Saturday, June 16, 2012

On press censorship in the Zia era

This piece offers a window into press censorship during the Zia era. Also, it touches upon the current state of journalism in Pakistan, specifically its dark side: its business of profiteering, blackmailing, hyper-sensationalizing, attachment to various forms of tribalisms, and making alliances with the corrupt political forces of one kind or another. Elements of the press supported the Zia regime too, but the ethics of objectivity and principles (supporting social justice, for instance) was still the currency that most journalists lived by or held themselves accountable to. Not anymore, it seems. Not for all journalists. The off-camera discussion that is referred to in the below piece can be seen here or here (both clips are in Urdu+Punjabi).

We do not deserve this freedom
Anwar Iqbal, DAWN, June 16, 2012

We were sitting in a half-lit room in a Washington suburb. All five of us had worked as journalists in Pakistan. And what brought us today was the airing of an off camera discussion between two talk show hosts of a prominent Pakistani channel and a property tycoon.

The footage has instigated a war of sorts between news channels as they accuse each other of being corrupt, dishonest and sleazy. We came here to discuss the so-called media-gate scandal, but shame, embarrassment and guilt overwhelmed us. So we started reminiscing about our past, perhaps to avoid thinking about our inglorious present.

Those were the days when people joined journalism out of political conviction, not to make easy money or become famous. There was little money or fame in the media then.

We recalled that in the Zia era, when the press was in chains, we also met in half-lit rooms but out of fear, not shame. Such meetings were illegal and those caught almost always lost their jobs. Some were even jailed and flogged. So we met late at night in secluded places.

We remembered one such meeting that we all attended. The lights were off all over the dark city, so the full moon shone in all its glory.

Free from the dwarfing influence of the neon lights and electric bulbs, it looked beautiful. But we shut the window, lit a candle and one of us tried to read an old newspaper, which carried the story we were looking for.

The jasmine and the Queen of the Night wafted through the closed doors. But even their aroma could not make us open the window.

I could not wipe the picture off my mind. There he was, Nasir Zaidi, chained to a hospital bed with two rifle-toting police constables flanking him.

We were not friends yet, but I knew him as a gentle and soft-spoken man, respected by everybody for his honesty and an almost religious fervour for a free press. But when his time came, his honesty and softness could not protect him. He had to receive all 15 lashes on his back and was now lying on a hospital bed, chained and handcuffed like a common criminal.

His crime? He defied a dictator’s order to close down some newspapers that dared criticise the army’s interference in politics.

On May 13, 1978 the then military government in Pakistan ordered four journalists flogged for refusing to toe the official line. The government issued a brief press note to announce the verdict.

Three of them were flogged within 70 minutes after the judgment and sent to prison to complete their terms. The fourth escaped because the prison doctor declared him unfit for the lashes.

The whipping was in reprisal for a countrywide agitation by the journalists against the government’s media policy. Within a year after taking over, the martial law government had closed down 11 newspapers and fined 13 others.

Two of the journalists flogged during Gen Ziaul Haq’s martial law — Zaidi and Jafri —are my friends now. Jafri is emotional, robust and quarrelsome. Zaidi is quiet and shy. He also suffers from asthma.

We never saw him arguing with anyone. Although we were convinced that all four were innocent, we never understood how anyone could flog Zaidi. He was so friendly and polite that everybody loved him.

Even his editors never called him by his first name. He was always addressed as Zaidi Sahib. His flogging was a shock for the entire media community. I saw several of his friends crying.

Zaidi is so humble that he never discusses his sacrifices. He says that as a journalist he had a personal reason to protest the dictator’s decision to close down newspapers. Like other, he says, journalists also have the right to work and if there are no newspapers, there will be no work for journalists.

Besides, he says, journalists also have professional reasons for disliking dictators. The press, according to him, does not prosper in a controlled society. There is not much a journalist can do in a dictatorship.

A free press and a dictatorship are like oil and water; they don’t mix. And he has a point. In a controlled press, most of the words are handed down by the dictator’s ministry of information and journalists simply reprint or broadcast them.

Nobody knows it better than journalists from Muslim nations. Before the Arab spring, which started only last year, almost all of them had totalitarian regimes. From Central and South Asia to the Middle East, the media was run by the rulers. Journalism, as it is known in democracies like India or the United States, does not exist.

The government already ran the electronic media and newspapers, too, were brought under direct government control through coercive laws that closed all options for freedom.

Every evening we had to take our newspapers to the information department where a bureaucrat — and sometimes a military officer, usually a major — would read the entire paper, front to back. They would take out anything they did not like.

The government issued broad guidelines to newspaper editors: They could not publish anything against the government — federal, provincial, or local. Any news that a government officer thought could incite people against the rulers was censored. Criticism of the army, the judiciary or the religious establishment was not allowed. Even stories that could arouse sexual feelings were censored.

Newspapers also needed permission to re-print what had already been published, such as excerpts from a book or a poem. Many times the censor officers showed their personal likes and dislikes in selecting news items. For example, if a newspaper wanted to carry a feature on open sewers in an area where a censor officer lived, he could take it out if he thought it would make his neighbourhood look bad.

Sometimes even film reviews were censored if the officer happened to like the film that the writer was criticising. All decisions were arbitrary. There was no appeal.

Journalists hated these restrictions. The rules denied them some of their basic rights and spawned various professional problems. It was already difficult to find stories that would not cross the guidelines.

But even when they did, they were not sure if the censor board would approve the stories, so they had to write two or three covering stories for every story they feared could be censored.

The officials insisted on seeing the pages after they were designed, complete with headlines and photos. This meant that a story removed by the officials disturbed the entire layout and the whole page had to be redesigned. Sometimes it also disturbed other pages where the censored story was carried over.

