had been informed by the slain leader's son and successor, Saad Hariri, that STL "will accuse some undisciplined [Hezbollah] members." Nasrallah has rejected the allegation, warning that the plot was part of "a dangerous project that is targeting the resistance."

During his speech, the resistance leader questioned the neutrality of the court, saying the United Nations Security Council is an instrument in the hands of Washington.

In an August speech, he presented evidence proving that Israel had masterminded Hariri's assassination. The televised address featured a video captured by Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as recorded confessions by Israeli fifth columnists, substantiating that Tel Aviv had been behind the killing.

On Monday, leading Lebanese newspaper As-Safir also warned of the "intensive" pressure, Washington is applying under the slogan of "no discussions before indictment is issued."

Political analysts have warned that such indictments are meant to sow discord in Lebanon.

Hezbollah would accept the indictment issued by the tribunal only if it is supported by credible evidence, Nasrallah said.

He further broached the issue of Tel Aviv's spying on Beirut.

Nasrallah confirmed the news about Israeli-waged intelligence warfare against the country, which aims to incriminate members of the resistance movement in espionage.

He recounted how Tel Aviv would "implant" phone lines in the telephone devices used by Hezbollah members.

Aided by technical experts and the Lebanese Army Intelligence, the movement carried out "a comprehensive investigation" into the matter.

"We discovered that there are two phone lines in the telephone. One, which belongs to the individual and another, which was planted by the Israelis," Nasrallah said.

"And in your telephones, they can plant numbers, which you have no idea about and they can make phone calls by these numbers. The Israelis can make phone calls to these numbers and hence they can make it look like you're a spy…."

A Friday report by the leading Lebanese daily As-Safir showed that Israeli infiltrators used duplicated numbers to contact the telephone devices.

The newspaper warned that the application of the numbers, which appeared to be coming in from Austria, marked "serious chapters" of Israel's ability to control Lebanon's telecommunications sector.

The report, however, hailed that members of Hezbollah's security service, the Army Intelligence bureau and a number of employees at the country's Telecommunications Ministry had been able to cope with Tel Aviv's techniques and advanced software.

The act of domestic defense, it added, was enabled through several tests and tryouts.

On Tuesday, Hassan Fadlallah, a parliamentarian representing the resistance said Israel had arranged for the sale of doctored phones to some Hezbollah members, enabling wiretapping of their communications and dispatch of Tel Aviv-desired texts, Lebanese portal Naharnet reported.

"After a lengthy, complex investigation ... it was revealed that three resistance members were using local mobile phones which had been deliberately sold to them after being implanted with secret Israeli lines" by a Tel Aviv-hired Lebanese, said Fadlallah, who also chairs the parliament's media and telecommunications committee.

Also on Tuesday, Lebanon's Minister of Telecommunications Charbel Nahas said Beirut had found new evidence confirming the infiltration of Israeli espionage apparatuses into the telecommunications sector.

The resistance leader similarly spoke of the infiltration, adding that Tel Aviv was using wiretapping against all Lebanese people.

Lebanon has arrested more than 100 people, including members of the country's security forces and telecommunications personnel, since April 2009 on suspicion of spying for Israel.

Beirut has also filed a complaint to the United Nations over Israel's espionage activities within the country, expressing concerns that Israeli agents have gone as far as spying on the Lebanese President Michel Sleiman and other top officials.

The letter bewailed that the spy networks "constitute an aggression on Lebanon and on its sovereignty in a clear violation of international resolutions, particularly [the United Nations Security Council] resolution 1701."

The resolution ended Tel Aviv's 2006 war on Lebanon that killed about 1,200 Lebanese, most of them civilians.

Israeli agents had been responsible for targeted killings, the letter said.

A number of the suspected Israeli operatives, captured in Lebanon, have admitted to their roles in helping Israel identify targets inside Lebanon, mostly belonging to Hezbollah.

Nasrallah further criticized some Lebanese official for remaining silent on Israeli espionage activities in Lebanon.

HN/PKH/MMN

Rannie Amiri: Hariri's House of Cards

Hariri's House of Cards
By Rannie Amiri, CounterPunch, Oct 1-3
Source

“Have a little mercy on the Lebanese. People were considerate with you at first because your father is a martyr, but today they have become bored with you. You are playing with the country, not with PlayStation.”

– Lebanese Unification (Tawhid) Movement leader Wiam Wahhab, in comments directed to Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, 27 September 2010

A war of words has erupted between Lebanon’s Hezbollah-led March 8 Coalition and Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri’s ruling March 14 Coalition, posing the greatest challenge to Hariri’s leadership yet and threatening the viability of his “national unity” government.

As indictments loom following the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s (STL) investigation into the February 2005 assassination of the late premier Rafiq al-Hariri, his now-prime minister son finds himself trapped between diametrically opposed forces. Those in his parliamentary bloc and own Future Movement back the STL—and importantly, its funding—while the March 8 opposition has called for it to either seriously consider claims of alleged Israeli involvement in Hariri’s killing or be shut down.

The STL is still expected to implicate Hezbollah elements in the murder even after Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah presented intercepted video footage obtained from Israeli reconnaissance drones revealing the path of Hariri’s motorcade and exact location of the attack. He also said Ghassan al-Jedd, a known Israeli spy, was present at the crime scene that day (Jedd later fled to Israel).

Nasrallah’s disclosures came against the backdrop of an extensive crackdown on Israeli espionage rings operating in Lebanon’s security and telecommunications sectors, including the state-owned mobile service provider, Alfa. Having worked for the Mossad for more than a decade, one agent confessed to installing computer programs and planting chips in Alfa transmitters to be used by Israeli intelligence to monitor communications, and locate and target individuals for assassination.

This is significant since the STL is expected to rely heavily on phone records in drawing its conclusions: “A preliminary report by the U.N. investigating team said it had collected data from mobile phone calls made the day of Hariri's murder as evidence,” AFP reported.

The fallout from Rafiq al-Hariri’s killing dramatically reshaped Lebanon’s relationship with Syria. Both the slain leader’s allies and son quickly pointed an accusatory finger at Damascus. Events that subsequently transpired became known as the “Cedar Revolution” and ultimately led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon after a 29-year presence in March-April 2005.

This made Saad al-Hariri’s recent about-face all the more stunning.

In an early September interview with the Saudi-owned newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat, Hariri said he had mistakenly blamed Syria for his father’s assassination. He withdrew what he called a “political” accusation and apologized.

But some would not let Hariri off the hook so easily.

Brigadier General Jamil al-Sayyed was Lebanon’s former head of general security at the time the massive bomb detonated under Hariri’s motorcade. He along with three other pro-Syrian generals were arrested in August 2005 and jailed for nearly four years—without charge—on suspicion of involvement in the crime. They were ordered released by the Tribunal in 2009 due to fabricated, recanted witness testimony and lack of evidence.

Al-Sayyed said Saad al-Hariri had “sold his father’s blood” by way of false witnesses so he could frame Syria for the murder:

“You [Saad al-Hariri], those who are with you and [former Prime Minister Fouad] Siniora know that you have been exercising falsification since the beginning … Had the false witnesses managed to cheat the court and had you accepted that, would you be apologizing today or would you be dancing in Damascus with the new leader you installed?

“But one day, I will take what is rightfully mine with my own hands if you do not give it to me …”

State prosecutor Said Mirza summoned al-Sayyed from France for the implied threat to Hariri and his call for the Lebanese people to revolt against the government. When he arrived at Beirut’s international airport, Hezbollah representatives met him in force and escorted him home. March 14 supporters said that the action amounted to an airport takeover meant to protect al-Sayyed from arrest.

The fact that fabricated witness testimony once used to incriminate Syria may now be directed Hezbollah’s way is obviously not lost on the March 8 Coalition.

