Maryam al-Khwaja: Bahrain's struggle is not a Shia-vs-Sunni conflict

Beneath Bahrain's Shia-versus-Sunni narrative, only the tyrants benefit

Through its repressive policies, the regime's long-term goal is to shift Bahrain's demographics: diluting the Shia majority

 

Maryam al-Khawaja, Guardian.co.uk, October 27, 2012

 

 

When you pick up the day's newspaper, it is not likely that you will find much coverage of the ongoing popular revolt in Bahrain. But on the off chance that Bahrain is mentioned, it is almost certain that two words will jump at you: Sunni and Shia. It is even more likely you will see some mention of a Shia revolt against a Sunni monarchy.

This is unfortunate; a very complicated situation is expediently packaged into a soundbite-like myth. That narrative is ahistorical and dangerous because, like all myths, there is a grain of truth to it.

Last year, when Bahrain's revolution began, it was not about sects. Sunnis, Shia along with Bahrain's "sushis" (people of mixed background), non-Muslims, atheists; all came together in Bahrain's version of Tahrir – Pearl Square. Their unifying demand was for a constitutional monarchy to be established in Bahrain. The people were demanding that the king honour his lofty reform promises made when he inherited the position from his Emir father.

This was the third act in a struggle predating the so-called Arab spring. It had started in the 1990s when the people of Bahrain had their own uprising largely forgotten in the west. Then, their demand was a return to Bahrain's more democratic 1973 constitution that gave people a real parliament. Instead, thousands of citizens were arrested and imprisoned. Dozens were killed, many under torture.

In 1999 that cycle was interrupted as Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa inherited power from his late father amid soaring hopes of reconciliation and reform. His first act was to announce a referendum promising to establish a constitutional monarchy.

Initially, the people celebrated Hamad's break with his repressive father's legacy as many voted in favour of the referendum. They were encouraged by the release of all political prisoners, and the return of political exiles back to Bahrain, and a halt of state-sanctioned torture.

In 2002, borrowing a page from Napoleon Bonaparte's playbook, "Hamad the Reformer" engineered his own monarchic putsch. He amended the constitution, granting himself absolute unchecked powers. A rubber-stamp parliament was then created – half appointed by him and the other half "elected", but with no legislative or monitoring powers.

The farce extended to elections as electoral districts were set up to prevent the opposition from ever making significant gains. As a result, if the leading opposition group got 60% of all votes, the new re-districting made it so that they would win only 18 out of 40 seats in the parliament. These measures were at the heart of a comprehensive effort to marginalise and discriminate against the country's majority population: Shia Muslims.

Bahrain's unwritten laws insidiously establish a quasi-apartheid regime preventing Shias from state-owned housing and many government jobs. For instance, there are entire areas like Riffaa, where Shia are not allowed to rent, buy homes or land.

Ironically, the country's largest employer is none other than the interior ministry and the security forces in charge of protecting the regime. Shia Muslims who, according to the latest numbers provided are about 70% of the population, are not allowed to be employed in them. They justify this through what Bahrainis call "political naturalisation".

For two decades, tens of thousands of people from places like Syria, Jordan, Yemen and Pakistan were expediently granted citizenship in Bahrain. All of them are Sunnis.

The regime is thus resolving two problems. A short-term need is filling the security services with politically reliable elements beholden to the monarchy and not to the nation. The long-term goal is to artificially shift the country's demographics: diluting the Shia majority.

Consequently, newly built government houses go to the politically naturalised, while a regular Bahraini family (Sunni or Shia) has to wait up to 20 years to receive housing. Many Bahrainis sit at home unemployed, while politically naturalised people receive a job immediately upon arrival.

These policies are not fortuitous but part of a deliberate attempt to foment sectarian tensions in society, and to play on the region's geopolitical and sectarian fault lines.

In the past, Bahrain's opposition was "Nasser-socialists before they were dubbed communists". Today they are regarded as Iranian agents and terrorists.

Aided by more than 13 different European and American public relations companies at times, the regime aims to turn its blatant repression into a net asset by capitalising on the fear of the enemy du jour: Shia Iran. At the end of the day the fact remains the same: you can be Shia and loyal to the regime, like Sameera Rajab who is minister of information; and you can be Sunni, sentenced by a military court, tortured and serving time in prison, like Ebrahim Sharif.

Next time you pick up a newspaper remember that the sectarian Shia-versus-Sunni narrative only serves Bahrain's tyrants. That is, of course, if Bahrain is written about at all.

