Balochistan CM dismissed after Shia protests throughout Pakistan



Governor’s rule imposed in Balochistan
Dawn, Jan 14, 2013
http://dawn.com/2013/01/14/constitutions-article-234-invoked-to-defuse-tension-in-quetta-governors-rule-imposed-in-balochistan/

QUETTA: The PPP government finally yielded to the protests that had enveloped the entire country over the weekend and Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf announced in front of a gathering of representatives of Hazara Shia community late on Sunday night that the provincial government was being dismissed forthwith and governor’s rule was being imposed in the whole of Balochistan.
“After holding consultations with all the stakeholders, we have decided to invoke Article 234 of the Constitution. Governor’s rule is being imposed in the province and the provincial government is being dismissed,” Mr Ashraf announced in front of the Hazara representatives.

His announcement was welcomed by thousands of Hazara Shias who had been staging a sit-in in freezing cold on Alamdar Road for the last three days along with the bodies of dozens of people killed in bombings on Thursday.

The prime minister took a bold but extremely necessary step of visiting the place in the middle of the night to make the announcement.

Earlier in the day, leaving Interior Minister Rehman Malik to deal with the Qadri march on Islamabad, Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf rushed to Quetta as the government braced itself against countrywide protests.

As night fell the protests had gained so much momentum that when media reports came that the prime minister was considering dismissing the provincial government, they seemed believable.

Protesting the carnage caused by three blasts in the provincial capital on Thursday, Hazaras, along with the unburied bodies of the victims, took to the streets on Friday, saying that the sit-in would not end and the funerals would not take place till the government called in the military to put an end to the attacks.

By Saturday, parallel protests had begun in major cities such as Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad — organised by Shia groups and parties as well as civil society.

On Sunday, these protests seemed to have enveloped the entire country, reducing the long march, which had dominated the political scene for the past few weeks, to a side story.

From Lahore to Karachi to Islamabad to Multan in the south and Skardu in the snow-covered north, the protests drew in more and more people. From religious leaders to women and children, the Pakistanis were united in condemning the targeted killing of an ethnic community and a sect, whose deaths had dominated the stories of violence and mayhem coming out of Pakistan in 2012.

Slogans such as “End to the killings of Shias” reverberated in every city and placards that read “Am I the next victim” were pictured in the hands of men, women and small children.

In Islamabad, the civil society protest continued overnight.

The Shia groups and parties, which had dispersed late on Saturday night, re-appeared and blocked a major road connecting the twin cities. Another protest by the parties also blocked part of the Islamabad-Lahore motorway.

In the opposite end of Pakistan, one group of protesters headed for the heavily protected Bilawal House where President Asif Ali Zardari has been ensconced for weeks. Despite being threatened by water canons — a favoured SOP of the Karachi police — the protest continued.

Other protests in the city were at Malir, M.A. Jinnah Road, Ancholi in Federal ‘B’ Area and North Nazimabad. At most of the protests, women were present in large numbers.

These were not protests that were limited to a particular political party or a particular social class.

Lahore too witnessed protests.

The demonstrations and the anger behind them were so palpable that the political leadership was forced to react in an unprecedented manner. The barrage of criticism directed at the PPP at the centre and in Balochistan had sent the party leadership into feverish activity by Sunday morning.

The prime minister flew into Quetta and was holed up in the Governor’s House all day, accompanied by Information Minister Qamar Zaman Kaira.

There was no news on when he planned to return but there were multiple reports that the PPP was now going to do something it had refused to do earlier when the Supreme Court had observed in its order on the Balochistan security situation case that the
 provincial government had lost its constitutional authority to rule.

The federal government had then refused to touch the provincial government but on Sunday it could no longer hold firm.

Prime Minister Raja Ashraf met provincial ministers, conferred with the governor and Law Minister Farooq Naek on the various options available which included, reportedly, the dismissal of the government and imposition of governor’s rule.

Phone calls went back and forth.

But despite all the activity, the Balochistan chief minister, who is probably the most criticised politician in the country at the moment, and a PPP member, did not return to Pakistan.

By the evening, even politicians were echoing the protesters’ demand to remove him. The MQM, ANP chief Asfandyar Wali and PML-Q leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain demanded that he be removed.

The political leadership was also forced into action by the growing protests.

Imran Khan, the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf chief, turned up at the Quetta protest early on Sunday morning, while the rest of the political leaders also headed for protest destinations in various cities later. Some PML-N leaders showed up at a protest in Lahore while the MQM joined the protesters in Karachi. Even the local Jamaat-i-Islami representative in Islamabad spoke at the civil society protest.

