Dawn: China voices concern over growing US influence

China voices concern over growing US influence

By Kalbe Ali, Dawn, Friday, 08 May, 2009

Source

ISLAMABAD: Chinese Ambassador Lou Zhaohui on Thursday said his country was ‘concerned over the increasing US influence’ in the region. He said the number of foreign forces was ‘too high’ in the region.

Talking to reporters during a visit to the Islamabad Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Chinese envoy said the ‘outside influence’ was growing in the region.

‘These are issues of serious concern for China,’ he said, adding that China was concerned over the US policies and the presence of a large number of foreign troops in the region.

He said that US strategies needed some ‘corrective measures’ to contain terrorism. However, he added, terrorism was a serious issue and required cooperation between countries in the region to counter it.

‘We are cooperating with the US and Pakistan in the fight against terror,’ Mr Zhaohui said, adding that separatists belonging to Muslim majority areas of western China had got training in Fata and Afghanistan during the 1980s.

‘These groups have been branded terrorists by the UN agencies.’ He said the Chinese authorities were in touch with Pakistani officials to chalk out a joint anti-terrorism strategy.

‘Counter-terrorism is needed with Pakistan and we are in close liaison with the interior ministry for the security of over 10,000 Chinese engineers and technical experts in Pakistan,’ he said, adding that China wanted long-term strategic relations with Pakistan.

The ambassador said that more than 60 Chinese companies were involved in 122 projects in Pakistan.

Dawn: US focused on ‘vulnerability’ of Pakistan nukes

Some related comments made on IS earlier: here

US focused on ‘vulnerability’ of Pakistan nukes

By Anwar Iqbal, Dawn, May 04, 2009

Source

WASHINGTON: The United States is expected to discuss the perceived vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons with the Pakistanis during President Asif Ali Zardari’s three-day visit which began on Monday.

The concern that the weapons may fall into the hands of the Taliban militants were first expressed in the US media and were then backed by various Washington think-tanks, all basing their fear on recent developments in the NWFP.

The Swat deal was interpreted in the US media as a victory for the Taliban and when the militants entered Buner, the media predicted that sooner or later they would also capture Islamabad because they were now less than 60 miles from the Pakistani capital.

But on Monday, America’s military chief Admiral Michael Mullen also joined the debate, indicating that while he did not believe the militants would actually seize the weapons, he shared the concerns expressed by the media and the think-tanks.

‘I don’t think that’s going to happen … but it is a strategic concern that we all share,’ he said.

The admiral then assured the Pakistanis that he ‘remain(s) comfortable that the nuclear weapons in Pakistan are secure.’

This is how other US officials have also responded whenever they are asked to comment on the perception of the US media that the militants were about to seize Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal: the weapons are save but they are vulnerable.

But a new element in the debate was introduced by a former Bush administration official, John Bolton. Mr Bolton, who has a hawkish reputation, urged the Obama administration earlier this week that they should try to take away as many weapons as possible from Pakistan.

In an article he wrote for the Wall Street Journal, Mr Bolton said: ‘We should contemplate whether and how to extract as many nuclear weapons as possible from Pakistan, thus somewhat mitigating the consequences of a regime collapse.’

Washington’s leading anti-nuclear lobby, the Institute for Science and International Security, added yet another element into the debate by insisting that Pakistan had totally ignored US concerns about its nuclear weapons. Instead of securing the weapons it already had, Pakistan was making new weapons.

The ISIS chief David Albright, previously a senior weapons inspector for the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency in Iraq, said commercial satellite photos showed two plutonium-producing reactors were nearing completion at Khushab, about 160 miles south-west of Islamabad.

‘In the current climate, with Pakistan's leadership under duress from daily acts of violence by insurgent Taliban forces and organised political opposition, the security of any nuclear material produced in these reactors is in question,’ Mr Albright said in a report issued by his group.