When you pick up the day's newspaper, it is not likely that you will find much coverage of the ongoing popular revolt in Bahrain. But on the off chance that Bahrain is mentioned, it is almost certain that two words will jump at you: Sunni and Shia. It is even more likely you will see some mention of a Shia revolt against a Sunni monarchy.

This is unfortunate; a very complicated situation is expediently packaged into a soundbite-like myth. That narrative is ahistorical and dangerous because, like all myths, there is a grain of truth to it.

Last year, when Bahrain's revolution began, it was not about sects. Sunnis, Shia along with Bahrain's "sushis" (people of mixed background), non-Muslims, atheists; all came together in Bahrain's version of Tahrir – Pearl Square. Their unifying demand was for a constitutional monarchy to be established in Bahrain. The people were demanding that the king honour his lofty reform promises made when he inherited the position from his Emir father.

This was the third act in a struggle predating the so-called Arab spring. It had started in the 1990s when the people of Bahrain had their own uprising largely forgotten in the west. Then, their demand was a return to Bahrain's more democratic 1973 constitution that gave people a real parliament. Instead, thousands of citizens were arrested and imprisoned. Dozens were killed, many under torture.

In 1999 that cycle was interrupted as Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa inherited power from his late father amid soaring hopes of reconciliation and reform. His first act was to announce a referendum promising to establish a constitutional monarchy.

Initially, the people celebrated Hamad's break with his repressive father's legacy as many voted in favour of the referendum. They were encouraged by the release of all political prisoners, and the return of political exiles back to Bahrain, and a halt of state-sanctioned torture.

In 2002, borrowing a page from Napoleon Bonaparte's playbook, "Hamad the Reformer" engineered his own monarchic putsch. He amended the constitution, granting himself absolute unchecked powers. A rubber-stamp parliament was then created – half appointed by him and the other half "elected", but with no legislative or monitoring powers.

The farce extended to elections as electoral districts were set up to prevent the opposition from ever making significant gains. As a result, if the leading opposition group got 60% of all votes, the new re-districting made it so that they would win only 18 out of 40 seats in the parliament. These measures were at the heart of a comprehensive effort to marginalise and discriminate against the country's majority population: Shia Muslims.

Bahrain's unwritten laws insidiously establish a quasi-apartheid regime preventing Shias from state-owned housing and many government jobs. For instance, there are entire areas like Riffaa, where Shia are not allowed to rent, buy homes or land.

Ironically, the country's largest employer is none other than the interior ministry and the security forces in charge of protecting the regime. Shia Muslims who, according to the latest numbers provided are about 70% of the population, are not allowed to be employed in them. They justify this through what Bahrainis call "political naturalisation".

For two decades, tens of thousands of people from places like Syria, Jordan, Yemen and Pakistan were expediently granted citizenship in Bahrain. All of them are Sunnis.

The regime is thus resolving two problems. A short-term need is filling the security services with politically reliable elements beholden to the monarchy and not to the nation. The long-term goal is to artificially shift the country's demographics: diluting the Shia majority.

Consequently, newly built government houses go to the politically naturalised, while a regular Bahraini family (Sunni or Shia) has to wait up to 20 years to receive housing. Many Bahrainis sit at home unemployed, while politically naturalised people receive a job immediately upon arrival.

These policies are not fortuitous but part of a deliberate attempt to foment sectarian tensions in society, and to play on the region's geopolitical and sectarian fault lines.

In the past, Bahrain's opposition was "Nasser-socialists before they were dubbed communists". Today they are regarded as Iranian agents and terrorists.

Aided by more than 13 different European and American public relations companies at times, the regime aims to turn its blatant repression into a net asset by capitalising on the fear of the enemy du jour: Shia Iran. At the end of the day the fact remains the same: you can be Shia and loyal to the regime, like Sameera Rajab who is minister of information; and you can be Sunni, sentenced by a military court, tortured and serving time in prison, like Ebrahim Sharif.

Next time you pick up a newspaper remember that the sectarian Shia-versus-Sunni narrative only serves Bahrain's tyrants. That is, of course, if Bahrain is written about at all.

Saudis continue to bulldoze Islam's history

The Saudi sacrilege and destruction of Islam's historical and sacred sites have a long history and they continue to this day as the following two stories (also) point out. Following these links are some bits from history.