Those were not the days of computers; everything had to be done with scissors and glue, such changes often delayed the newspaper. To overcome this problem, editors tried to complete the pages as early as possible. Thus they often missed important late events. But sometimes missing a story also annoyed the government. Authorities believed newspapers missed stories on purpose to let people know how strict the censorship was.

The intention behind all these restrictions was to teach self-censorship to the journalists. The government wanted them to learn how to write “positive” stories. It wanted to create a docile and subservient press. But this did not work. Most journalists resisted these restrictions at every stage.

In the beginning most newspapers refused to fill the space left behind by a censored story. Instead they just printed a sketch of a pair of scissors in that space to show that the news item or article had been censored.

Sometimes one newspaper would have several scissor-filled spaces. This made the government look bad and so the censor officers prevented newspapers from doing it.

The newspapers then found another device. They would print a neutral, non-offensive headline and the writer’s byline but leave the rest of the space empty. Thus sometimes a newspaper would have eight stories, which only had headlines and bylines. The government also banned this practice.

Now newspapers started printing irrelevant or unimportant stories on the front or back pages to fill a censored space, stories that would not have been published at all in a more normal world. When the government banned this too, Pakistani journalists learned to write between the lines.

In the beginning, they were not sure whether the readers would understand what they were trying to say. But the readers proved more intelligent than the writers thought. Readers understood everything and would often do their own investigations, based on the clues they found in a newspaper.

If they read about a sudden shortage of tomatoes and eggs in a particular market, and another story somewhere else in the newspaper reported that a federal minister had visited the market the same day, they guessed that the minister had had to face a barrage of rotten vegetables when he visited the mall.

Sometimes newspapers just published the sketch of a story, allowing the readers to fill in the gaps. In the early 1980s a worker of Murtaza Bhutto’s Al Zulfikar group fired a rocket at Zia’s helicopter near Islamabad, the next day’s newspapers had a story about a rocket fired at an unknown helicopter and urged the police and intelligence agencies to be more vigilant against terrorists. The censor officers were not aware of the attack, so they allowed it to be published. And the next day everybody knew that someone had tried to kill Zia.

Scores of political jokes started making rounds: some new, others adapted from the outside world to suit the local situation. The journalists struggled and the people supported them. But this enthusiasm did not lead to a popular uprising. It was more a passive resistance.

In Pakistan people seem to have a lot of patience. No matter how bad the situation, they can sit and wait. They wait for years until their patience runs out. Then they wake up, hold rallies and processions.

The rallies lead to countrywide strikes. Buses and shops are burnt, people are killed, and the government changes with the help of both violent and peaceful methods.

But before it can lead to a real change, people go back to their passive mood. So the change is always cosmetic.

Only a few faces change; the system remains as oppressive as ever. We get another set of corrupt rulers. We curse them, but we learn to live with them until the next uprising.

However, we always believed that the media was an agent of change. It rejected the status quo. It was with the underdog. How wrong we were!

Sacrifices offered by people like Zaidi did bring freedom to the media but the free media in Pakistan is no longer an agent of change.

It is part of the establishment now.

Journalists play the same game that others in the establishment do, of becoming rich and powerful overnight. And the so-called media-gate scandal shows that they are no better than eggs and tomatoes. Anyone can buy them if he is willing to pay the right price.

I never thought I would want the censorship back. I still do not.

But I must admit that we were better human beings when we were in chains. We do not deserve this freedom.

The author is a correspondent for Dawn, based in Washington, DC

Thursday, March 22, 2012

Rannie Amiri: The Bahrain Uprising in Numbers

Please note that this piece was published at the end of last year, so the numbers may be a bit dated. But the ground situation does not appear to have improved on any of these perimeters since then. Meanwhile, the people's protests against the Khalifa regime have been regularly occuring. Most recently, there was a massive turnout on March 9, 2012 (see BBC, Raw-footage).

The Bahrain Uprising in Numbers
by Rannie Amiri, December 29, 2011
http://original.antiwar.com/rannie-amiri/2011/12/28/the-bahrain-uprising-in-numbers/

Population of Bahrain: 1.2 million

Number of citizens: 535,000

Percentage of citizens who are Shia Muslim: 70

Percentage of those in government: 13

Number of senior positions they fill in the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, the National Guard, the Supreme Defense Council, and the Royal Court: 0

Percentage in the Ministry of Finance: 10

Percentage in the Ministry of Information: 6

Percentage in the judiciary: 5

Of the 1,000 National Security Apparatus employees, percentage who are non-Bahraini: 64

Percentage who are Shia Bahraini: less than 5

Of the 20,000 paramilitary Special Security Forces, percentage who are non-Bahraini: 90

Percentage who are Shia Bahraini: 0

Number of elected Bahrainis from all sects who sit on the country’s all-powerful Shura Council: 0

Day pro-democracy protests began in Bahrain as part of the Arab Spring: Feb. 14, 2011

People who took to the streets: 300,000

Proportional equivalent if Egyptians had done likewise: 40 million

Evidence that Iran instigated the demonstrations: 0

Day Saudi Arabia invaded to put down the uprising: March 14, 2011

Number of Saudi, UAE, and Qatari troops who arrived in armored vehicles: 1,500

People killed since Feb. 14: 50

Fatalities as a result of tear gas shot into residential homes or birdshot fired at close range: 30

Age of youngest victim: 5 days

Arbitrary arrests: 1,500

Civilians sentenced by military courts: 208

Physicians sentenced for offering medical treatment to demonstrators: 20

Cumulative jail terms levied: 2,500 years

Citizens currently accused of violating freedom of speech or assembly laws: 1,000

Documented cases of torture and ill-treatment since the revolt began: 1,866

Bahraini officials held responsible for killings or the systemic use of torture: 0

Mosques destroyed: 40+

Journalists targeted: 90+

Workers fired for supporting, taking part, or suspicion of having taken part in pro-democracy activities: 2,710

University students expelled for the same reasons: 477

Prisoners of conscience: 500

Bahrain’s rank among countries in political prisoners per capita: 1st

Proposed U.S. arms sales to Bahrain: $53 million

Years the al-Khalifa family has ruled Bahrain: 228

Days left in power: numbered

Thanks to the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and other NGOs for helping compile these figures.