Hezbollah M.P. Hasan Fadlallah said, “When we talk about this issue, we don't only refer to four or five people who gave false testimonies during the investigations in the murder of (former) premier (Rafiq) Hariri. These are only one ring of the rings of false witnesses, and maybe the weakest and smallest ring in this dossier. We want this group dismantled, the heads of this group unveiled and the case followed up at the judicial, legal and political levels in Lebanon, so that it faces trial and accountability.”

Hariri has a number of fateful decisions on his hands: to proceed with or table the STL finance bill (Lebanon pays 49 percent of the Court’s cost and Hezbollah has already vowed to block it); to enforce the summons against Gen. al-Sayyed or prosecute the false witnesses; and most significantly, to decide whether to back the STL verdict likely blaming Hezbollah despite evidence of Israeli complicity. If so, March 8 ministers (holding one-third of cabinet seats) could pull out of his administration, plunging the country into an even deeper political crisis.

Hariri’s government is now more fragile than ever; a proverbial house of cards erected on fabricated witness testimonies and one likely to be brought down by the upcoming indictments of a discredited tribunal.

Rannie Amiri is an independent Middle East commentator. He may be reached at: rbamiri [at] yahoo [dot] com.

Ahmadinejad meets Nasrallah and Assad in Syria: What is the significance?

Here is one perspective. See here if this video does not play.

Defending the Palestinian Cause on Jon Stewart's Daily Show

The Daily Show With Jon Stewart	Mon - Thurs 11p / 10c
Exclusive - Anna Baltzer & Mustafa Barghouti Extended Interview Pt. 1
www.thedailyshow.com
Daily Show Full Episodes Political Humor Health Care Crisis

(Do watch the second part too)

The interview showed the human and rational face of the Palestinian resistance not widely known to the general American viewers. It moved beyond the usual morality tale of 'poor Israelis facing genocidal-minded Arabs/Muslims' . It must have impressed upon the viewers that Palestinians, like Israelis, may also have legit concerns and need to be heard too.

My concern with that interview and with many others out there chanting 'peace, peace, non-violence, non-violence' is that sometimes they are used to de-legitimize militant resistance (as 'irrational' and 'unjustifiably violent'). It takes attention away from the whole history of Israeli atrocities by focusing too much on - and even blaming at times - the victims for responding with violence in defense. (Same goes for the case of Lebanon.) The 'peace, peace' slogans at times neglect the fact that the international community has failed to deliver any positive results in the last sixty years. So far the only thing that has been directly effective against the Israeli expansionism is militant resistance.

That said I don't think Anna believes that militant resistance is wrong in principle. I was in one of her presentations last year where she emphasized the role of historical atrocities which led Palestinians to adopt violent tactics. From what I understand, she would not want to de-legitimize the militant resistance, although she might believe that non-violence is preferable and more effective. (I don't know the position and politics of Mustafa Barghouti.)

I think the resistance in Palestine as well as Lebanon would also prefer non-violence over violence. The difference really is on the question of 'efficacy' of violent vs. non-violent tactics. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was largely non-violent. Even scholars of non-violent movements acknowledge that fact.

The distinction between principle and tactic is important here. We would be arguing on a very different level if some peace activist believes in non-violence as a principle - that militant resistance is always wrong. (Even Gandhi made exceptions to that principle!)

But if it is a matter of tactic with non-violence as the preferred method, then the implication is that if legit resistance-s choose militant tactics in Palestine or Lebanon, their actions should not be looked down upon by peace activists. Also since it is a matter of tactic (not principle), tomorrow the resistance-s may very well decide to become non-violent, if they feel that time has changed and the international community is more responsive to non-violent tactics and can actually do something to address their grievances.

Back to the interview. Given the imposed limitations in the mainstream media over this issue, I think the interview was a step forward in pushing the limits of the debate. Though it would have been nicer if the two had somehow questioned the framework in which the debate was framed. Joseph Levine's excellent article in Boston Review comes to mind: http://bostonreview.net/BR33.5/levine.php The debate needs to be re-framed from that of ‘Israeli security vs. terrorism’ to ‘Israeli occupation vs. Palestinian resistance’. That is critical.

On Lebanon's Elections

Lebanon's Elections
By Franklin Lamb, Counter Punch, June 8, 2009
Source

Excerpt:

"Today’s predawn stillness was shortly and regularly broken by the crowing of Beirut’s eternal chanters, its roosters. Some from as many as 20 stories up in downtown and Hamra apartment building balconies and roofs, others shunted and jammed into small cages or pits inside the Palestinian Refugee Camps. They seemed to speak and pass messages from the posh neighborhoods of East Beirut to the gypsy shacks and tents near Ouzai, as they welcomed the new day.

The votes have been tallied and the election results show pretty much a status quo ante with the Majority picking up a net four seats (a new total of 71 with 57 for the Opposition) at the expense of the Christian Maronite leader and Opposition ally, former General Aoun and the Free Patriotic Movement. Sometimes contentious in the heat of campaign, the FPM was gracious this morning in conceding its opponents will remain the Majority, if obviously disappointed.

One FPM supporter was in tears and she explained that having been educated abroad, she returned to Lebanon and hoped an Opposition victory would expose and end rampant corruption and the Ziam graft system and she was depressed because she fears things might remain as they have been. Michel de Chadarevian, a member of Gen. Michel Aoun's FPM political bureau told the media that FPM was disappointed with the election result but would respect the outcome and would now work with all parties to form a government of national unity. "Lebanon can only be governed by a national unity government," he said. "Even if we had won we would have formed a national unity government.”

Hezbollah, which won all 11 districts in which it fielded its 11 candidates, and along with its allies won 21 seats in southern Lebanon succeeded in raising its vote tallies, despite a Saudi-funded rival Shai party, Lebanon Option Movement. Hezbollah’s and its allies also won 10 seats in the eastern Baalbek region.

Hezbollah member, Hasan Fadlallah, an MP in the outgoing parliament, explained: “What matters to us now is that Lebanon turns a new page, one based on partnership, cooperation and understanding," he said. "Lebanon's specificity is in its diversity and there is no majority or minority. No party can claim to have won the majority among all communities." Hezbollah MP Mohamed Raad, the Opposition leader in Parliament, reminded his fellow Lebanese that “the majority must commit not to question our role as a resistance party, the legitimacy of our weapons arsenal and the fact that Israel is an enemy state”.

The US administration is reportedly disappointed that their ‘Team’ did not achieve a stronger victory. Just before the voting, the Obama administration allowed Jeffrey Feltman, Deputy Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, in clear violation of Lebanon voting laws, which required no campaigning after midnight on Friday, to blitz the media through carefully timed interviews with pro-Majority An-Nahar and al-Hayat newspapers, with his personal calls for the Lebanese to have enough intelligence to vote as Feltman saw fit. Many Lebanese resented the additional interference in which Feltman announced: "The election's outcome will naturally affect the world's stance towards the new Lebanese government and the manner in which the United States and Congress deal with Lebanon. I believe the Lebanese are smart enough to understand that there will be an effect.”

Feltman attacked the head of the Free Patriotic Movement MP General Michel Aoun, lecturing Lebanese voters: "one of your politicians is proposing that Christians shouldn't depend on the United States. I hope the Lebanese had accurately listened to the president's [Barack Obama] speech that specifically pointed to the widest Christian religious minority in Lebanon, the Maronites. The president spoke about the need for respecting all peoples in the region including minorities…I hope the Lebanese would ask themselves: do we want to be on the side of the international community and close to the stances that president Obama made? I hope they would say, yes."

The June 7, 2009 election has done little to change the political landscape here. It was never a question of an Islamic Republic if the Opposition had decisively prevailed or whether Hezbollah’s weapons would be decommissioned before Lebanon was able to defend itself. Nor was it in question that a slim majority by either side would not require a renewed commitment to the Taef Accord calls and the full implementation of all the clauses and the need for Parliament to enact a modern electoral law based on proportional representation which a majority in Lebanon desire.