NYTimes (2002): Where the Prophet Trod, He Begs,Tread Lightly: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/15/international/middleeast/15SAUD.html

The Independent (2012): Saudis take a bulldozer to Islam's history (quoted below): http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/medina-saudis-take-a-bulldozer-to-islams-history-8228795.html

 

The Baqi cemetery years before the Saudi demolition

The Baqi cemetery after the 1925 Saudi demolition

Jannat al-Baqi is a cemetery in Medina, adjoining the Prophet's Mosque. Buried there are "Wives and Companions of the Prophet, several Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt [the noble progeny of the Prophet Mohammad], and a host of lesser luminaries from the spiritual and intellectual history of Islam." (Algar 2002:27). This was done by the forces of King Abdul Aziz al-Saud in the year 1345 AH (April 21, 1925)" (p. 43).

This was the second time the Saudi-Wahhabis engaged in the sacrilege of the two holy cities. From 1806 to 1812, for about six and a half years of their short-lived rule in the Mecca and Medina, the Saudi-Wahhabis alliance "engaged in their signature activity of dome demolition. In Mecca, the domes over the houses reputed to have been the birthplaces of the Prophet, Khadijat al-Kubra, Imam Ali, and Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, were destroyed, and the tombs and mausolea in the historic cemetery of al-Ma'la were levelled to the ground. In Medina, the treasury of the Prophet's Mosque was plundered but attempts to demolish the dome surmounting the grave of the Prophet were abandoned when several of the zealots entrusted with the task fell providentially to their deaths" (p. 27). About four years before, in 1802, Saudi-Wahhabi forces had similarly pillaged the holy city of Karbala in southern Iraq, the place of martyrdom and burial of Imam Husayn, the grandson of the Prophet (p. 24).

In 1925, numerous historic sites that had survived the previous Wahhabi occupation were demolished (p. 43).

Source: Hamid Algar. 2002. Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Islamic Publications International.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Independent story

Saudis take a bulldozer to Islam's history

Authorities are building a mosque so big it will hold 1.6m people – but are demolishing irreplaceable monuments to do it

 

Jerome Taylor, The Independent, Friday, 26 October 2012 

 

Three of the world’s oldest mosques are about to be destroyed as Saudi Arabia embarks on a multi-billion-pound expansion of Islam’s second holiest site. Work on the Masjid an-Nabawi in Medina, where the Prophet Mohamed is buried, will start once the annual Hajj pilgrimage ends next month. When complete, the development will turn the mosque into the world’s largest building, with the capacity for 1.6 million worshippers.

But concerns have been raised that the development will see key historic sites bulldozed. Anger is already growing at the kingdom’s apparent disdain for preserving the historical and archaeological heritage of the country’s holiest city, Mecca. Most of the expansion of Masjid an-Nabawi will take place to the west of the existing mosque, which holds the tombs of Islam’s founder and two of his closest companions, Abu Bakr and Umar.

Just outside the western walls of the current compound are mosques dedicated to Abu Bakr and Umar, as well as the Masjid Ghamama, built to mark the spot where the Prophet is thought to have given his first prayers for the Eid festival. The Saudis have announced no plans to preserve or move the three mosques, which have existed since the seventh century and are covered by Ottoman-era structures, or to commission archaeological digs before they are pulled down, something that has caused considerable concern among the few academics who are willing to speak out in the deeply authoritarian kingdom.

“No one denies that Medina is in need of expansion, but it’s the way the authorities are going about it which is so worrying,” says Dr Irfan al-Alawi of the Islamic Heritage Research Foundation. “There are ways they could expand which would either avoid or preserve the ancient Islamic sites but instead they want to knock it all down.” Dr Alawi has spent much of the past 10 years trying to highlight the destruction of early Islamic sites.

With cheap air travel and booming middle classes in populous Muslim countries within the developing world, both Mecca and Medina are struggling to cope with the 12 million pilgrims who visit each year – a number expected to grow to 17 million by 2025. The Saudi monarchy views itself as the sole authority to decide what should happen to the cradle of Islam. Although it has earmarked billions for an enormous expansion of both Mecca and Medina, it also sees the holy cities as lucrative for a country almost entirely reliant on its finite oil wealth.

Heritage campaigners and many locals have looked on aghast as the historic sections of Mecca and Medina have been bulldozed to make way for gleaming shopping malls, luxury hotels and enormous skyscrapers. The Washington-based Gulf Institute estimates that 95 per cent of the 1,000-year-old buildings in the two cities have been destroyed in the past 20 years.

In Mecca, the Masjid al-Haram, the holiest site in Islam and a place where all Muslims are supposed to be equal, is now overshadowed by the Jabal Omar complex, a development of skyscraper apartments, hotels and an enormous clock tower. To build it, the Saudi authorities destroyed the Ottoman era Ajyad Fortress and the hill it stood on. Other historic sites lost include the Prophet’s birthplace – now a library – and the house of his first wife, Khadijah, which was replaced with a public toilet block.