Fisk and Safi on the Afghan Massacre and Media

Below, see two pieces on the media coverage of the recent Afghan massacre. In the first piece, Fisks suggests that frustration and revenge may be more common among the US soldiers, instead of exceptions among few individuals, because of losing the Afghan war. But the media presented the massacre in exactly the latter terms, as exceptions. I would add that the soldiers could also be driven by revenge just because of it, and a sense of national superiority and tribalism, for these attitudes are strongly cultivated in their military training. Also see Omid Safi's piece quoted below with my comments.

Madness is not the reason for this massacre
Robert Fisk, March 17, 2012,
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-madness-is-not-the-reason-for-this-massacre-7575737.html

I'm getting a bit tired of the "deranged" soldier story. It was predictable, of course. The 38-year-old staff sergeant who massacred 16 Afghan civilians, including nine children, near Kandahar this week had no sooner returned to base than the defence experts and the think-tank boys and girls announced that he was "deranged". Not an evil, wicked, mindless terrorist – which he would be, of course, if he had been an Afghan, especially a Taliban – but merely a guy who went crazy.

This was the same nonsense used to describe the murderous US soldiers who ran amok in the Iraqi town of Haditha. It was the same word used about Israeli soldier Baruch Goldstein who massacred 25 Palestinians in Hebron – something I pointed out in this paper only hours before the staff sergeant became suddenly "deranged" in Kandahar province.

"Apparently deranged", "probably deranged", journalists announced, a soldier who "might have suffered some kind of breakdown" (The Guardian), a "rogue US soldier" (Financial Times) whose "rampage" (The New York Times) was "doubtless [sic] perpetrated in an act of madness" (Le Figaro). Really? Are we supposed to believe this stuff? Surely, if he was entirely deranged, our staff sergeant would have killed 16 of his fellow Americans. He would have slaughtered his mates and then set fire to their bodies. But, no, he didn't kill Americans. He chose to kill Afghans. There was a choice involved. So why did he kill Afghans? We learned yesterday that the soldier had recently seen one of his mates with his legs blown off. But so what?

The Afghan narrative has been curiously lobotomised – censored, even – by those who have been trying to explain this appalling massacre in Kandahar. They remembered the Koran burnings – when American troops in Bagram chucked Korans on a bonfire – and the deaths of six Nato soldiers, two of them Americans, which followed. But blow me down if they didn't forget – and this applies to every single report on the latest killings – a remarkable and highly significant statement from the US army's top commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen, exactly 22 days ago. Indeed, it was so unusual a statement that I clipped the report of Allen's words from my morning paper and placed it inside my briefcase for future reference.

Allen told his men that "now is not the time for revenge for the deaths of two US soldiers killed in Thursday's riots". They should, he said, "resist whatever urge they might have to strike back" after an Afghan soldier killed the two Americans. "There will be moments like this when you're searching for the meaning of this loss," Allen continued. "There will be moments like this, when your emotions are governed by anger and a desire to strike back. Now is not the time for revenge, now is the time to look deep inside your souls, remember your mission, remember your discipline, remember who you are."

Now this was an extraordinary plea to come from the US commander in Afghanistan. The top general had to tell his supposedly well-disciplined, elite, professional army not to "take vengeance" on the Afghans they are supposed to be helping/protecting/nurturing/training, etc. He had to tell his soldiers not to commit murder. I know that generals would say this kind of thing in Vietnam. But Afghanistan? Has it come to this? I rather fear it has. Because – however much I dislike generals – I've met quite a number of them and, by and large, they have a pretty good idea of what's going on in the ranks. And I suspect that Allen had already been warned by his junior officers that his soldiers had been enraged by the killings that followed the Koran burnings – and might decide to go on a revenge spree. Hence he tried desperately – in a statement that was as shocking as it was revealing – to pre-empt exactly the massacre which took place last Sunday.

Yet it was totally wiped from the memory box by the "experts" when they had to tell us about these killings. No suggestion that General Allen had said these words was allowed into their stories, not a single reference – because, of course, this would have taken our staff sergeant out of the "deranged" bracket and given him a possible motive for his killings. As usual, the journos had got into bed with the military to create a madman rather than a murderous soldier. Poor chap. Off his head. Didn't know what he was doing. No wonder he was whisked out of Afghanistan at such speed.

We've all had our little massacres. There was My Lai, and our very own little My Lai, at a Malayan village called Batang Kali where the Scots Guards – involved in a conflict against ruthless communist insurgents – murdered 24 unarmed rubber workers in 1948. Of course, one can say that the French in Algeria were worse than the Americans in Afghanistan – one French artillery unit is said to have "disappeared" 2,000 Algerians in six months – but that is like saying that we are better than Saddam Hussein. True, but what a baseline for morality. And that's what it's about. Discipline. Morality. Courage. The courage not to kill in revenge. But when you are losing a war that you are pretending to win – I am, of course, talking about Afghanistan – I guess that's too much to hope. General Allen seems to have been wasting his time.

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Below, also see Omid Safi's piece on the Afghan massacre. Omid Safi compares the media coverage of the Afghan massacre to the coverage of the 2009 Fort-Hood-shooting (by a person from Muslim background). Safi limits himself to criticizing the media's double standards. He also hopes that, "future investigations would demonstrate that Hasan’s actions were indeed the actions of a lone person, not part of a broader campaign."

I feel that he could have made a more incisive argument there, questioning if the Fort Hood issue should be seen as a "Muslim" issue at all. Furthermore, he could have scrutinized the pressure and politics that compell American Muslims to respond to Fort-Hood-like events in an apologetic way. In other words, why is it that American Muslims as a collectivity feel threatened and compelled to issue apologetic statements (to the general Americans) anytime someone does something in any part of the world.