With regard to the noisy issue of the arms of the resistance, there remains insufficient political will in Lebanon to force the issue in Parliament, although Israel has wasted no time insisting on it. The new parliament has important business to conduct, from granting women rights, including the right to confer nationality on their children, to aiding the Palestinian refugees with civil rights until the return to their country and many other pressing social issues..."

Rannie Amiri: Understanding Lebanon's June Elections

Understanding Lebanon's June Elections
By Rannie Amiri, Counter Punch, May 1-3, 2009
Source

“ … it is in the interest of Lebanon and its stability that there is understanding and partnership among Lebanese in running their country's affairs.”

– Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, on Lebanon’s upcoming parliamentary elections

“We will not take part in the government if the [Hezbollah-led] March 8 Alliance wins the elections ... ”

– Parliamentary majority leader Saad Hariri

In the Middle East, there are “elections” and there are elections. The majority, when they do occur, invariably fall under the first category. There are a few however, that fall under the second – transparent, legitimate, meaningful contests that have both domestic and regional implications.

One of the most notable took place in January 2006 when Hamas swept Palestinian parliamentary polls, giving them the majority in the Palestine National Council and the ability to form a government. Monitored by the Carter Center, former President Jimmy Carter called them “open, honest, and fair contests.” The reaction they engendered in the U.S., Israel and Egypt – and the subsequent punishment meted out on the electorate – needs little elaboration.

This June, two Middle East countries will be holding elections of consequence a mere five days apart; Lebanon on June 7 and Iran on June 12.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s faceoff against reformist candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mahdi Karroubi was recently discussed.

Due to the Lebanon’s complex, sectarian-based political framework, understanding the mechanics and dynamics behind its upcoming parliamentary vote is more complicated.

March 8 vs. March 14

In Lebanon today there are two main political coalitions, dubbed March 8 and March 14.

The March 8 Alliance is named after the date of a massive 2005 Beirut rally organized by Hezbollah that expressed opposition to its disarmament, support for Syria, and resistance to Israel. The coalition is primarily comprised of Hezbollah, Nabih Berri’s Amal party, and the secular Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of General Michel Aoun. Unlike Nasrallah and Berri who are Shia Muslims, Aoun is a Maronite Christian and thus draws support from this and other Christian constituencies.

The March 14 Alliance is also named after the date of a huge 2005 Beirut demonstration, but one decidedly anti-Syrian. It occurred exactly one month after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and heralded the beginning of the “Cedar Revolution.” This ultimately led to the withdrawal of all Syrian troops from Lebanon after 29 years. March 14 is the current Western-backed, ruling coalition and is principally comprised of Sunni, Druze, and Christian parties. It is led Saad Hariri, billionaire son of Rafiq, and his Future Movement forms its largest bloc.

The tension and mutual recriminations between the March 8 and March 14 coalitions dramatically increased after the July 2006 Israeli attack on Lebanon. This led to an 18-month political standoff whereby the country was left without a president and fears of a return to civil war were reignited.

The longstanding stalemate was finally resolved when representative of both sides met in Qatar in May 2008 and the Doha Accord was reached. In the Accord, the March 8 Alliance’s demand of having veto-power over cabinet decisions was granted. Once this and other obstacles were overcome, consensus nominee Michel Suleiman was quickly elected president.

Parliamentary Arithmetic

Next, it is important to appreciate how Lebanon’s parliament is structured.

The Chamber of Deputies, or National Assembly, is made up of 128 seats divided equally between Christians and Muslims. The seats are further subdivided among the nation’s 18 recognized religious sects (Maronite Christians are allotted 34, Orthodox 14, Sunni 27, Shia 27, etc.). It should be stressed that this apportionment is not based on any recent demographic information; Lebanon’s last census was conducted in 1932 and has not been repeated since.

In the National Assembly, the March 14 Alliance holds 70 seats and March 8, 58.

Considering that most all Shia and Sunni candidates belong to March 8 and March 14 respectively, seats held by these two sects are unlikely to change hands and tip the balance either way.

Instead, the deciding factor in the legislative poll will likely be how the Christian vote splits; to Aoun’s FPM or to Christian parties affiliated with March 14. This similarly holds true for the Druze vote which also has parties in both coalitions, but to a lesser extent.

Analysts believe there will be only about 30 truly contested seats, and March 8 need only win an additional seven to gain the parliamentary majority.

Generals Released

A development which may help them achieve that goal occurred this week. Four generals detained without charge for nearly four years in the aftermath of the Hariri assassination were unconditionally released under orders of the UN-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The Tribunal judge concluded there was no evidence to justify their continued detention, which was based solely on recanted witness testimony, and said the generals were no longer considered suspects.

“Our detention was politically motivated and was exploited for four years by the majority. We were jailed by a political decision but were freed by a court ruling,” said one upon his release.

Lebanese judiciary officials who first ordered their detention are close allies of Saad Hariri, and he may indeed suffer the political consequences as demands for their resignation start to grow.

Time For Change?

Based on an expected narrow margin of victory, no sect, group, party, or alliance will be able to effectively govern Lebanon in isolation. The clear necessity to reach across political and religious lines makes Lebanon unique among Arab countries and is exactly what Hassan Nasrallah, in the opening quote, indicated. Unfortunately, it appears Hariri does not think likewise should March 14 be unable to claim victory.

The possibility of replacing a pro-U.S. government in Lebanon, step-child of the equally pro-American Egypt-Jordan-Saudi nexus, caused Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to show up unannounced in Beirut last weekend. Interfering in an election she called for non-interference in, an implicit threat of aid reduction was made should March 8 emerge victorious. Israel is also planning large-scale military exercises on the Lebanese border the week prior to the vote.

Intimidation and threats notwithstanding, Lebanon’s spring elections may serve as yet another example of the dwindling influence of leaders who have unabashedly sided with the U.S. and their policies in the Middle East; whether they be reflexively anti-Iranian, supportive of Israel’s siege and attack on Gaza, or aim to stifle their citizens’ ability to freely express themselves in the media or at the ballot box.

In the latter circumstance, Lebanon is certainly the exception. And on June 7, it has the ability to divorce itself from the U.S.-Israel-Egypt-Jordan-Saudi axis and send a powerful message to the rest of the Arab world: if little Lebanon can do it, so can you.

Rannie Amiri is an independent Middle East commentator. He may be reached at: rbamiri AT yahoo DOT com.

------
Also see, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's speech on May 25, 2009 (with English dubbing) discussing these dynamics.

Bahrain and Pakistan: The Shia Dilemmas

(Bahrain's Shia Majority Claims Discrimination - Al Jazeera - May 1, 2009)



(Bahrain, Poverty Down the Sectarian Lines - CNN - Mar 3, 2007)

IN Bahrain, the rulers are engaged in a concerted effort to shift the demographic make-up along the sectarian lines. In a population of around a million, if the government brings in new Sunni immigrants from Syria, Jordan, and other countries in hundreds of thousands that is surely going to raise concerns among the local Shias who are more than 70-80% of the population.

Another issue is that of fair representation in the parliament and other political institutions. Bahraini Shias have also demanded fair representation and opportunities in social and cultural spheres. Social includes educational and job opportunities. Cultural includes representation of their voices and cultural symbols in the public sphere. They complain that their voices are underrepresented and their symbols (like Shia mosques) have been literally kept off the main streets of Bahrain.

The Bahraini Shias are also concerned that foreign personnel, usually from South Asia, serve in the law enforcement agencies. One, the selection criteria in this “foreign deputation” (as it is called in Pakistan) for Bahrain is strictly limited to Sunnis. Two, since these personnel usually do not speak Arabic, their contact is minimal with the local population. Tactfully employing religious, linguistic, and ethnic differences and distances indicates the obvious Machiavellian politics on the part of the rulers, who want to maintain their domination at any cost.