Others were forced to provide sound bites to the media in a bid to show they cared. General (retd) Pervez Musharraf also spoke to news channels on the issue.

All eyes are now on the Bilawal House in Karachi and the Governor’s House in Quetta — only they can now end this wave of anger that has swept the entire country.

— Additional reporting by our correspondents in Quetta, Karachi and Lahore

Is this a Sunni-Shia conflict in Pakistan?

Much has been written on this blog as to why the attacks on the Shias, Barelwi Sunnis, Sufi/Shia/Sunni shrines, imambargahs, muharram processions, and mosques must not be thought of as a "Sunni-Shia" conflict. For one, often the same sectarian groups are behind these attacks. Moreover, there are broader political interests attached to these militant activities (consider for instance the factors involved in 2009 Karachi Ashura bombing; see here and here). Some of these sectarian groups are also linked to the anti-Pakistan Taliban groups, which have also attacked the military and police bases in Pakistan. They are said to have been involved in attacks on political parties as well. While other Taliban groups -- the "good" Taliban -- are still protected by the rogue elements of the state's security agencies. These groups have also aligned themselves with other sectarian outfits.

Within the above context, consider these two pieces of evidence.

1. An Ahle Hadith Cleric Gunned Down; One Militant Caught

This militant was not Shia. Yet in the simplistic numerical aggregations of some journalistic accounts, the killed cleric, belonging to the Sunni Ahle Hadith school, would be categoried as a "Sunni" and the event as a "Sunni-Shia" conflict. Too often this is how the so-called "sectarian" violencde has been viewed. See in this previous post how the 2006 Nishtar Park bombing was blamed on the Shias by a foreign journalist.



http://tribune.com.pk/story/475750/deserted-by-friends-fleeing-suspect-caught-by-mob/

KARACHI (Dec 6, 2012): A target killer was caught red-handed by seminary students after his accomplices escaped but his motorcycle stalled as he tried to flee after killing a cleric in New Karachi.

The prayer leader-cum-seminary teacher of Jamia Masjid-o-Madressa Islamia, Qari Ahsanullah Rasheed, was shot dead on Wednesday evening while he was teaching Quran to the students, Bilal Colony police said.

Three armed men came to the mosque on a motorcycle, witnesses said. One of the three entered the mosque and shot the victim in the head, killing him on the spot. When he went outside, he saw his accomplices had already escaped. He tried to kick-start the motorcycle but as a mob approached him, he started running. He also fired at the crowd, injuring a man in the shoulder, SP Salman Hussain, the New Karachi division police chief, told The Express Tribune. The killer was then handed over to the police.

The accused was later identified as Kashif Shakoor alias Bilal, who lives in Quaidabad. During interrogation, the assassin said he was associated with a militant outfit. “He was directed by someone from Waziristan to kill the victim on suspicion of being a police informer,” said the SP citing the suspect.

The victim, Qari Rasheed, had been associated with the mosque for the past 15 years. The killer and his victim both were from the Ahle Hadith sect, said SP Hussain.

Unconfirmed reports suggested they were also associated with the Jamaatud Dawa but its spokesperson denied, saying the organisation had no links with the mosque, its administration or the men.

Earlier, a young man was shot dead at his car showroom on Shaheed-e-Millat Road, Ferozabad police said. Two armed men on a motorcycle shot Tanvir Hussain Bangash, 28, twice, killing him on the spot, said ASP Ghulam Murtaza Malik. The victim, father of one, lived in PECHS and belonged to the Shia sect.

Suspected militants arrested

A potential attack on an imambargah in Gulshan-e-Iqbal was averted as two suspects allegedly associated with the banned religious outfit, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), were arrested on Tuesday night, Azizabad police said.

Five men in a high-roof vehicle were asked to stop by police in Block-2, Federal B Area but they started firing. After an encounter, Hafiz Hanif and Qari Chiraghuddin were arrested while three of their accomplices escaped, the police said.

The police have identified the other suspects as Qari Ghulam Mohammad, Qari Ghulam Akbar and Riaz. The law enforcers are conducting raids in different neighbourhoods in search of the other alleged militants.

During interrogation, the men admitted they were associated with the LeJ as well as Harkatul Mujahideen and were planning to attack an imambargah in Gulshan-e-Iqbal through an explosives-laden vehicle, said DSP Saleem Akhtar Siddiqui. The suspects were trained in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

The suspects were also involved in collecting funds for their organisations through donations and selling skins of sacrificial animals.

Published in The Express Tribune, December 6th, 2012.