Also, are there good and bad Muslim causes from an Islamic perspective, some of which may have resorted to violent struggle as their mode of resistance? Would the American Muslims support the good resistance causes that involve killing of oppressors -- for instance, that in Palestine and Lebanon? And how would that synchronize with the moral compass that Safi presents at the end of his piece? Could such a compass also de-legitimize the legit movements (in addition to removing the messy history from the equation in each case, putting the oppressor and oppressed, powerful and powerless, all on the same level)? (On these critical questions, also see: Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: Cracking the Media Code from IslamicInsights.com).

There may be a lead in the MLK quote that Safi refers to while describing his moral compass. To quote MLK in full: "I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character." The "content of character" may be a way to add the needed distinctions to Safi's moral compass. How do we judge the good and bad character and from whose perspective and with what assumptions and politics would be the key questions.

When Americans Kill vs. When Muslims Kill
by Omid Safi, Mar 19, 2012
http://www.religionnews.com/blogs/omid-safi/when-americans-kill-vs.-when-muslims-killl3

The news from Afghanistan over the last few weeks has been heart-wrenching, devastating, and infuriating. An American soldier named Robert Bales (on the left in the image below) walked into the midst of an Afghan civilian community, and shot 16 people dead, including 9 children and 3 women.

The shooting in Afghanistan has eerie echoes of the Fort Hood Shooting from November 5th, 2009, when an American Muslim military member, Nidal Malik Hasan, opened fire inside a military base, and killed 13 people.

And yet the media coverage of the two episodes has been diametrically opposed. When Americans kills, it is portrayed as an aberration, an act of a tormented and troubled individual. When Muslims kill, it is covered as a signal of a communal, global genocidal tendency. Let’s go over some details.

Here is how Fox covered the shootings by Major Malik Nadal in the Fort Hood shootings:

The murders at Ft. Hood are about the radicalization of individuals by an extremist ideology -- jihadism -- which fuels acts of terror.
The main question we should be asking is when did Hasan become radicalized and who indoctrinated him?


Fox’s “analysis” was written by Walid Phares, the same person that Mitt Romney had picked as his Middle East foreign policy adviser. The very same person who has been identified as a major Islamophobes, and involved in massacres in Middle East.

Phares and Fox News take great pains to point out that Nadal’s actions are not about one individual man, but part of a grander Islamist war against America. Here is what they say:

Instead it is part of a wider ideological war, generated by radicalization and inciting individuals to perform such acts.
"Lone wolf" or not, organized or not, fully self-aware perpetrator or not, influenced by overseas radicals or not, this massacre of servicemen has moved America from stage to another.


Of course future investigations would demonstrate that Hasan’s actions were indeed the actions of a lone person, not part of a broader campaign.

In short, when a deranged Muslim kills Americans, Fox News tells us that it is “the largest terror act since 9/11,” and "it's jihadist evil and terrorism." When a deranged American kills Muslims, such as the actions of Robert Bales in Afghanistan in February 2012, Fox News and its subsidiaries behave in an entirely different fashion. We are offered the following litany of explanations and justifications:

*There was alcohol involved.
* it is an isolated act of a “troubled” person that in no way shape or form reflects on the noble ideals of America or Americans.
*The soldier was housed in the “most troubled” base in America.
*He was on his fourth tour of duty, and neither he nor his family wanted to go back.
*he simply “snapped.”
*He was experiencing martial difficulties.

The headline from Fox news read: “Money, career woes reportedly plagued Afghan Killing Suspect.” The first sentence of the article reads: “Bypassed for a promotion and struggling to pay for his house, Robert Bales was eyeing a way out of his job at a Washington state military base months before he allegedly gunned down 16 civilians in an Afghan war zone, records and interviews showed as a deeper picture emerged Saturday of the Army sergeant's financial troubles and brushes with the law.”

In short, the assumption that when we Americans kill, it is an aberration from our good nature. Even if the act is abominable, it is said to be purely an individual act totally disconnected from any larger institutional or political context. However, when Muslims kill, it is a sign of a world-wide, evil ideology of jihad and terrorism.

I have searched in vain to find a commentator in the United States that grasps the above double standard, and have not so far seen that insight in a mainstream American press. The only place I have seen it is in the UK, by Robert Fisk: Fisk correctly points that that most Western journalists use descriptions like how Robert Bailes was “"Apparently deranged", "probably deranged", "might have suffered some kind of breakdown" (The Guardian), a "rogue US soldier" (Financial Times) whose rampage was "doubtless [sic] perpetrated in an act of madness" (Le Figaro).

It is these types of double standards that are at the heart of the hypocrisy of our current situation vis-à-vis Islam and Muslims. What we should be saying is simply this: the life of each and every person in the world, civilian or military, American, Afghani, Palestinian, Israeli, Iraqi, Iranian, male or female, rich or poor, gay or straight, carries exactly and identically the same intrinsic value. Just as Dr. King taught us that the measure of a character is not connected to the color of our skin, we should be demanding that the measure of a human life is not connected to the nationality of the victim or the assailant. All human lives are sacred, all are sacrosanct. And all violations of human lives are equally morally repugnant.

Taking that type of an approach would restore a sense of dignity and honor to our standing in the world community, and it would allow us to recover the moral dignity that we have squandered over the last ten years.

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About Omid Safi: Safi is a bona fide scholar on Sufism and used to be part of the (now defunct) Progressive Muslim Union (PMU) of North America. He emphasizes compassion, love, and theological plurality drawing from the resources of various sufi traditions. On PMU-NA, see (with a pinch of salt):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Progressive_Muslim_Union

http://www.theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/mwu_muslim_wakeup_and_pmu_progressive_muslims_union_progressive_voices/

http://pmunadebate.blogspot.com/2005/07/omid-safi-declares-takfir-on-irshad.html

Monday, March 12, 2012

Younus Habib spills the beans in the Mehrangate-IJI case

This is a window into the politics of the upper echelons of power in Pakistan. It is also another reminder of the moral bankruptcy of those who run this country.