The underlying logic of the conflict is that of power and powerlessness, although sectarian communities are certainly being targeted. But the fight is not between Sunni and Shia masses. It is between a marginalized Shia community and the oppressive rulers who are also supported and influenced by the neighboring Arab regimes.

If Shias do get the legitimate rights they are demanding that would effectively shift the political configuration of the Bahraini state. Hence not only the rulers but also the Arab status quo, dictatorial regimes (Saudi, Jordan, Egypt) perceive the Shia demands as a threat. Their strategy has been to blame Iran for causing agitation among Bahraini Shias. Whether Iran is actually doing that or not, those charges certainly distract attention from the oppressive policies of the Bahraini rulers.

Blaming it on Iran or the so-called “the emergence of Shia crescent” also has a broader utility for the geo-politics of the region: Hamas is now labeled as a Shia organization and Lebanese supposedly speak Farsi! The popularity of Hezbollah's and Hamas' and the Iranian leaders in the Arab world and South Asia - among both Sunnis and Shias - creeps out these Arab regimes. These regimes have always been wary of (1.) the rise of any prominent Arab leader on the inter-regional level (like Gamal Abdul Nasser) who might potentially politicize their subjects/populations, and (2.) their Palestinian refugee populations (an example is in the Jordanian Black September of 1970). During and after the Gaza massacre, the provocative statements by these status quo regimes and also the recent move by Morocco to cut ties with Iran are indications of their bewilderment.

How conflicts are framed in the global media therefore becomes very crucial. Also how Shias engage with their Sunni brothers, how they frame their grievances, and how they protest, whether in the West or in other parts of the world, requires active caution and strategic thinking.

Internal vs. External

In the media, the adjective "sectarian" is often used as the description as well as the explanation of the conflict: that the doctrinal differences and supposedly inherent hatred between the two sects explain the nature of the current conflict(s). That's obviously too simplistic - it emphasizes the religious dimensions at the expense of the political. The region-specific dynamics of conflicts are often ignored in the media to create smooth narratives. It is unfortunate that at times many Sunni and Shias also speak in these over generalized terms.

Even if one broadens the scope of explanation to other factors like internal power struggle, socio-economic discrimination, and rivalry among Muslim states, the focus still tends to be on the ‘internal’. The ‘external’ factors, like the role of foreign powers in forging sectarian conflict in colonial and postcolonial eras, are not given adequate weight. Even Vali Nasr's book “The Shia Revival”, although written in a much nuanced manner, couldn't escape this fragmented focus, as the subtitle of his books clearly states: 'How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future." Any prognosis of either Middle Eastern or South Asian politics however is inadequate without factoring in the role and interests of regional and global powers like the US, Israel, India, China, and Afghanistan.

The popularity of the “sectarian conflict” narrative (as both description and default explanation) poses serious challenges to those Shias and Sunnis who understand the actual dynamics of the conflicts in different regions and want to change the situation. How to raise voice against the injustice but at the same time not promote or multiply the effects of sectarian tensions? Especially considering that conflict in one region - say in Iraq or Bahrain - can have ripple effects on sectarian relations in other parts of world.

The Geo-political Connections

After the unexpected outcome of the summer 2006 Israeli war and then the recent loss of Israel in Gaza, both of which were also bitter losses for the US and the Arab status quo regimes, it became quite predictable that there will be an escalation in sectarian violence in sensitive regions of the world. The Saudi authorities, it seems, are deliberately trying to fan sectarian tensions using one tactic or another (for example, their recent move to put barriers around Jannatul Baqi.) [Edit May 20, 2009: See also here and here]

In Pakistan, the agencies-supported SSP (Sipahe Sahaba) and its allies re-surfaced last year. The connection among these security agencies, the militant SSP, and the Saudis is no secret. (Saudis, it seems, are also trying to revive the old Taliban in Afghanistan.) If the local militant groups in Pakistan were not allied with certain Taliban factions before, according to a recent NYTimes report (April 14, 2009), they are now.

The broader goal, it seems, is to keep both Shias and Sunnis in Pakistan busy. To break their united position on the Palestine and Lebanese resistance movements through the sectarian card. The local and national political circumstances in various regions of Pakistan are making this task (of fanning sectarian conflict) easily achievable (for example the recent clashes in Karachi).

Within this broad geo-political framework, one can see a parallel with the Shia dilemma in 1998 when the Taliban killed a number of Iranian officials in Mazar Sharif and there was a growing pressure on Iran to attack the Taliban in response, while in Pakistan the SSP and Lashkare Jhangvi were ready to do mass killing of Shias if Iran had attacked the Taliban. The two conflicts would have been framed together as a Sunni-Shia war, like the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, which was also instigated and framed likewise.

During the 18-month long siege of Parachinar, Pakistani Shias faced the same dilemma: if they complain that they are being targeted, the conflict will be framed as a sectarian conflict. The criminal elements and the local and foreign Taliban who were attacking them would be presented as representing the Sunni sentiments in Pakistan. The Shias knew that these criminal elements wanted to spread the conflict to the rest of Pakistan (the SSP leaders have repeatedly said that they are targeting Shias in D.I. Khan and other areas because "Sunnis" are being targeted in Parachinar.) The dilemma and challenge, again, was to speak out for justice and struggle for the legitimate rights without falling in the trap of "sectarian conflict".

The dynamics of the political conflict in Bahrain highlights both the country-specific causes and the geo-political connections. Given the variety of power configuration in different regions, Pakistan is a much more complicated case. Especially at stake at the moment are 1. The future of Islamist politics vis-a-vis liberal-secular prescriptions from inside and outside of Pakistan. And the fragile democracy: More and more people are talking about how things were much better under the military rule. 2. The political and economic stability. If the downward spiral continues, we may see a regime change very soon, possibly in the next two months: Either a direct military coup or a compromise between the US and the Pakistani military on Nawaz Sharif type character as a replacement 3. Pakistan's Nuclear assets. Both of these cases - Bahrain and Pakistan - highlight the dilemmas mentioned above.

If this analysis has any weight, Muslims - both Shias and Sunnis - in different regions of the world need to be extra-cautious in how they perceive and respond to any provocation - real or imaginary - from any side.

After Gaza

Gaza war ended in utter failure for Israel - By Gideon Levy - Ha'aretz, January 22, 2009

Another War, Another Defeat - By John J. Mearsheimer, The American Conservative, January 26, 2009

How do we resolve the Palestine-Israel Conflict? - By Ali A., Gaza Awareness, January 25, 2009

What's Really Behind the Israeli Attacks in Gaza?

The Israeli air strikes in Gaza have already killed more than 350 people. Below is a good four-point summary by Neve Gordon on what might be the objectives behind. Would like to add in the first point though that the objective may not be to kill Hamas, although Israel would certainly wish that. But - as the below article also states - that is not realistic. I think Israel also understands that quite well. They tried that with Hezbollah in 2006, and failed miserably. Like Hezbollah, Hamas enjoys mass support among the Palestinians and throughout the Arab/Muslim world. The Israeli objective is probably to force Hamas into a settlement based on conditions of Israel's choosing. The objective is to cut Hamas' hands, logistical and moral. Logistical in terms of further restricting their movement and activities. Moral in terms of de-legitimatizing their cause in the eyes of the world should they engage in violent resistance in future against any Israeli aggression. That also appears to be the goal behind the economic blockade in Gaza for the last several months. Haaretz reports that Israeli "Defence Minister Ehud Barak instructed the Israel Defense Forces to prepare for the operation over six months ago, even as Israel was beginning to negotiate a ceasefire agreement with Hamas." The report also notes that about a month ago Israel deliberately flared up the tension by carrying out a military incursion in Gaza during the ceasefire.