Mr Albright warned that the continuing development of Pakistan's atomic weapons programme could trigger a renewed nuclear arms race with India. But he suggested a more immediate threat to nuclear security arose from recent territorial advances in north-west Pakistan by indigenous Taliban and foreign jihadi forces opposed to the Pakistani government and its American and British allies.

‘Current US policy, focused primarily on shoring up Pakistan's resources for fighting the Taliban and al Qaida, has had the unfortunate effect of turning the US into more of a concerned bystander of Pakistan's expansion of its ability to produce nuclear weapons,’ Mr Albright said in the report, co-authored with Paul Brannan.

The US and the British media quickly pointed out that the Khushab reactors were situated on the border of Punjab and the NWFP, the scene of heavy fighting between Taliban and government forces.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told Congress recently that Pakistan had dispersed its nuclear warheads to different locations across the country in order to improve their security. But Mr Bolton said that this move could have the opposite effect to that intended.

‘There is a tangible risk that several weapons could slip out of military control. Such weapons could then find their way to al Qaida or other terrorists, with obvious global implications,’ Mr Bolton said.

Mr Bolton questioned President Barack Obama's assurance last week that while he was ‘gravely concerned’ about the stability of Pakistan's government, he was ‘confident that the nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands’.

Since there was a real risk of governmental collapse, Bolton said the US must be prepared for direct military intervention inside Pakistan to seize control of its nuclear stockpile and safeguard western interests.

‘To prevent catastrophe will require considerable American effort … We must strengthen pro-American elements in Pakistan's military, roll back Taliban advances and, together with our increased efforts in Afghanistan, decisively defeat the militants on either side of the border,’ he said.

Jamaat's New Amir Interviewed on Jawab Deyh

Jamaat-e Islami Pakistan's new Amir, Syed Munawar Hassan, faces tough questions from Iftekhar Ahmed on Jawab Deyh (GEO TV) in Urdu, aired on April 5, 2009. Defending the Taliban rule in Afghanistan was his weakest moment in the interview.

Part I



Part II



Part III



Part IV



(Alternative link to the same interview)

Bahrain and Pakistan: The Shia Dilemmas

(Bahrain's Shia Majority Claims Discrimination - Al Jazeera - May 1, 2009)



(Bahrain, Poverty Down the Sectarian Lines - CNN - Mar 3, 2007)

IN Bahrain, the rulers are engaged in a concerted effort to shift the demographic make-up along the sectarian lines. In a population of around a million, if the government brings in new Sunni immigrants from Syria, Jordan, and other countries in hundreds of thousands that is surely going to raise concerns among the local Shias who are more than 70-80% of the population.

Another issue is that of fair representation in the parliament and other political institutions. Bahraini Shias have also demanded fair representation and opportunities in social and cultural spheres. Social includes educational and job opportunities. Cultural includes representation of their voices and cultural symbols in the public sphere. They complain that their voices are underrepresented and their symbols (like Shia mosques) have been literally kept off the main streets of Bahrain.

The Bahraini Shias are also concerned that foreign personnel, usually from South Asia, serve in the law enforcement agencies. One, the selection criteria in this “foreign deputation” (as it is called in Pakistan) for Bahrain is strictly limited to Sunnis. Two, since these personnel usually do not speak Arabic, their contact is minimal with the local population. Tactfully employing religious, linguistic, and ethnic differences and distances indicates the obvious Machiavellian politics on the part of the rulers, who want to maintain their domination at any cost.

The underlying logic of the conflict is that of power and powerlessness, although sectarian communities are certainly being targeted. But the fight is not between Sunni and Shia masses. It is between a marginalized Shia community and the oppressive rulers who are also supported and influenced by the neighboring Arab regimes.

If Shias do get the legitimate rights they are demanding that would effectively shift the political configuration of the Bahraini state. Hence not only the rulers but also the Arab status quo, dictatorial regimes (Saudi, Jordan, Egypt) perceive the Shia demands as a threat. Their strategy has been to blame Iran for causing agitation among Bahraini Shias. Whether Iran is actually doing that or not, those charges certainly distract attention from the oppressive policies of the Bahraini rulers.