Money arranged at behest of Ghulam Ishaq, Aslam Beg: Habib

Islamabad: A frail-looking Younus Habib, who headed the now defunct Mehran Bank, spilled the beans in the Mehrangate-IJI case on Thursday when he revealed in his first-ever statement before the Supreme Court that he had been forced by former president late Ghulam Ishaq Khan and former army chief Aslam Beg to arrange Rs340 million in the “supreme national interest”.



Nasir Iqbal, Dawn, March 9, 2012
Link: http://www.dawn.com/2012/03/09/younus-habib-says-money-arranged-at-behest-of-ghulam-ishaq-aslam-beg-rs340m-lavished-in-national-interest.html

Mr Habib, who was on wheelchair, said he had also been jailed for serving the “so-called supreme national interest”.

A three-judge bench comprising Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Justice Khilji Arif Hussain and Justice Tariq Parvez accepted his sworn handwritten statement which the elderly banker first said should be treated as a confidential document, but later agreed to read it loudly in the open court.

The bench had taken up the 1996 petition of Tehrik-i-Istiqlal chief Air Martial (retd) Asghar Khan accusing the ISI of financing several politicians during the 1990 elections to create the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) and prevent Benazir Bhutto’s PPP from winning. The ISI allegedly dished out Rs140 million for the purpose. The petition was based on the affidavit of former ISI chief Asad Durrani.

On Thursday, the court ordered defence ministry’s director (legal) Mohammad Hussain Shahbaz to submit reports on the working of security and intelligence agencies from 1990 till date. The documents would remain confidential “in the interest of the nation”.

Younus Habib said Gen Aslam Beg and ISI’s Brigadier Hamid Saeed had provided number of certain accounts in UBL, ABL and MCB for depositing the amount while the counterfoil of the deposit slip had been handed over to one Colonel Akbar.

Both Gen Aslam Beg and Asad Durrani were in the court, quietly listening to Mr Habib’s affidavit.

“In all I was asked to arrange Rs350 million by the former president and the army chief before the 1990 general elections,” said Mr Habib while reading out the affidavit.

Of the Rs345 million, Rs140 million was paid through Gen Aslam Beg to politicians — Rs70 million to former Sindh chief minister Jam Sadiq Ali who was provided another Rs150 million (from Mehran Bank’s funds) for arranging licence to set up Mehran Bank, Rs15 million to Pir Pagara through Jam Sadiq, Rs70 million to Younus Memom on the instructions of Ishaq Khan and Gen Beg for the politicians who wished not to receive the money directly from the ISI. Some of the money was also dished out to the Army Welfare Trust.

Younus Habib, who joined the Habib Bank Limited in 1963 as a clerk and retired as the bank’s Sindh chief in 1991, tendered an apology for his involvement in the scam and threw himself at the mercy of the court.

He admitted that he used to talk to Gen (retd) Beg frequently and it was in March 1990 that the latter wanted him to arrange Rs350 million before the elections. A few months later, he said, he had been invited by Gen Beg to attend the installation ceremony of Col Commandant Sindh regiment where he was treated like chief guest.

Mr Habib submitted a photograph, along with his affidavit, in which he is seen with former president Ishaq Khan and a uniformed army officer having conversation with Gen Beg.

The court made the photograph part of the record.

He said a meeting later arranged at the Balochistan House in Islamabad was attended only by him, Ishaq Khan and Gen Beg. “I was told by Ishaq Khan that the money ought to be arranged by hook or by crook.”

Mr Habib said he had told them that arranging such a huge amount was not possible through legal means for which he had to manipulate the system. At this Ishaq Khan told him that he would have to do whatever he could for the national cause.

Mr Habib’s bag of surprises had a few other information. On Sept 29, 1990, he said, a meeting had been held in the Q block of the Islamabad Secretariat in which former attorney general late Aziz A. Munshi and Roedad Khan (probably the then chief of a cell to initiate cases against Asif Ali Zardari and Benazir Bhutto) had been pressurised to lodge a complaint against Mr Asif Zardari implicating him in the Fauzi Ali Kazmi Tax Free Plaza scam.

Younus Habib was arrested on the orders of Roedad Khan at Karachi airport when he refused to oblige. He was kept in an FIA cell for five to six days. While in custody, Mr Habib said, he concluded that he had to arrange the money and was also bullied through the courtesy of Jam Sadiq Ali.

Mr Habib said the case had been dubbed the Mehran Bank scandal, but actually the amount had been provided by the HBL and the NBP.

When former prime minister Benazir came to power for the second time, she ordered an audit of the bank.

Earlier, two sealed documents (four folders), one comprising a report by a commission tasked to review the working of security and intelligence agencies, were opened in the court. The other document contained two audio-cassettes and unsigned statements/cross-examination of Maj-Gen (retd) Naseerullah Babar and Lt-Gen (retd) Asad Durrani recorded during an in-camera session of the court.

The court noted that its office had also tried to find out whether the examination of Naseerullah Babar and Asad Durrani was recorded because no such document was on record.


WHO RECEIVED HOW MUCH

According to Younus Habib:
•Rs140 million was paid through Gen Beg to politicians;
•Rs70 million to former chief minister Sindh Jam Sadiq Ali;
•Rs15 million to Pir Pagara through Jam Sadiq;
•Rs70 million to Younus Memom on the instructions of then president Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Gen Beg for the politicians who wished not to be paid directly from the ISI;

•Some amount was also dished out to the Army Welfare Trust.