One may also add another possibility here. Preparing vigorously since the end of the summer 2006 Lebanon war, Israel's objective may be to open two fronts, the other being South Lebanon. The objective may be limited to regaining its aura of 'invincibility' (or power of deterrence) by launching effective air raid campaigns on Gaza and South Lebanon (see point three in the below article). But the plan may also be wider in scope. Some reports indicate that Israel has already asked its residents in the North, close to the Lebanese border, to take precautionary measures, and be ready to move into protective shelters. Eight Katyusha rockets were found by a farmer on Thursday (Dec 25) in a valley in South Lebanon, two miles from the Israeli border. They were fitted with timers and set to launch on late Thursday night. This was before the Israel air raids started in Gaza on Saturday (Dec 27). In a speech on Sunday, Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah suggested that Israel may be looking for an excuse to attack South Lebanon, and, if Hezbollah were to make any strikes on Israel, it would do it openly. He also suggested that Israel wants to make use of the transitional period in the White House and create conditions that will shape the possibilities and constraints for the next incumbent. Nasrallah reminded people to be vigilant against Israeli plots.

On a related note, I don't think Nasrallah expects anything out of ordinary from Obama's administration. Given the team of 'hawkish-pragmatists' that Obama has assembled around himself, if that is any indicator, it seems that there won't be any significant changes to the current US policy toward the Palestine-Israel conflict. Rather it seems likely that we will see a continuation of 'creating a new middle east' agenda, under one pretext or another. The agenda is supported not only by Israel but also many Arab regimes. The current onslaught in Gaza is probably part of that plan. The US and the Arab regimes all have given a green signal to Israel.

Like in 2006 when they blamed Hezbollah, this time the status quo Arab regimes (Saudi, Egypt, Jordan) are blaming Hamas. Over the past few years, as Seymour Hersh and other noted journalists have pointed out, these regimes have actively collaborated with Israel and America to crush the resistance in Gaza and Lebanon (and the anti-dictatorial movements in their own countries).

What, Exactly, is Israel's Mission?
By Neve Gordon, CounterPunch, December 29, 2008
Source

The first bombardment took three minutes and forty seconds. Sixty Israeli F-16 fighter jets bombed fifty sites in Gaza, killing over two hundred Palestinians, and wounding close to a thousand more.

A few hours after the deadly strike, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert convened a press conference in Tel-Aviv. With Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni sitting on his right and Defense Minister Ehud Barak on his left, he declared: “It may take time, and each and every one of us must be patient so we can complete the mission.”

But what exactly, one might ask, is Israel’s mission?

Although Olmert did not say as much, the “mission” includes four distinct objectives.

The first is the destruction of Hamas, a totally unrealistic goal. Even though the loss of hundreds of cadres and some key leaders will no doubt hurt the organization, Hamas is a robust political movement with widespread grassroots support, and it is unlikely to surrender or capitulate to Israeli demands following a military assault. Ironically, Israel’s attempt to destroy Hamas using military force has always ended up strengthening the organization, thus corroborating the notion that power produces its own vulnerability.

The second objective has to do with Israel’s upcoming elections. The assault on Gaza is also being carried out to help Kadima and Labor defeat Likud and its leader Benjamin Netanyhu, who is currently ahead in the polls. It is not coincidental that Netanyahu’s two main competitors, Livni and Barak, were invited to the press conference – since, after the assault, it will be more difficult for Netanyahu to characterize them as “soft” on the Palestinians. Whether or not the devastation in Gaza will help Livni defeat Netanyhu or help Barak gain votes in the February elections is difficult to say, but the strategy of competing with a warmonger like Netanyhu by beating the drums of war says a great deal about all three major contenders.

The third objective involves the Israeli military. After its notable humiliation in Lebanon during the summer of 2006, the IDF has been looking for opportunities to reestablish its global standing. Last Spring it used Syria as its laboratory and now it has decided to focus on Gaza. Emphasizing the mere three minutes and forty seconds it took to bomb fifty sites is just one the ways the Israeli military aims to restore its international reputation.

Finally, Hamas and Fatah have not yet reached an agreement regarding how to proceed when Mahmoud Abbas ends his official term as President of the Palestinian National Authority on January 9th, 2009. One of the outcomes of this assault is that Abbas will remain in power for a while longer since Hamas will be unable to mobilize its supporters in order to force him to resign.

What is clearly missing from this list of Israeli objectives is the attempt to halt the firing of Qassam rockets into Israel’s southern towns. Unlike the objectives I mentioned, which are not discussed by government officials, this one is presented by the government as the operation’s primary objective. Yet, the government is actively misleading the public, since Israel could have put an end to the rockets a long time ago. Indeed, there was relative quiet during the six-months truce with Hamas, a quiet that was broken most often as a reaction to Israeli violence: that is, following the extra-judicial execution of a militant or the imposition of a total blockade which prevented basic goods, like food stuff and medicine, from entering the Gaza Strip. Rather than continuing the truce, the Israeli government has once again chosen to adopt strategies of violence that are tragically akin to the one’s deployed by Hamas, only the Israeli ones are much more lethal.

If the Israeli government really cared about its citizens and the country’s long term ability to sustain itself in the Middle East, it would abandon the use of violence and talk with its enemies.

Neve Gordon is the chair of the Department of Politics and Government, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel, and is the author of Israel’s Occupation, University of California Press, 2008. His website is www.israelsoccupation.info

Lebanese Shiite cleric opposes US-Iraq pact

Lebanese Shiite cleric opposes US-Iraq pact
AP, October 21, 2008
Source

BEIRUT, Lebanon: Lebanon's top Shiite cleric criticized Tuesday a proposed U.S.-Iraqi security pact, saying the Baghdad government has no right to "legitimize" the presence of foreign troops.

Iraqi-born Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah says any security pact should call for an imminent and unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.

Fadlallah's edict came in response to questions by some Shiite members of Iraq's parliament who asked the cleric to give his opinion about the proposed security pact.

The cleric was born in the Iraqi Shiite holy city of Najaf and wields some influence among Iraq's Shiite majority. He is one of the founders of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa Party.

"No authority, establishment or an official or nonofficial organization has the legitimacy to impose occupation on its people, legitimize it or extend its stay in Iraq," Fadlallah said in the edict released by his office.

The agreement provides for American troops to leave Baghdad and other Iraqi cities by the end of June and fully withdraw from the country by the end of 2011 unless the government asks them to stay.

It would also give Iraq limited authority to prosecute U.S. soldiers and contractors for crimes committed off-base and off-duty, limit U.S. authority to search homes and detain people and give Iraqis more say in the conduct of American military operations.

Fadlallah said that any pact should call for an "unconditional withdrawal of occupation forces from Iraq," and put a "fixed and imminent timetable for a complete American withdrawal from Iraq."

He added that no U.S. bases or centers should be allowed to stay adding that any American presence would have to be based on normal diplomatic missions.

Fadlallah added that the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq should not be linked to the improvement of the security situation in the country because the Americans can cause security problems in order to extend the stay of their forces.
---
See IS comments on this issue, Thousands in Iraq protest security pact with US.

Also see,
Iraq Cabinet seeks changes in security pact with US, LA Times, October 21, 2008
Cleric in Iran issues fatwa against US-Iraqi pact, AP, October 21, 2008
Gates gives warning on US-Iraq pact, Aljazeera, October 21, 2008
Will Iraq finally end the colonial era?, By Rami G. Khouri, Daily Star, October 22, 2008

Millions Honor International Quds Day

Muslims of the World Honor International Quds Day
Millions of people around the world held massive rallies on the International Quds Day in support of Palestinian people's rights.
Press TV, September 26, 2008
Source

Demonstrations are underway in different countries, including Iran, Iraq, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf states, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and the city of al Quds (Jerusalem).

International Quds Day, an initiative of the late Founder of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini, is observed in all Islamic nations. Demonstrations by Muslims and concerned individuals worldwide show support for the Palestinian people suffering under occupation and hardship.

Quds Day is held on the fourth Friday of the fasting month of Ramadan every year.

People in several other countries also honored the occasion.