Blaming it on Iran or the so-called “the emergence of Shia crescent” also has a broader utility for the geo-politics of the region: Hamas is now labeled as a Shia organization and Lebanese supposedly speak Farsi! The popularity of Hezbollah's and Hamas' and the Iranian leaders in the Arab world and South Asia - among both Sunnis and Shias - creeps out these Arab regimes. These regimes have always been wary of (1.) the rise of any prominent Arab leader on the inter-regional level (like Gamal Abdul Nasser) who might potentially politicize their subjects/populations, and (2.) their Palestinian refugee populations (an example is in the Jordanian Black September of 1970). During and after the Gaza massacre, the provocative statements by these status quo regimes and also the recent move by Morocco to cut ties with Iran are indications of their bewilderment.

How conflicts are framed in the global media therefore becomes very crucial. Also how Shias engage with their Sunni brothers, how they frame their grievances, and how they protest, whether in the West or in other parts of the world, requires active caution and strategic thinking.

Internal vs. External

In the media, the adjective "sectarian" is often used as the description as well as the explanation of the conflict: that the doctrinal differences and supposedly inherent hatred between the two sects explain the nature of the current conflict(s). That's obviously too simplistic - it emphasizes the religious dimensions at the expense of the political. The region-specific dynamics of conflicts are often ignored in the media to create smooth narratives. It is unfortunate that at times many Sunni and Shias also speak in these over generalized terms.

Even if one broadens the scope of explanation to other factors like internal power struggle, socio-economic discrimination, and rivalry among Muslim states, the focus still tends to be on the ‘internal’. The ‘external’ factors, like the role of foreign powers in forging sectarian conflict in colonial and postcolonial eras, are not given adequate weight. Even Vali Nasr's book “The Shia Revival”, although written in a much nuanced manner, couldn't escape this fragmented focus, as the subtitle of his books clearly states: 'How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future." Any prognosis of either Middle Eastern or South Asian politics however is inadequate without factoring in the role and interests of regional and global powers like the US, Israel, India, China, and Afghanistan.

The popularity of the “sectarian conflict” narrative (as both description and default explanation) poses serious challenges to those Shias and Sunnis who understand the actual dynamics of the conflicts in different regions and want to change the situation. How to raise voice against the injustice but at the same time not promote or multiply the effects of sectarian tensions? Especially considering that conflict in one region - say in Iraq or Bahrain - can have ripple effects on sectarian relations in other parts of world.

The Geo-political Connections

After the unexpected outcome of the summer 2006 Israeli war and then the recent loss of Israel in Gaza, both of which were also bitter losses for the US and the Arab status quo regimes, it became quite predictable that there will be an escalation in sectarian violence in sensitive regions of the world. The Saudi authorities, it seems, are deliberately trying to fan sectarian tensions using one tactic or another (for example, their recent move to put barriers around Jannatul Baqi.) [Edit May 20, 2009: See also here and here]

In Pakistan, the agencies-supported SSP (Sipahe Sahaba) and its allies re-surfaced last year. The connection among these security agencies, the militant SSP, and the Saudis is no secret. (Saudis, it seems, are also trying to revive the old Taliban in Afghanistan.) If the local militant groups in Pakistan were not allied with certain Taliban factions before, according to a recent NYTimes report (April 14, 2009), they are now.

The broader goal, it seems, is to keep both Shias and Sunnis in Pakistan busy. To break their united position on the Palestine and Lebanese resistance movements through the sectarian card. The local and national political circumstances in various regions of Pakistan are making this task (of fanning sectarian conflict) easily achievable (for example the recent clashes in Karachi).