Neither the Saudi Embassy in London nor the Ministry for Foreign Affairs responded to requests for comment when The Independent contacted them this week. But the government has previously defended its expansion plans for the two holy cities as necessary. It insists it has also built large numbers of budget hotels for poorer pilgrims, though critics point out these are routinely placed many miles away from the holy sites.

Until recently, redevelopment in Medina has pressed ahead at a slightly less frenetic pace than in Mecca, although a number of early Islamic sites have still been lost. Of the seven ancient mosques built to commemorate the Battle of the Trench – a key moment in the development of Islam – only two remain. Ten years ago, a mosque which belonged to the Prophet’s grandson was dynamited. Pictures of the demolition that were secretly taken and smuggled out of the kingdom showed the religious police celebrating as the building collapsed.

The disregard for Islam’s early history is partly explained by the regime’s adoption of Wahabism, an austere and uncompromising interpretation of Islam that is vehemently opposed to anything which might encourage Muslims towards idol worship.

In most of the Muslim world, shrines have been built. Visits to graves are also commonplace. But Wahabism views such practices with disdain. The religious police go to enormous lengths to discourage people from praying at or visiting places closely connected to the time of the Prophet while powerful clerics work behind the scenes to promote the destruction of historic sites.

Dr Alawi fears that the redevelopment of the Masjid an-Nabawi is part of a wider drive to shift focus away from the place where Mohamed is buried. The spot that marks the Prophet’s tomb is covered by a famous green dome and forms the centrepiece of the current mosque. But under the new plans, it will become the east wing of a building eight times its current size with a new pulpit. There are also plans to demolish the prayer niche at the centre of mosque. The area forms part of the Riyadh al-Jannah (Garden of Paradise), a section of the mosque that the Prophet decreed especially holy..

“Their excuse is they want to make more room and create 20 spaces in a mosque that will eventually hold 1.6 million,” says Dr Alawi. “It makes no sense. What they really want is to move the focus away from where the Prophet is buried.”

A pamphlet published in 2007 by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs – and endorsed by the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdulaziz al Sheikh – called for the dome to be demolished and the graves of Mohamed, Abu Bakr and Umar to be flattened. Sheikh Ibn al-Uthaymeen, one of the 20th century’s most prolific Wahabi scholars, made similar demands.

“Muslim silence over the destruction of Mecca and Medina is both disastrous and hypocritical,” says Dr Alawi. “The recent movie about the Prophet Mohamed caused worldwide protests... and yet the destruction of the Prophet’s birthplace, where he prayed and founded Islam has been allowed to continue without any criticism.”

Mecca and Medina in numbers

12m The number of people who visit Mecca and Medina every year

3.4m The number of Muslims expected to perform Hajj (pilgrimage) this year

60,000 The current capacity of the Masjid an-Nabawi mosque

1.6m The projected capacity of the mosque after expansion

1990 Election Rigged, Rules Pakistan's Supreme Court

For some background, see here

1990 Election was Rigged, Rules SC
October 19, 2012, Dawn.com
http://dawn.com/2012/10/19/asghar-khan-case-sc-resumes-hearing-3/

ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court on Friday ordered legal proceedings against a former head of intelligence and former army chief over allegations that politicians were bankrolled to stop the current ruling Pakistan People’s Party from winning the 1990 election.

It was a landmark ruling from the Supreme Court 16 years after retired air marshal Asghar Khan filed a case, accusing the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency of doling out money to a group of politicians in the 1990s.

A three-judge bench comprising the chief justice, Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja and Justice Khilji Arif Hussain issued the short order after hearing a petition filed in 1996 by Khan requesting the court to look into allegations that the Inter-Services Intelligence had financed many politicians in the 1990 election by dishing out Rs140 million to create the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) and stop Benazir Bhutto’s PPP from coming to power. The petition was based on an affidavit of Durrani.

The Supreme Court in its short order ruled that there was ample evidence to suggest that the 1990 election was rigged and that a political cell maintained by the then president Ghulam Ishaq Khan supported the formation of the IJI to stop a victory of the PPP. The ruling said Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Baig and Durrani violated the Constitution.

The Supreme Court ruled that “the general election held in the year 1990 was subjected to corruption and corrupt practices.” Moreover, “it has been established that an “Election Cell” had been created in the Presidency, which was functioning to provide financial assistance to the favoured candidates, or a group of political parties to achieve desired result by polluting election process and to deprive the people of Pakistan from being represented by their chosen representatives.”

“Late Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the then President of Pakistan, General (R) Aslam Baig and General (R) Asad Durrani acted in violation of the Constitution,” said the apex court, adding the federal government should take “necessary steps under the Constitution and Law against them.”