Millions of Iranians took to streets throughout the country to show solidarity with the Palestinian people.

According to Press TV reporter in Tehran, hundreds of thousands turned out in the capital city of the Islamic Republic.

According to our correspondents in al-Quds, Palestinians have staged the same demonstration to protest the six-decade-old occupation by the Jewish regime.

In Iraq, thousands of people marked September 26, the last Friday of Ramadan, by staging massive demonstrations in Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, and al-Amarah.

The demonstrators, carrying banners and pictures of Imam Khomeini expressed their resentment against the Israeli regime and its allies, especially the United States.

Hundreds in Bangladesh staged rallies in the capital Dhaka to commemorate the day.

Millions of Palestinian people have been forced to flee their homeland since the establishment of the occupying regime of Israel in 1948.

The demonstrators are also calling for an end to Israel's illegal control of al-Quds.

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Also See

The News: Quds Day Observed Countrywide

Press TV: Pakistanis show solidarity with Palestine

Muslims in Pakistan mark Al Quds Day with big rallies and protest demonstrations

AlQuds Day Observed in Pakistan

Lebanon Jews Tap Diaspora to Rebuild Beirut's Shelled Synagogue

Lebanon Jews Tap Diaspora to Rebuild Beirut's Shelled Synagogue

By Massoud A. Derhally, Bloomberg.com, September 17, 2008

Source

Sept. 18 (Bloomberg) -- In 1983, Isaac Arazi and his wife were caught in sectarian fighting during Lebanon's 15-year civil war. A Shiite Muslim militiaman helped the couple escape.

Arazi, a leader of Lebanon's tiny Jewish community, sees the incident as a lesson in the Arab country's tradition of tolerance. Now he is trying to make use of that tradition, along with the global diaspora of Lebanese Jews, in a drive to rebuild Beirut's only synagogue, damaged during the war.

``Those who don't have a past don't have a future,'' Arazi said to explain his push to rebuild the synagogue.

Beirut's Maghen Abraham Synagogue opened in 1926 in Wadi Abou Jmil, the city's Jewish quarter, located on the edge of west Beirut near the Grand Serai palace, where the government meets, and within walking distance of parliament.

Lebanon then was something of a haven for Jews, some of whom were the descendants of those who had fled the Spanish inquisition; it later served a similar role for refugees from Nazi Germany. With ``no history of anti-Jewish tensions,'' it was the only Arab country whose Jewish population rose after Israel's creation in 1948, according to Kirsten Schulze, a lecturer at the London School of Economics and author of ``The Jews of Lebanon.''

By the mid-1960s, there were as many as 22,000 Lebanese Jews, said Arazi, 65. In addition to heading the Jewish Community Council he owns a food-machinery business with 1,000 customers.

All Together

``Christians, Muslims and Jews were all living together when I was growing up,'' said Liza Srour, 57. ``Whenever there was a war with Israel, or tension, the government used to provide protection for us.''

That changed with the nation's 1975-1990 civil war, as Jews fled the violence triggered by rivalries among the nation's Christian, Muslim and Druze factions and emigrated to Europe, North and South America.

Now, Arazi said, only 100 Jews live permanently in the country, while another 1,900 go back and forth or have intermarried into other religions. Srour is the only Jew still residing in Wadi Abou Jmil.

In 1982, according to an Associated Press report at the time, Israeli shells tore through roof of Maghen Abraham as the Jewish state invaded southern Lebanon in an effort to crush Palestinian guerrillas. The synagogue has been closed ever since, its brittle entrance gate chained and padlocked. Plaster and rubble are scattered on the floor.

Political Calm

Arazi figures it will cost about $1 million to restore the synagogue. Making the effort possible is the end of an 18-month crisis between Lebanon's political factions, the blessing of the Lebanese government, financial support from a downtown reconstruction project and acquiescence from the Shiite Hezbollah movement that fought a month-long war against Israel in 2006.

He so far has raised about $40,000 for the project, but has promises of more. Ten percent of the estimated cost will come from Solidere SAL, a company founded in 1994 by then-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri -- later assassinated in a bombing supporters blame on Syria -- to rebuild the capital's downtown.

The company has given $150,000 to each of 14 religious organizations that are restoring places of worship in Lebanon -- about $2.1 million in all. ``We help all the communities,'' said Solidere chairman Nasser Chammaa.

The Safra family, whose Safra Group includes Brazil's Banco Safra SA and Safra National Bank of New York and which was based in Lebanon in the 1940s as part of the Jewish community, has agreed to help fund the project once work begins, Arazi said.

Financial Help

Joseph R. Safra, nephew of Republic National Bank of New York founder Edmond Safra, said: ``We do not comment on private matters.'' Joseph Safra heads Arview Holdings, Inc., a New York financial-consulting and advisory firm.

Two banks in Switzerland whose founders have Lebanese- Jewish roots also agreed to provide financing, Arazi said. One of the banks has pledged $100,000 toward the synagogue's restoration. Arazi declined to name the banks.

Even the warring factions in Lebanon's government have blessed the project. ``This is a religious place of worship and its restoration is welcome,'' Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, 65, said in an interview. Hussain Rahal, a spokesman for Hezbollah, said his group -- which refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist, and which the West considers a terrorist organization -- also supports the restoration of Maghen Abraham.

``We respect the Jewish religion just like we do Christianity,'' he said. ``The Jews have always lived among us. We have an issue with Israel's occupation of land.''

Arazi said work on the restoration is to begin next month. Meanwhile, his council is already working on plans for its next project: restoring Beirut's Jewish cemetery, where about 4,500 people are buried.

Walking among the weeds overgrowing the cemetery's tombstones, Arazi said: ``I remember my father when I come here.''

To contact the reporter on this story: Massoud A. Derhally in Beirut at mderhally@bloomberg.net

The Shia-Sunni divide: myths and reality

The Shia-Sunni divide: myths and reality

Omayma Abdel-Latif examines the causes, and effects, of the growth of sectarian rhetoric across the region

Al-Ahram, March 1-7, 2007

Source

As the US-led occupation of Iraq enters its fifth year, conflicts and political rivalries in the region appear to be assuming a sectarian edge unseen since the 1982-1989 war between Iraq and Iran.

The debate over why this should be so is increasingly dominated by two approaches. Proponents of the first argue that concepts corruption, autocracy, occupation, nationalism, etc..., can no longer explain the range of conflicts and alliances within the region. "It is, rather, old feuds between Shia and Sunnis which will forge attitudes and define prejudices," writes Vali Nasr in his book, The Shia Revival.

As a consequence, argues Nasr and his fellow travellers, sectarian identity will play an increasingly significant role in drawing political lines and determining regional alliances, shaping not just how states and sub-state actors behave but the political attitudes of ordinary people as well. Sectarian-inspired conflicts, along the lines of those seen in Iraq, will come to constitute a major fault line in Middle East politics. Seen from this perspective, the political conduct of Iran or Hizbullah can be explained as a reawakening of Shia identity. By the same token Saudi Arabia's condemnation of Hizbullah as provoking Israel's attack on Lebanon last summer can be reduced to Riyadh's concern over growing Shia influence in Lebanon. Supporters of such a view would also argue that the Saudi Arabian mediation that resulted in the Mecca agreement between the two main Palestinian factions was also a product of Riyadh's desire to reassert Sunni influence. "Saudi Arabia fought to get Hamas back," said Martin Indyk, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, in a recent New York Times interview. Concerned over Tehran's growing influence in Palestine, the Saudis were determined to reassert themselves. Hamas, argued Indyk, may well be viewed as extremists by Riyadh, but at least they are Sunni extremists.