2. A Sectarian Militant Killed in Quetta; belonged to the Levies Force

On September 30, 2012, two gunmen attacked a jewelry shop owned by a Shia Muslim, Abdul Khaliq, in Quetta’s Liaquat Bazar. Khaliq was injured in the attack. The shop's private security guard returned fire and killed one gunman, while the other escaped. The gunman was identified as Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, a sepoy in Balochistan Levies, a paramilitary force, who was posted in Balochistan's Sherani district. In another case, a gunned down attacker turned out to be a part of an anti-terrorism task force. It is rare that an attacker would be killed or captured. But these two cases are sufficient to consider that the anti-Shia outfits have deep penetration and connections. At times, those captured have also been able to "escape" from jail. For instance, two high profile militants, Usman Saifullah Kurd and Shafeeq Rind, had escaped from a tightly secured jail of Anti-Terrorist Force in the Quetta Cantonment area.

Abdul Khaliq, the shop owner in the above case, was a Qandhari Shia. In the last few years, the sectarian outfits have indiscriminately killed hundreds of Shias from Hazara, Qandhari, Punjabi, Saraeki, and other ethnic backgrounds in Balochistan. Over 100 Shias have been killed in 2012 alone.
 

Shia Killing in Quetta - CNBC Pakistan's program in Urdu

Pakistan's CNBCTv program about Shia Killing in Quetta -- Part I CNBCTv program about Shia Killing in Quetta -- Part II CNBCTv program about Shia Killing in Quetta -- Part III

A Letter from Quetta - On the Plight of the Shia Hazaras

Letter from Quetta: ‘I too had a dream, but being a Pakistani Shia, it will remain a dream’
Written by S. Batool, July 13, 2012
Source

It takes a thousand voices to tell a single story, but today here’s the single voice to represent the thousand voices.

Unlike routine days, my phone beeped several times that made me wake up while I was asleep. I checked my phone and my breath was taken away, ‘Plz ask —- If she is alright, Did — go to university today? , Is —- Alright? Make sure if —- is alright…’

The darkest day to be remembered in the history of Pakistan; it was a remote control bomb blast on BUITEMS University Bus. This blast took away 6 lives leaving behind 25+ severely injured talents.

University faculty didn’t utter a single word in condemnation, this was not enough to cut apart an already wounded community that within a two-day gap, another University ‘Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s University, Balochistan’ arranged a separate University bus for Shia Hazara students.

I was in the University that day, rumors circulated that Hazara Shia students are supposed to travel by a separate bus – this was ordered on the call of other communities’ request to the VC of the University. I didn’t doubt VC to be such a sap-head to act upon the call, however, my expectations dusted and we were asked to travel by the separate bus.

Agony hooked my mind. I felt very much alone, was over-whelmed by grief, and I expected sympathy. I found no sympathy; I saw only faces of my co-Hazara Shia students as badly mangled as mine. I looked around, hundreds of eyes were staring. Cruel, pitiless stares. Angry stares, unfeeling cold stares.

You are alone here! I murmured to myself and got on the bus provided. That day ended with utter chaos as we then landed to our places with a bang on our heads. Can they be this selfish? I could have never imagined.

Nevertheless, the next day’s sun arose with which I witnessed courage that ran chills up and down my spine because by then I had decided not to give up and stand against the melting pot of apparent Muslims, but actually terrorist jihadists attacking my faith and those cruel stares leaving me alone the previous day.

“University Buses are jammed for Alamdar Road (where Shia Hazara students reside) “was yet another blow within 2 days. This cracked up my nerves. No transport-No University-No Education, Period.

I frozed, dazed and pinned down. My mind screamed, No! Education is my right!

It was 18 June, 2012 and today it is 11 July 2012 and we are still sitting at homes as no transport facility is provided to us. Is there anyone who could show up a fraction of humanity? , Who could feel that we are also Pakistani and we have the rights to enjoy equal freedom in Pakistan?

Hear me O’ the failed Government; jailing us is not the solution, why don’t you jail those Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) rats whose residents are all known to you? They attacked on the University bus, you jammed it for us. They attacked the Passenger bus for Iran, you jammed that. Tomorrow they will attack us at our homes; will you then shift us to some mountain cage?

O the silent spectators/Government/ISI agencies , wake up, wake up from deep slumber, Today it is us, Tomorrow it will be your own daughters and sons , it is only the matter of interest – This is the only cry of my soul, a deep rumble, shattering the predawn silence.

I once had a dream, a dream of being among the graduates marching around the pavilion in caps and gowns – But being a Shia, it seems it will remain a dream.

Pen it down and know it, we are motivated to exist and resist before the inhuman acts of all the veiled and un-veiled terrorists.