Within this broad geo-political framework, one can see a parallel with the Shia dilemma in 1998 when the Taliban killed a number of Iranian officials in Mazar Sharif and there was a growing pressure on Iran to attack the Taliban in response, while in Pakistan the SSP and Lashkare Jhangvi were ready to do mass killing of Shias if Iran had attacked the Taliban. The two conflicts would have been framed together as a Sunni-Shia war, like the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, which was also instigated and framed likewise.

During the 18-month long siege of Parachinar, Pakistani Shias faced the same dilemma: if they complain that they are being targeted, the conflict will be framed as a sectarian conflict. The criminal elements and the local and foreign Taliban who were attacking them would be presented as representing the Sunni sentiments in Pakistan. The Shias knew that these criminal elements wanted to spread the conflict to the rest of Pakistan (the SSP leaders have repeatedly said that they are targeting Shias in D.I. Khan and other areas because "Sunnis" are being targeted in Parachinar.) The dilemma and challenge, again, was to speak out for justice and struggle for the legitimate rights without falling in the trap of "sectarian conflict".

The dynamics of the political conflict in Bahrain highlights both the country-specific causes and the geo-political connections. Given the variety of power configuration in different regions, Pakistan is a much more complicated case. Especially at stake at the moment are 1. The future of Islamist politics vis-a-vis liberal-secular prescriptions from inside and outside of Pakistan. And the fragile democracy: More and more people are talking about how things were much better under the military rule. 2. The political and economic stability. If the downward spiral continues, we may see a regime change very soon, possibly in the next two months: Either a direct military coup or a compromise between the US and the Pakistani military on Nawaz Sharif type character as a replacement 3. Pakistan's Nuclear assets. Both of these cases - Bahrain and Pakistan - highlight the dilemmas mentioned above.

If this analysis has any weight, Muslims - both Shias and Sunnis - in different regions of the world need to be extra-cautious in how they perceive and respond to any provocation - real or imaginary - from any side.

Karachi Under Fire Again

The ongoing ethnic clashes once again point to the complicated confluence of ethnic politics and religious extremism in Karachi. (See a video report in Urdu here)

For some useful insights, see Dawn April 30, 2009: The Karachi Question: Ethnicity or Extremism? by Huma Yusuf.

On the specter of Talibanization in Karachi and its possible connection to ethnic politics, see political analyst, Ayesha Siddiqa's column published on August 15, 2008: State within State. My comments on this piece are here.

The MQM claims that the conflict was instigated by land grabbers, drugs mafia, and Taliban inspired elements in certain neighborhoods (see a video report in Urdu here). It has also demanded that the IJ Sindh and CCPO Karachi should be removed. In their assessment, the IJ Sindh and CCPO Karachi apparently put some blame on the MQM.

The Turmoil in Afghan-Pakistan Region: Need to put things into perspective

(Above: Afghan Civilian Deaths Breeding Extremism - Al Jazeera - April 27, 2009)

Too often the media has focused on the rhetoric of religious extremists. But that's only part of the picture. Why do some segments of the population find an appeal in their rhetoric? That question has not been looked at closely. The focus is usually on the 'internal'. The usual answer given is the madrassa: Students from under-served socio-economic backgrounds end up in these madrassas where they are brainwashed into becoming 'martyrs'. The external factors, like the one mentioned in the above report, are scarcely considered.

Perhaps even more important is to place the current situation in a sound historical framework. How were Taliban created? What was the context of their creation? Out of multitude of factions in Afghanistan, how come only they were able to consolidate power in the 1990s? What was the utility of Afghan Jihad for the global powers? Today, where are they getting their continuous supply of weapons from? In Pakistan, how come against the bombardment of ISAF/NATO/CIA in FATA and Pakistan Army's continuous campaign in the last many years, they are expanding like wildfire. Why is Army willing to negotiate with Taliban but uses an iron hand against the Baloch insurgents? How this political violence and the extremism it breeds legitimize the presence of global powers in the Afghan-Pakistan region (and, similarly, in Iraq for that matter)?