According to the affidavit of former DG ISI Asad Durrani:

•Nawaz Sharif received Rs3.5 million;
•Mir Afzal Khan Rs10 million;
•Lt-Gen Rafaqat Rs5.6m for distribution among journalists;
•Abida Hussain Rs1 million;
•Jamaat-i-Islami Rs5 million;
•Altaf Hussain Qureshi Rs0.5 million;
•Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi Rs5 million;
•Jam Sadiq Rs5 million;
•Mohammad Khan Junejo Rs0.25 million;
•Pir Pagara Rs2 million;
•Maulana Salahuddin Rs0.3 million;
•Humayun Marri Rs1.5 million;
•Jamali Rs4 million;
•Kakar Rs1 million;
•K. Baloch Rs0.5 million
•Jam Yousuf Rs0.75 million
•Bizenjo Rs0.5 million;

•Various small groups in Sindh received Rs5.4 million.

Sunday, March 4, 2012

Shia killing on the rise in Pakistan

The last two months have witnessed a surge in Shia killing, with tragic instances in Kohistan (K-PK), Parachinar (FATA), Khanpur (Punjab), and Quetta, Karachi, and D.I. Khan. The causes, again, are complex, and the local, national, and international forces all appear entangled. For one, I doubt that Jundallah (based in the Balochistan province, which claimed responsibility of the Kohistan attack on Feb 28) could have done this attack without support of the local militant groups in that remote area of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (that is, if Jundallah did indeed carry out this attack). Jundallah's Washington connection is also well known. The attackers were also said to be wearing army uniforms.

On the interconnections among various militant groups and their foreign supporters as identified in wikileaks cables, see here.

The Pakistani media -- and police -- often frames the target killing of the Shias as a "sectarian conflict". The label implies that Pakistani Sunni and Shia communities are fighting against each other. That is far from the truth. The label also hides the fact that both Shias and Sunnis have been killed by the same militant groups (for instance, see here and here). The label, moreover, gives a sense of symmetry ("Sunnis kill Shias, then Shias kill Sunnis"), whereas in reality a disproportionally high number of Shias have been killed or injured in recent years. It is more appropriate to call the recent surge as "Shia" killing, not "sectarian" killing. Each incident also requires a nuanced analysis of the causes (consider, for instance, the entangled causes surrounding the December 2009 Ashura blast in Karachi).

Saudis and UAE fund extremist groups in Southern Punjab, Pakistan - Wikileaks

With a pinch of salt, check out these two videos. The first is by Dawn News in Urdu, uploaded on youtube on May 22, 2011, that quotes a leaked cable of Bryan D. Hunt, a US diplomat in the Lahore consulate. The report suggests that some extremist groups in Southern Punjab receive more than 10 million dollars annually directly from Saudi Arabia and UAE.



The report, however, maligns whole maslaks (Islamic schools of thought) instead of focusing on the specific extremist-leaning organizations (belonging to these maslaks or otherwise), like Sipahe Sahaba, Jamatud Dawa, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. The following cable from the same diplomat, published by Dawn, names these specific groups. It also emphasizes the mutual connection among these groups (the connection extends beyond Southern Punjab). The cable also suggests that Qaddhafi's Libya may also have supported the extremist groups in Pakistan.

http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/26/2009-was-qaddafi-funding-sipahe-sahaba.html

Next, another clip in Urdu, uploaded on youtube on March 2, 2012, where some Ahle Hadith ulama reject and protest the militant agenda of Lashkar-e-Tayiba and Jamatud Dawa. (This particular clip does not contain any condemnation of these militant groups' anti-Shia ideology and activities.)

Saturday, November 26, 2011

Iran's nuclear threat: New revelations or change in IAEA's leadership?

Has IAEA found new evidence or discovered undisclosed sites in Iran recently that's fueling its growing concern over Iran's nuclear program, or is it the change in IAEA's leadership that explains the different attitude? The renowned journalist Seymour Hersh writes in the New Yorker on Nov 18, 2011:

"The shift in tone at the I.A.E.A. seems linked to a change at the top. The I.A.E.A.’s report had extra weight because the Agency has had a reputation for years as a reliable arbiter on Iran. Mohammed ElBaradei, who retired as the I.A.E.A.’s Director General two years ago, was viewed internationally, although not always in Washington, as an honest broker—a view that lead to the awarding of a Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. ElBaradei’s replacement is Yukiya Amano of Japan. Late last year, a classified U.S. Embassy cable from Vienna, the site of the I.A.E.A. headquarters, described Amano as being “ready for prime time.” According to the cable, which was obtained by WikiLeaks, in a meeting in September, 2009, with Glyn Davies, the American permanent representative to the I.A.E.A., said, “Amano reminded Ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make concessions to the G-77 [the group of developing countries], which correctly required him to be fair-minded and independent, but that he was solidly in the U.S. court on every strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the handling of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.” The cable added that Amano’s “willingness to speak candidly with U.S. interlocutors on his strategy … bodes well for our future relationship.”"

See the full text here

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On the topic, see a recent interview of Mohammad Javad Larijani with MSNBC here (20.49m)

Thursday, October 13, 2011

The whoo-scary Iranian terror plot

Watching the US corporate media coverage of this Iranian terror plot is like watching "Wag the Dog" movie again - except that the enemy plot in the movie had less holes and was more convincing than the one in the present episode.

The “very scary” Iranian Terror plot
Glenn Greenwald
http://politics.salon.com/2011/10/12/the_very_scary_iranian_terror_plot/singleton/
The most difficult challenge in writing about the Iranian Terror Plot unveiled yesterday is to take it seriously enough to analyze it. Iranian Muslims in the Quds Force sending marauding bands of Mexican drug cartel assassins onto sacred American soil to commit Terrorism — against Saudi Arabia and possibly Israel — is what Bill Kristol and John Bolton would feverishly dream up while dropping acid and madly cackling at the possibility that they could get someone to believe it. But since the U.S. Government rolled out its Most Serious Officials with Very Serious Faces to make these accusations, many people (therefore) do believe it; after all, U.S. government accusations = Truth. All Serious people know that. And in the ensuing reaction one finds virtually every dynamic typically shaping discussions of Terrorism and U.S. foreign policy.