I am leaving now to slay the foe
Fight the battles, high and low
I’ve grown my wings, I want to fly
Seize my victories where they lie
I want to shake the dead souls
though there are dangers , there are fears
Carve my niche, sew my seams.

A hopeful and hopeless Shia Hazara student.

Shia killing on the rise in Pakistan

The last two months have witnessed a surge in Shia killing, with tragic instances in Kohistan (K-PK), Parachinar (FATA), Khanpur (Punjab), and Quetta, Karachi, and D.I. Khan. The causes, again, are complex, and the local, national, and international forces all appear entangled. For one, I doubt that Jundallah (based in the Balochistan province, which claimed responsibility of the Kohistan attack on Feb 28) could have done this attack without support of the local militant groups in that remote area of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (that is, if Jundallah did indeed carry out this attack). Jundallah's Washington connection is also well known. The attackers were also said to be wearing army uniforms.

On the interconnections among various militant groups and their foreign supporters as identified in wikileaks cables, see here.

The Pakistani media -- and police -- often frames the target killing of the Shias as a "sectarian conflict". The label implies that Pakistani Sunni and Shia communities are fighting against each other. That is far from the truth. The label also hides the fact that both Shias and Sunnis have been killed by the same militant groups (for instance, see here and here). The label, moreover, gives a sense of symmetry ("Sunnis kill Shias, then Shias kill Sunnis"), whereas in reality a disproportionally high number of Shias have been killed or injured in recent years. It is more appropriate to call the recent surge as "Shia" killing, not "sectarian" killing. Each incident also requires a nuanced analysis of the causes (consider, for instance, the entangled causes surrounding the December 2009 Ashura blast in Karachi).

Bahrain and Pakistan: The Shia Dilemmas

(Bahrain's Shia Majority Claims Discrimination - Al Jazeera - May 1, 2009)



(Bahrain, Poverty Down the Sectarian Lines - CNN - Mar 3, 2007)

IN Bahrain, the rulers are engaged in a concerted effort to shift the demographic make-up along the sectarian lines. In a population of around a million, if the government brings in new Sunni immigrants from Syria, Jordan, and other countries in hundreds of thousands that is surely going to raise concerns among the local Shias who are more than 70-80% of the population.

Another issue is that of fair representation in the parliament and other political institutions. Bahraini Shias have also demanded fair representation and opportunities in social and cultural spheres. Social includes educational and job opportunities. Cultural includes representation of their voices and cultural symbols in the public sphere. They complain that their voices are underrepresented and their symbols (like Shia mosques) have been literally kept off the main streets of Bahrain.

The Bahraini Shias are also concerned that foreign personnel, usually from South Asia, serve in the law enforcement agencies. One, the selection criteria in this “foreign deputation” (as it is called in Pakistan) for Bahrain is strictly limited to Sunnis. Two, since these personnel usually do not speak Arabic, their contact is minimal with the local population. Tactfully employing religious, linguistic, and ethnic differences and distances indicates the obvious Machiavellian politics on the part of the rulers, who want to maintain their domination at any cost.

The underlying logic of the conflict is that of power and powerlessness, although sectarian communities are certainly being targeted. But the fight is not between Sunni and Shia masses. It is between a marginalized Shia community and the oppressive rulers who are also supported and influenced by the neighboring Arab regimes.

If Shias do get the legitimate rights they are demanding that would effectively shift the political configuration of the Bahraini state. Hence not only the rulers but also the Arab status quo, dictatorial regimes (Saudi, Jordan, Egypt) perceive the Shia demands as a threat. Their strategy has been to blame Iran for causing agitation among Bahraini Shias. Whether Iran is actually doing that or not, those charges certainly distract attention from the oppressive policies of the Bahraini rulers.

Blaming it on Iran or the so-called “the emergence of Shia crescent” also has a broader utility for the geo-politics of the region: Hamas is now labeled as a Shia organization and Lebanese supposedly speak Farsi! The popularity of Hezbollah's and Hamas' and the Iranian leaders in the Arab world and South Asia - among both Sunnis and Shias - creeps out these Arab regimes. These regimes have always been wary of (1.) the rise of any prominent Arab leader on the inter-regional level (like Gamal Abdul Nasser) who might potentially politicize their subjects/populations, and (2.) their Palestinian refugee populations (an example is in the Jordanian Black September of 1970). During and after the Gaza massacre, the provocative statements by these status quo regimes and also the recent move by Morocco to cut ties with Iran are indications of their bewilderment.

How conflicts are framed in the global media therefore becomes very crucial. Also how Shias engage with their Sunni brothers, how they frame their grievances, and how they protest, whether in the West or in other parts of the world, requires active caution and strategic thinking.