Concerning the Shia targeting (bombing and target killing) in Pakistan, an important question to consider is how in the face of ISAF/CIA/NATO' s and half-million- strong Pakistan Army's campaign, a few thousand Taliban and their local supporter groups could still open a third front against the Turi/Shia tribes in Kurram Agency (Parachinar, Pewaar, etc.) last year? Anyone familiar with the long history of Taliban and their supporter groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan knows that the timing of their attacks and their targets are usually very strategically calculated. Now whether they do this strategic thinking themselves or the 'hidden hands' behind them (while the Taliban factions consciously or unconsciously play in their hands), the important point is to discern the possible strategic goals. What's at stake in provoking Shias in the current political turmoil and how do they expect Shias to respond?

It's important to distinguish the pawns, the kings, and the actual players playing the game on the chessboard.

The point is not to emphasize one factor (internal or external) over the other (and silent the latter). It's about the need to develop a sound analysis of the ground realities.

After Gaza

Gaza war ended in utter failure for Israel - By Gideon Levy - Ha'aretz, January 22, 2009

Another War, Another Defeat - By John J. Mearsheimer, The American Conservative, January 26, 2009

How do we resolve the Palestine-Israel Conflict? - By Ali A., Gaza Awareness, January 25, 2009

Obama orders closure of Guantanamo in a year, the fate of prisoners remains unclear

A friend forwarded the following. Quite thoughtful.

----------------
Salaams,

I don't recall receiving too many emails regarding the closing of Guantanamo Bay Prison, which Pres. Obama signed an executive order to close within the next year.

This brings up several questions:

• There are approx. 250 prisoners still kept at the prison, what will happen to them?
• Of the ones who are proven guilty, what will be their fate?
• Of the ones who are proven innocent, what will be their fate?
• What reparations will be made to the prisoners and their families of those who were innocent all these years?
• How many of the prisoners will receive a fair trial?
• Will secret evidence be used?
• Will evidence that was obtained while using (illegal forms of) torture be used?
• Where will the innocent prisoners go?
• The US is unwilling to offer any of them to settle in the US.
• They have no say in where they will be sent and may be sent to countries where their families cannot join them.
• Many of their countries of origin have revoked their citizenship/legal status and/or are unwilling to take them back
• The US has repeatedly asked its allies to accept the prisoners, most are unwilling and the ones that are take only a few at a time.
• Until a country is willing to host these individuals, they have to remain in confinement, which may take years (and has for some of the prisoners already released).
• When will the international community challenge the US for using methods that go against the Geneva Conventions?
• What will Congress do when all these issues will be given to them to sort out?
• What is the future of the US's policies on imprisonment, extraordinary rendition, and torture?

If interested, some movies discussing this topic include:

Road To Guantanamo

http://www.roadtoguantanamomovie.com/

Taxi to the Dark Side

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0854678/

OUTLAWED: Extraordinary Rendition, Torture and Disappearances in the "War on Terror"
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=3080182736973832540

Robert Fisk: Why do they hate the West so much, we will ask

Why do they hate the West so much, we will ask
By Robert Fisk, The Indepdent, January 7, 2009
Source

Excerpts:

"So once again, Israel has opened the gates of hell to the Palestinians. Forty civilian refugees dead in a United Nations school, three more in another. Not bad for a night's work in Gaza by the army that believes in "purity of arms". But why should we be surprised?

Have we forgotten the 17,500 dead – almost all civilians, most of them children and women – in Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon; the 1,700 Palestinian civilian dead in the Sabra-Chatila massacre; the 1996 Qana massacre of 106 Lebanese civilian refugees, more than half of them children, at a UN base; the massacre of the Marwahin refugees who were ordered from their homes by the Israelis in 2006 then slaughtered by an Israeli helicopter crew; the 1,000 dead of that same 2006 bombardment and Lebanese invasion, almost all of them civilians?