Iranian Terror Plot: Fake, Fake, Fake
Justin Raimondo
http://original.antiwar.com/justin/2011/10/11/iranian-terror-plot-fake-fake-fake/

News Media Hypes the “Iran Did It” Line, Ignores Holes in the Story
John Glaser
http://www.antiwar.com/blog/2011/10/12/news-media-hypes-the-iran-did-it-line-ignores-holes-in-the-story/

Thursday, September 15, 2011

What's at stake in the PA's bid for statehood at UN

Below, see an insightful piece worth engaging.

Check out Massad's another excellent article on the topic: How surrendering Palestinian rights became the language of "peace"


For more on the two-state solution, see: How realistic is the two-state solution?

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State of Recognition
Whether the UN grants the PA status as a state or refuses to do so, either outcome will be in Israel's interest.
Joseph Massad, 15 Sep 2011


What is at stake in Barack Obama's vehement refusal to recognise Palestine as a mini-state with a disfigured geography and no sovereignty, and his urging the world community not to recognise it while threatening the Palestinians with retribution? What is the relationship between Obama's refusal to recognise Palestine and his insistence on recognising Israel's right to be a "Jewish state" and his demand that the Palestinians and Arab countries follow suit?

It is important to stress at the outset that whether the UN grants the Palestinian Authority (PA) the government of a state under occupation and observer status as a state or refuses to do so, either outcome will be in the interest of Israel. For the only game in town has always been Israel's interests, and it is clear that whatever strategy garners international support, with or without US and Israeli approval, must guarantee Israeli interests a priori. The UN vote is a case in point.

Possible outcomes

Let us consider the two possible outcomes of the vote and how they will advance Israeli interests:

The ongoing Arab uprisings have raised Palestinian expectations about the necessity of ending the occupation and have challenged the modus vivendi the PA has with Israel. Furthermore, with the increase in Palestinian grass-roots activism to resist the Israeli occupation, the PA has decided to shift the Palestinian struggle from popular mobilisation it will not be able to control, and which it fears could topple it, to the international legal arena. The PA hopes that this shift from the popular to the juridical will demobilise Palestinian political energies and displace them onto an arena that is less threatening to the survival of the PA itself.

The PA feels abandoned by the US which assigned it the role of collaborator with the Israeli occupation, and feels frozen in a "peace process" that does not seek an end goal. PA politicians opted for the UN vote to force the hand of the Americans and the Israelis, in the hope that a positive vote will grant the PA more political power and leverage to maximise its domination of the West Bank (but not East Jerusalem or Gaza, which neither Israel nor Hamas respectively are willing to concede to the PA). Were the UN to grant the PA its wish and admit it as a member state with observer status, then, the PA argues, it would be able to force Israel in international fora to cease its violations of the UN charter, the Geneva Conventions, and numerous international agreements. The PA could then challenge Israel internationally using legal instruments only available to member states to force it to grant it "independence". What worries the Israelis most is that, were Palestine to become a member state, it would be able to legally challenge Israel.

This presumed addition of power the Palestinians will gain to bring Israel to justice will actually be carried out at enormous cost to the Palestinian people. If the UN votes for the PA statehood status, this would have several immediate implications:This logic is faulty, though, because the Palestinians have not historically lacked legal instruments to challenge Israel. On the contrary, international instruments have been activated against Israel since 1948 by the UN's numerous resolutions in the General Assembly as well as in the Security Council, not to mention the more recent use of the International Court of Justice in the case of the Apartheid Wall. The problem has never been the Palestinians' ability or inability to marshal international law or legal instruments to their side. Instead, the problem is that the US blocks international law's jurisdiction from being applied to Israel through its veto power. The US uses threats and protective measures to shield the recalcitrant pariah state from being brought to justice. It has already used its veto power in the UN Security Council 41 times in defense of Israel and against Palestinian rights. How this would change if the PA became a UN member state with observer status is not clear.


True, the PA could bring more international legal pressure and sanctions to bear on Israel. It could have international bodies adjudicate Israel's violations of the rights of the Palestinian state. The PA could even make the international mobility of Israeli politicians more perilous as "war criminals". This would render Israel's international relations more difficult, but how would this ultimately weaken an Israel that the US would shield completely from such effects as it has always done?

Implications of the UN vote


(1) The PLO will cease to represent the Palestinian people at the UN, and the PA will replace it as their presumed state.

(2) The PLO, which represents all Palestinians (about 12 million people in historic Palestine and in the diaspora), and was recognised as their "sole" representative at the UN in 1974, will be truncated to the PA, which represents only West Bank Palestinians (about 2 million people). Incidentally this was the vision presented by the infamous "Geneva Accords" that went nowhere.

(3) It will politically weaken Palestinian refugees' right to return to their homes and be compensated, as stipulated in UN resolutions. The PA does not represent the refugees, even though it claims to represent their "hopes" of establishing a Palestinian state at their expense. Indeed, some international legal experts fear it could even abrogate the Palestinians' right of return altogether. It will also forfeit the rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel who face institutional and legal racism in the Israeli state, as it presents them with a fait accompli of the existence of a Palestinian state (its phantasmatic nature notwithstanding). This will only give credence to Israeli claims that the Jews have a state and the Palestinians now have one too and if Palestinian citizens of Israel were unhappy, or even if they were happy, with their third-class status in Israel, they should move or can be forced to move to the Palestinian state at any rate.