Proponents of the second approach, while acknowledging the role played by sectarian identity in shaping the attitudes of some political actors, argue that other factors, including the foreign policy goals of the countries involved, state structures and chronic regional problems such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, political reform and Washington's Middle East policies, all play a part. While Saudi Arabia views Iran's influence over Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian issue with increasing alarm, they argue, Riyadh acts less out of sectarian motives than concern over the regional balance of power. Tehran's foreign policy, they say, with the exception of Iraq, has transcended communal loyalties to embrace causes that were once the exclusive domain of Arab nationalist forces.

SO IS THERE A SHIA REVIVAL? The discourse on sectarianism is hardly new. The region fell prey to a similar bout of sectarian fever during the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran. In an attempt to rally Arab public opinion former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein resorted to anti-Shia rhetoric which was disseminated through the legions of Arab commentators and intellectuals on the Baathist payroll.

This time round, though, a new element is in play. It has to do with what is perceived as the growing role being played by Arab Shia who many see is making a radical break with a long tradition of political inactivity. Different terms have been coined to describe this phenomenon. Two years ago King Abdullah of Jordan spoke of the emergence of a "Shia Crescent"; more recently commentators have referred to "the rise of the Shia, the Shia wave, Shia awakening and Shia revival".

For those who seek to read the prevailing conditions in the Middle Easy along exclusively sectarian lines the developing Shia identity has been manifested in several ways. For the first time in their history the Shia have been handed power in an Arab country and inspired by the Shia assumption of power in Iraq, argues one of the lead theorists of the Shia revival, Hizbullah is now seeking to replace the Lebanese government headed by Fouad Al-Siniora. Hizbullah opposition is consequently reduced to an attempt to redraw the power-sharing model established by the Saudi- brokered Taif Agreement in 1989. Hizbullah's ambition would not, it is argued, be sustainable without the emergence of Iran as a key regional power with nuclear ambitions. Iran maintains ties with Shia groups across the Arab world, providing them not only with material support but a model state and sense of empowerment.

A number of Lebanese Shia thinkers and academics refute such arguments. The most important fault lines, they insist, are, and will remain, political, not sectarian: the tendency to frame conflict and politics in the Middle East within an exclusively sectarian frame is no more than a rehash of the colonial attempt to reduce the region to a serious of tribes, sects and communal groups rather than viable states.

One of the recurrent themes in the speeches of Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah is his insistence that the Shia "cannot be lumped together in one basket". Nasrallah's assertion is commonly interpreted as an attempt to distance the resistance movement from Shia political groups elsewhere, particularly in Iraq, where they maintain an intimate relationship with their occupiers.

In one of his Ashoura speeches last month, Nasrallah fell just short denouncing Iraq's current rulers as a liability. He was nonetheless keen on emphasising the need to understand political developments in Iraq within an Iraqi context. Such a discourse, coming from the leader of one of the biggest socio-political Shia movements in the Arab and Muslim world, exposes the fallacy of supposing the Shia's rise to power in Iraq as part of some grand Shia design.

It was military success against Israel in Lebanon and not the rise to power of a corrupt ruling elite in Iraq, says one Shia thinker close to Hizbullah, that has empowered the Shia, just as has the Sunnis. What is happening in Iraq, he continues, is not something from which strength can be drawn; rather, the opposite is true, and the Iraqi situation weakens political Shiism.

This seems to be the general consensus among Hizbullah's leaders about the Iraqi situation, complicated as it is by Iranian involvement, the operation of death squads and the ambivalent relationship between occupiers and occupied.

Hizbullah prefers to focus on issues that unite rather than divide. This is not to say that the party has avoided taking a clear-cut stand on sectarian strife in Iraq, Iraqi Shia parties' close ties with the US or even the lack of a fatwa from Shia religious authorities to fight the Americans. Nasrallah's speeches are replete with condemnations of atrocities committed in Iraq regardless of the sectarian identity of the perpetrators. But Hizbullah's leaders believe their focus should be on causes and not effects. The cause, in the case of Iraq and Palestine, is occupation. And it is Iran's support for the Palestinian cause and for resistance movements, according to one Lebanese academic, that has created a favourable Arab public opinion towards Iran despite continuous efforts by pro-US regimes to turn the tide of public opinion in an opposite direction.

A recent Zogby International poll found that close to 80 per cent of Arabs consider Israel and the United States to be the biggest external threats to their security whereas only six per cent cited Iran. The survey of a total of 3,850 respondents in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Morocco and Lebanon was carried out in November and early December. According to the poll less than one in four Arabs believe Iran should be pressured to halt its nuclear programme while 61 per cent, including majorities in all six countries, said Tehran had the right to pursue a nuclear programme even if, as most believe, its ultimate aim is to develop nuclear weapons.

The popular view is a result, says Ali Fayad, head of the Consultative Centre for Strategic and Documentation Studies, a Hizbullah think tank, of Iran's pursuit of Sunni foreign policy goals.

"At the heart of Iran's foreign policy are two key issues; the Palestinian cause and confronting Washington's hegemonic schemes in the region," says Fayad. "There is nothing particularly Shia about the two issues. Indeed both have been presented as the causes for the majority Sunni Arabs. In this sense Iran's foreign policy is Sunni. One can say that the Islamic Republic has transcended the sectarian issue in its foreign policy."

Western hostility towards Iran's nuclear ambitions, says Fayad, is fuelled by Tehran's support of the Palestinians. By the same token Hizbullah's strategy in the Arab-Israeli conflict transcends its communal identity since it serves national and pan-Islamic goals, not sectarian ones.

Iranian policy in Iraq remains for many the weak link in its foreign strategy. Arab commentators from across the board have been scathing of the Iranian regime's failure to hold its Iraqi allies back from falling into the sectarian trap. While Fayad acknowledges that Iraq represents a huge problem he still holds the Americans responsible for working to foment Shia-Sunni strife in Iraq. "We cannot describe the present order in Iraq as a Shia state just as we cannot describe other regimes in the region as Sunni regimes," he says.

So what should be made of the Shia revivalists' claims about Hizbullah's attempts to increase its powers?

Party members, including its leader, have repeatedly said Hizbullah has no ambitions to expand the quotas the Shia have already been allotted within the Lebanese system.

"We are not interested in any redistribution of power," announced one Hizbullah official. The current conflict in Lebanon is over foreign policy, Lebanon's position vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict and the question of Hizbullah's arms. The group has always respected the political mechanisms established by the Taif Agreement and any change, its leaders stress, must target political sectarianism not the system itself.

While many argue that talk of a Shia revival is exaggerated, there are clear signs of growing Shia political activism. The model that is being adopted, though, is the one furnished by Hizbullah and not that of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution. Its arch enemies are the Israeli occupation and US hegemony rather than co-religionists.

SUNNI-SHIA CONFLICT: While there appears to be a consensus that sectarian violence is no longer limited to Iraq but has expanded to influence developments from the Gulf to Lebanon, public debate in the Arab world offers interesting insights about how both sides view the possible repercussions of deepening sectarian divisions.

The consensus in both Sunni and Shia circles appears to be that attempts to emphasise Sunni- Shia rivalries are intended to deflect attention from both the US occupation of Iraq and continuing Israeli aggression. That the US is working to fuel such tensions is almost an article of faith for Muslims on both sides. In its attempt to create an anti-Iran alliance, they say, the US is resorting to a strategy which aims to raise the spectre of sectarianism across the Muslim world.

Even before Seymour Hersh blew the whistle in The New Yorker on Washington's role in fuelling Sunni-Shia tensions, leading Shia and Sunni figures had warned that the US was behind much of the sectarian violence in Iraq and Lebanon.

When, in an Al-Jazeera interview two weeks ago, prominent Shia leader Sayed Mohamed Hussein Fadlullah was asked who it was that is threatened by the Shia he answered, simply, "Israel".

Fadlullah has been a staunch critic of US policy in the region and Sunni-Shia strife has been the subject of the majority of his Friday sermons for months now. In his most recent sermon, Fadlullah accused Washington of replacing its plans to spread democracy with schemes to incite Shia- Sunni sedition. Continuing rhetoric about a Shia revival and false stories about Shiisation of Sunnis were, he said, all part of a scheme to divide the two communities.