What is amazing is that so many Western leaders, so many presidents and prime ministers and, I fear, so many editors and journalists, bought the old lie; that Israelis take such great care to avoid civilian casualties. "Israel makes every possible effort to avoid civilian casualties," yet another Israeli ambassador said only hours before the Gaza massacre. And every president and prime minister who repeated this mendacity as an excuse to avoid a ceasefire has the blood of last night's butchery on their hands. Had George Bush had the courage to demand an immediate ceasefire 48 hours earlier, those 40 civilians, the old and the women and children, would be alive.

What happened was not just shameful. It was a disgrace. Would war crime be too strong a description? For that is what we would call this atrocity if it had been committed by Hamas. So a war crime, I'm afraid, it was.
---
"The Sabra and Chatila massacre was committed by Israel's right-wing Lebanese Phalangist allies while Israeli troops, as Israel's own commission of inquiry revealed, watched for 48 hours and did nothing. When Israel was blamed, Menachem Begin's government accused the world of a blood libel. After Israeli artillery had fired shells into the UN base at Qana in 1996, the Israelis claimed that Hizbollah gunmen were also sheltering in the base. It was a lie. The more than 1,000 dead of 2006 – a war started when Hizbollah captured two Israeli soldiers on the border – were simply dismissed as the responsibility of the Hizbollah. Israel claimed the bodies of children killed in a second Qana massacre may have been taken from a graveyard. It was another lie. The Marwahin massacre was never excused. The people of the village were ordered to flee, obeyed Israeli orders and were then attacked by an Israeli gunship. The refugees took their children and stood them around the truck in which they were travelling so that Israeli pilots would see they were innocents. Then the Israeli helicopter mowed them down at close range. Only two survived, by playing dead. Israel didn't even apologise.

Twelve years earlier, another Israeli helicopter attacked an ambulance carrying civilians from a neighbouring village – again after they were ordered to leave by Israel – and killed three children and two women. The Israelis claimed that a Hizbollah fighter was in the ambulance. It was untrue. I covered all these atrocities, I investigated them all, talked to the survivors. So did a number of my colleagues. Our fate, of course, was that most slanderous of libels: we were accused of being anti-Semitic.

And I write the following without the slightest doubt: we'll hear all these scandalous fabrications again. We'll have the Hamas-to-blame lie – heaven knows, there is enough to blame them for without adding this crime – and we may well have the bodies-from-the-cemetery lie and we'll almost certainly have the Hamas-was-in-the-UN-school lie and we will very definitely have the anti-Semitism lie. And our leaders will huff and puff and remind the world that Hamas originally broke the ceasefire. It didn't. Israel broke it, first on 4 November when its bombardment killed six Palestinians in Gaza and again on 17 November when another bombardment killed four more Palestinians."

Dr. Shahid Masood on Gaza - Jan 03 2009 - Urdu

Dr. Shahid Masood, GeoTV, covers the developments in the ongoing Gaza crisis. He laments the shameful role of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi, and other Arab countries for their failure to support the poor Gazans and their complicity in the American-supported Israeli aggression.

For basic demographics and number of casualties in Palestine, see IfAmericansKnew and B'Tselem.

Some useful readings:

On Hamas' elections and the response of the Arab world and the US, see Robert Fisk Welcome to 'Palestine'.

On Israeli violation of the ceasefire, see Barak Ravid in Haaretz and Rory McCarthy in Guardian.

Further:

Jonathan Cook, The real goal of the slaughter in Gaza, Electronic Intifada, Jan 1, 2009

Joseph Levine, History Matters: Why we must acknowledge the claims of the Palestinians, Boston Review, Sep/Oct 2008

Neve Gordon, What, exactly, is Israel’s mission?, CounterPunch, Dec 29, 2008

Joseph Massad, The Gaza Ghetto Uprising, Electronic Intifada, Jan 4, 2009

Ziyaad Lunat, On collaboration and resistance of the oppressed, Electronic Intifada, Jan 03, 2009

Robert Fisk's Why bombing Ashkelon is the most tragic irony, Independent, Dec 30, 2008