(4) Israel could ostensibly come around soon after a UN vote in favour of Palestinian statehood and inform the PA that the territories it now controls (a small fraction of the West Bank) is all the territory Israel will concede and that this will be the territorial basis of the PA state. The Israelis do not tire of reminding the PA that the Palestinians will not have sovereignty, an army, control of their borders, control of their water resources, control over the number of refugees it could allow back, or even jurisdiction over Jewish colonial settlers. Indeed, the Israelis have already obtained UN assurances about their right to "defend" themselves and to preserve their security with whatever means they think are necessary to achieve these goals. In short, the PA will have the exact same Bantustan state that Israel and the US have been promising to grant it for two decades!

(5) The US and Israel could also, through their many allies, inject a language of "compromise" in the projected UN recognition of the PA state, stipulating that such a state must exist peacefully side by side with the "Jewish State" of Israel. This would in turn exact a precious UN recognition of Israel's "right" to be a Jewish state, which the UN and the international community, the US excepted, have refused to recognize thus far. This will directly link the UN recognition of a phantasmatic non-existent Palestinian state to UN recognition of an actually existing state of Israel that discriminates legally and institutionally against non-Jews as a "Jewish state".

(6) The US and Israel will insist after a positive vote that, while the PA is right to make certain political demands as a member state, it would have to abrogate its recent reconciliation agreement with Hamas. Additionally, sanctions could befall the PA state itself for associating with Hamas, which the US and Israel consider a terrorist group. The US Congress has already threatened to punish the PA and will not hesitate to urge the Obama administration to add Palestine to its list of "State Sponsors of Terrorism" along with Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria.

All of these six outcomes will advance Israeli interests immeasurably, while the only inconvenience to Israel would be the ability of the PA to demand that international law and legal jurisdiction be applied to Israel so as to exact more concessions from that country. However, at every turn the US will block and will shield Israel from its effects. In short, Israeli interests will be maximised at the cost of some serious but not detrimental inconvenience.

The second possible outcome, a US veto, and/or the ability of the US to pressure and twist the arms of tens of countries around the world to reject the bid of the PA in the General Assembly, resulting in failure to recognise PA statehood, will also be to the benefit of Israel. The unending "peace process" will continue with more stringent conditions and an angry US, upset at the PA challenge, will go back to exactly where the PA is today, if not to a weaker position. President Obama and future US administrations will continue to push for PA and Arab recognition of Israel as a "Jewish state" that has the right to discriminate by law against non-Jews in exchange for an ever-deferred recognition of a Palestinian Bantustan as an "economically viable" Palestinian state - a place where Palestinian neoliberal businessmen can make profits off international aid and investment.

Either outcome will keep the Palestinian people colonised, discriminated against, oppressed, and exiled. This entire brouhaha over the UN vote is ultimately about which of the two scenarios is better for Israeli interests. The Palestinian people and their interests are not even part of this equation.

The question on the table before the UN, then, is not whether the UN should recognise the right of the Palestinian people to a state in accordance with the 1947 UN Partition Plan, which would grant them 45 per cent of historic Palestine, nor of a Palestinian state within the June 5, 1967 borders along the Green Line, which would grant them 22 per cent of historic Palestine. A UN recognition ultimately means the negation of the rights of the majority of the Palestinian people in Israel, in the diaspora, in East Jerusalem, and even in Gaza, and the recognition of the rights of some West Bank Palestinians to a Bantustan on a fraction of West Bank territory amounting to less than 10 per cent of historic Palestine. Israel will be celebrating either outcome.

Joseph Massad is Associate Professor of Modern Arab Politics and Intellectual History at Columbia University in New York.

Monday, June 13, 2011

Bahraini poet tortured and sentenced to one year in prison

Update: July 14, 2011

Bahraini regime releases Ayat Al-Qormezi, but does not revoke sentence
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/bahrain-releases-poet-who-became-a-symbol-of-resistance-to-regime-2313309.html

Video: Ayat al-Qormezi in a cheering crowd after the release
http://shiatv.net/view_video.php?viewkey=48d72658717f3d3d135f

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The Bahraini regime recently appointed Khalifa Al Dhahrani as the head of the national dialogue - the same Dhahrani who is said to be responsible for the sham investigations against many prominent political figures sympathetic to the opposition. The appointment followed the Bahraini crown prince's visit to Washington just a few days ago. This should be an eye opener to anyone still deluded by the rhetoric of reforms by the regime or the Obama administration. Meanwhile, the regime has continued its brutal suppression against the non-violent protesters using the weapons that were sold by U.S. companies with the approval of the U.S. government.

Just yesterday, the regime's military court sentenced the brave poet, Ayat Al Qormezi, to one year in prison.


Ayat Al-Qormezi, a 20-year-old poet and trainee at the Faculty of Teachers in Bahrain was arrested two months ago for reading out a passionate poem at a freedom rally.

"We are the people who kill humiliation and assassinate misery," she told a massive crowd of protesters in the famous Pearl Square in February. "We are the people who use peace to destroy the foundation of injustice."

Addressing Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa directly, she said: "Don't you hear their cries, don't you hear their screams?"

Toward the end of her poem, she prayed: “The Sunni and Shia are brothers. God care for them all!”

As she finished, the crowd shouted: "Down with Hamad!"

A few days later the Bahraini security forces raided her house, but did not find her. She was forced to give herself up when the forces threatened to kill her four brothers one by one in front of her parents.

Ayat has not been by her family since then. She did speak to her mother once on the phone. “During her detention she was whipped across the face with electric cable, held for nine days in a tiny cell with the temperature near freezing, and was forced to clean lavatories with her bare hands.” (The Independent, June 11 and 13, 2011). Later, it was found out that she was in a military hospital due to injuries from the torture.

On June 12, she was sentenced to one year in prison.

According to The Independent, “The details of her interrogation and imprisonment are similar to the experiences of other women detained by Bahraini security forces since they launched a full scale repression on 15 March…” (June 11, 2011)

Moreover, despite the lifting of martial law on June 1, 'some 600 people are still detained, at least 2,000 have been sacked, and more than 27 mosques have been bulldozed.' (June 2, 2011)