Echoing similar views, Mohamed Mahdi Akef, the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, has criticised the increasingly vociferous rhetoric about the rise of Shia influence. He sees it as part of the ongoing efforts to set Shias and Sunnis against one another. Akef blamed the "enemies of Islam and the foreign occupiers for the division and the spirit of hatred which has recently spread".

For these leaders, Hersh's revelations about the US propagation of sectarian divisions in an attempt to make the case against Iran came as no surprise. The fact that the CIA is financing -- through Al-Siniora's government -- Salafi groups in Palestinian camps in Lebanon lends credence to the views put forward by Lebanese writer Jihad Azine. In an article published in the daily An- Nahar two weeks ago Azine questioned US motives in fuelling sectarian strife. "Could it be that the US endgame is to weaken Islam from within," he wrote, "and divert attention from targeting US interests to targeting the Shia?"

What is not clear is whether leaks made to Hersh by CIA officials are meant to increase sectarian tensions in Lebanon.

For months the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar has been publishing reports about Sunni groups receiving military training in Tripoli and in Palestinian camps. In one story published on 10 January Al-Akhbar reported that the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had agreed on a strategy of fostering increased cooperation between Tayyar Al-Mustaqbal and Fatah in an attempt to offset the influence of Hizbullah and Hamas. Although most of the reports are unsourced, the parties mentioned have not issued denials. The newspaper has also reported that Ahmed Al-Khatib, a former leader of the Arab Army, a Lebanese Sunni militia with Nasserist leanings, and Tayyar Al-Mustaqbal were coordinating their activities. Al-Khatib is said to have to have set up recruiting and training centres in the Beqaa Valley. During Lebanon's civil war Al-Khatib fought alongside the Palestinians.

While it would be interesting to explore the type of training and the ideologies that are on offer in such camps a more significant issue when it comes to the Salafi groups and the former Nasserist militia, is just who it is that is being defined as the enemy.

"Sectarian animosity between Sunnis and Shia is a temporary and false construct in Lebanon," insists one Lebanese sociologist. "It might offer a basis for outbreaks of friction here and there but it is not a reason to take a whole sect to war and it's too weak, as yet, to sustain an all out war."

Robert Fisk: How easy it is to put hatred on a map

Robert Fisk: How easy it is to put hatred on a map
Our guilt in this sectarian game is obvious. We want to divide our potential enemies

Saturday, 3 March 2007, The Independent

Source

Why are we trying to divide up the peoples of the Middle East? Why are we trying to chop them up, make them different, remind them - constantly, insidiously, viciously, cruelly - of their divisions, of their suspicions, of their capacity for mutual hatred? Is this just our casual racism? Or is there something darker in our Western souls?

Take the maps. Am I the only one sickened by our journalistic propensity to publish sectarian maps of the Middle East? You know what I mean. We are now all familiar with the colour-coded map of Iraq. Shias at the bottom (of course), Sunnis in their middle "triangle" - actually, it's more like an octagon (even a pentagon) - and the Kurds in the north.

Or the map of Lebanon, where I live. Shias at the bottom (of course), Druze further north, Sunnis in Sidon and on the coastal strip south of Beirut, Shias in the southern suburbs of the capital, Sunnis and Christians in the city, Christian Maronites further north, Sunnis in Tripoli, more Shias to the east. How we love these maps. Hatred made easy.

Of course, it's not that simple. I live in a small Druze enclave in the west of Beirut. But my local grocer and my driver are Sunnis. I suppose they have no business to be in the wrong bit of our map. So do I tell my driver Abed that our map shows he can no longer park outside my home? Or that the Muslim publisher of the Arabic edition of my book The Great War for Civilisation can no longer meet me at our favourite rendezvous, Paul's restaurant in east Beirut, for lunch because our map shows this to be a Maronite Christian area of Beirut?

In Tarek al-Jdeidi (Sunni), some Shia families have moved out of their homes - temporarily, you understand, a brief holiday, keys left with the neighbours, it's always that way - which means that our Beirut maps are now cleaner, easier to understand. The same is happening on a far larger scale in Baghdad. Now our colour-coding can be bolder. No more use for that confusing word "mixed".

We did the same in the Balkans. The Drina Valley of Bosnia was Muslim until the Serbs "cleansed" it. Srebrenica? Delete "safe area" and logo it "Serb". Krajina? Serb until the Croats took it. Did we call them "Croats"? Or "Catholics"? Or both on our maps?

Our guilt in this sectarian game is obvious. We want to divide the "other", "them", our potential enemies, from each other, while we - we civilised Westerners with our refined, unified, multicultural values - are unassailable. I could draw you a sectarian map of Birmingham, for example - marked "Muslim" and "non-Muslim" (there not being many Christians left in England - but no newspaper would print it. I could draw an extremely accurate ethnic map of Washington, complete with front-line streets between "black" and "white" communities but The Washington Post would never publish such a map.

Imagine the coloured fun The New York Times could have with Brooklyn, Harlem, the East River, black, white, brown, Italian, Catholic, Jew, Wasp. Or the Toronto Globe and Mail with French and non-French Canadian Montreal (the front line at one point follows the city Metro) or with Toronto (where "Little Italy" is now Ukrainian or Greek), and colour the suburb of Mississauga green for Muslim, of course. But we don't draw these Hitlerian maps for our societies. It would be unforgivable, bad taste, something "we" don't do in our precious, carefully guarded civilisation.

Passing a book stall in New York this week, I spotted the iniquitous Time magazine and there on the cover - and this might truly have been a 1930s Nazi cover - were two cowled men, one in black, the other largely hidden by a chequered scarf. "Sunnis vs Shi'ites," the headline read. "Why they hate each other." This, naturally, was a "take-out" on Iraq's civil war - a civil war by the way, that America's spokesmen in Baghdad were talking about in August 2003 when not a single Iraqi in his worst nightmares dreamt of what has now come to pass.

Buy Time magazine, dear reader, turn to page 30, and what will you find? "How to Tell Sunnis and Shi'ites Apart." Helpful, uh? And after this, are columns of useful, divisive information. "Names," for example. "Some names carry sectarian markers... Abu Bakr, Omar and Uthman ... men with these names are almost certainly Sunni. Those called Abdel-Hussein and Abdel-Zahra," (I have never in met an "Abdel-Zahra" by the way) "are most likely Shi'ite." Then there are columns headed "Prayer", "Mosques", "Homes", "Accents" and "Dialects", even - heaven spare us - "cars". The last, for those readers not already reeling in disbelief, tells us which car stickers to look out for (spot a picture of Imam Ali and you know the driver is Shia) or which licence plate (Anbar province registrations, for instance) means a probable Sunni driver.

Thanks again. I don't know why the American military doesn't just buy up this week's edition of Time and drop the lot over Baghdad to help any still ignorant local murderers with easy-to-identify targets. But will Time be helping us to identify America's deeply divided society (who has most rubbish in their gardens in Washington, which bumper stickers to look for in Dearborn, Michigan)? Will they hell.

I, too, am guilty of playing these little sectarian games in the Middle East. I ask a Lebanese where he or she comes from, not to remember the mountains or rivers near their home but to code them into my map. But I easily come unstuck. The man who tells me he comes from the Lebanese south (Shia) turns out to live in the southern Druze town of Hasbaya. The woman who tells me she's from Jbeil (Christian) turns out to be from the town's Shia minority. Oh, if only these pesky minorities would go and live in the right bit of our imperial, sectarian maps.

And we go on talking to our Sunni monarchs in the Middle East - we listen to their raving about the "Shia crescent" - no wonder we hate Shia Iran so much. And we go on dividing and scissoring up the lands, and printing more and more of our racial maps and I do wonder most seriously if we wish to promote civil war across this part of the world, and you know what? I rather think we do.