Internal vs. External

In the media, the adjective "sectarian" is often used as the description as well as the explanation of the conflict: that the doctrinal differences and supposedly inherent hatred between the two sects explain the nature of the current conflict(s). That's obviously too simplistic - it emphasizes the religious dimensions at the expense of the political. The region-specific dynamics of conflicts are often ignored in the media to create smooth narratives. It is unfortunate that at times many Sunni and Shias also speak in these over generalized terms.

Even if one broadens the scope of explanation to other factors like internal power struggle, socio-economic discrimination, and rivalry among Muslim states, the focus still tends to be on the ‘internal’. The ‘external’ factors, like the role of foreign powers in forging sectarian conflict in colonial and postcolonial eras, are not given adequate weight. Even Vali Nasr's book “The Shia Revival”, although written in a much nuanced manner, couldn't escape this fragmented focus, as the subtitle of his books clearly states: 'How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future." Any prognosis of either Middle Eastern or South Asian politics however is inadequate without factoring in the role and interests of regional and global powers like the US, Israel, India, China, and Afghanistan.

The popularity of the “sectarian conflict” narrative (as both description and default explanation) poses serious challenges to those Shias and Sunnis who understand the actual dynamics of the conflicts in different regions and want to change the situation. How to raise voice against the injustice but at the same time not promote or multiply the effects of sectarian tensions? Especially considering that conflict in one region - say in Iraq or Bahrain - can have ripple effects on sectarian relations in other parts of world.

The Geo-political Connections

After the unexpected outcome of the summer 2006 Israeli war and then the recent loss of Israel in Gaza, both of which were also bitter losses for the US and the Arab status quo regimes, it became quite predictable that there will be an escalation in sectarian violence in sensitive regions of the world. The Saudi authorities, it seems, are deliberately trying to fan sectarian tensions using one tactic or another (for example, their recent move to put barriers around Jannatul Baqi.) [Edit May 20, 2009: See also here and here]

In Pakistan, the agencies-supported SSP (Sipahe Sahaba) and its allies re-surfaced last year. The connection among these security agencies, the militant SSP, and the Saudis is no secret. (Saudis, it seems, are also trying to revive the old Taliban in Afghanistan.) If the local militant groups in Pakistan were not allied with certain Taliban factions before, according to a recent NYTimes report (April 14, 2009), they are now.

The broader goal, it seems, is to keep both Shias and Sunnis in Pakistan busy. To break their united position on the Palestine and Lebanese resistance movements through the sectarian card. The local and national political circumstances in various regions of Pakistan are making this task (of fanning sectarian conflict) easily achievable (for example the recent clashes in Karachi).

Within this broad geo-political framework, one can see a parallel with the Shia dilemma in 1998 when the Taliban killed a number of Iranian officials in Mazar Sharif and there was a growing pressure on Iran to attack the Taliban in response, while in Pakistan the SSP and Lashkare Jhangvi were ready to do mass killing of Shias if Iran had attacked the Taliban. The two conflicts would have been framed together as a Sunni-Shia war, like the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, which was also instigated and framed likewise.

During the 18-month long siege of Parachinar, Pakistani Shias faced the same dilemma: if they complain that they are being targeted, the conflict will be framed as a sectarian conflict. The criminal elements and the local and foreign Taliban who were attacking them would be presented as representing the Sunni sentiments in Pakistan. The Shias knew that these criminal elements wanted to spread the conflict to the rest of Pakistan (the SSP leaders have repeatedly said that they are targeting Shias in D.I. Khan and other areas because "Sunnis" are being targeted in Parachinar.) The dilemma and challenge, again, was to speak out for justice and struggle for the legitimate rights without falling in the trap of "sectarian conflict".

The dynamics of the political conflict in Bahrain highlights both the country-specific causes and the geo-political connections. Given the variety of power configuration in different regions, Pakistan is a much more complicated case. Especially at stake at the moment are 1. The future of Islamist politics vis-a-vis liberal-secular prescriptions from inside and outside of Pakistan. And the fragile democracy: More and more people are talking about how things were much better under the military rule. 2. The political and economic stability. If the downward spiral continues, we may see a regime change very soon, possibly in the next two months: Either a direct military coup or a compromise between the US and the Pakistani military on Nawaz Sharif type character as a replacement 3. Pakistan's Nuclear assets. Both of these cases - Bahrain and Pakistan - highlight the dilemmas mentioned above.

If this analysis has any weight, Muslims - both Shias and Sunnis - in different regions of the world need to be extra-cautious in how they perceive and respond to any provocation - real or imaginary - from any side.