Stating that corruption was carried out in the 1990 election, the ruling said that the president, the army chief and the ISI’s director-general were not authorised to constitute an election cell. It added that the state should implement its authority through the elected representatives of the people.

The election cell “was aided by General (R) Mirza Aslam Baig who was the Chief of Army Staff and by General (R) Asad Durrani, the then Director General ISI and they participated in the unlawful activities of the Election Cell in violation of the responsibilities of the Army and ISI.”

The apex court moreover ruled that political cells of the ISI and the President House should be abolished and ordered the government to take legal action against former retired generals involved in the corruption as well as against Younus Habib, former president of the now defunct Mehran Bank.

The court further ordered that money that was illegally disbursed among the politicians by the then president and the ISI should be recovered and deposited in the Habib Bank along with the accumulated interest on it. Adding to that, the short order said that legal action should also be taken against the politicians who received the money.

The order adds that “legal proceedings shall be initiated against the politicians, who allegedly have received donations to spend on election campaigns in the general election of 1990”, and a “transparent investigation on the criminal side shall be initiated by the FIA against all of them.”

“Mr. M. Younas A. Habib, the then Chief Executive of Habib Bank Ltd…arranged/provided Rs.140 million belonging to public exchequer, out of which an amount of Rs.60 million was distributed to politicians,” added the short order.

The ruling further said that Federal Investigation Agency should investigate into the matter, adding that, if evidence was found against anyone, action should be taken against them.

Moreover, the Supreme Court said that political activism was not the domain of the military and the intelligence agencies. Their job is to cooperate with the government, the judgment said.

Friday’s proceedings

During the hearing, Attorney General Irfan Qadir began presenting his arguments.

Qadir said he was representing the federation and the defence ministry.

Responding to which, Chief Justice Iftikhar directed Qadir to produce the document enabling him to represent the defence ministry.

The attorney general said he would try to assist the court to the best of his abilities “in the short time that was available” to him.

Qadir criticised the judiciary upon which the bench expressed its displeasure.

The attorney general said he had reservations over comments alleged to have been made by Justice Khawaja.

“Justice Khawaja said the Pakistan People’s Party government had failed to perform in the past four years,” Qadir said.

Upon which, Justice Hussain said: “You should not name a particular judge. Those were the remarks of the bench.”

The attorney general requested the bench to exclude the concerned remarks from the record of the case.

Qadir added that judges had taken oaths under the PCO in the past and had also allowed the military to step in, in violation of the Constitution.

The attorney general moreover said that the Asghar Khan case had been pending for the past 15 years and blamed the judiciary for the delay.

He further alleged that “the present judiciary” wanted to “destabilise the government”.

The chief justice remarked that Rs140 million had been given out by Younus Habib and asked as to who was responsible for that.

He further said that evidence suggested that the money was distributed at the behest of the presidency, adding that, prima facie the President House was involved in the operation.

The chief justice reiterated that the president should be impartial and should not partake in political activity.

Responding to which, the attorney general said that the president’s oath does not restrict him from partaking in politics, adding that, the office of the president was also a political position.

The president’s oath is not any different from the oaths administered to the prime minister and the ministers, Qadir said.

Upon which, the chief justice said that the Constitution entitles the president, not the prime minister, as the head of state.

The attorney general added the parliament had on several occasions saved the judiciary from embarrassment.

Chief Justice Iftikhar said the judiciary would not allow derailment of democracy in the country.

He further said that former interior minister Lt-Gen (retd) Naseerullah Babar had also revealed that money was distributed to politicians to manipulate the country’s politics, adding that, it was allegedly done in the greater national interest.

The attorney general said those involved in the decisions of the past were important personalities, adding that, the individuals who were accused of receiving the money should also be heard.

Zia personally supported sectarian outfits in Pakistan

Yet another piece of evidence:

"Tariq Khosa, a former director-general of FIA, recalled how sectarian groups like the Sipah-i-Sahaba received official patronage at the highest level in the 1980s.

Reminiscing about his early days in police force, he said when he was an ASP in Jhang district, he apprehended Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of the SSP, for delivering a provocative speech. But the then president Ziaul Haq himself intervened for his release, Mr Khosa added.

Similarly, in another incident he had hauled up a cache of weapons, but was asked to release that on directives from none other than Gen Zia."


Senate body’s rare foray into military matters
DAWN,September 29, 2012
http://dawn.com/2012/09/29/senate-bodys-rare-foray-into-military-matters/

ISLAMABAD, Sept 28: The Senate’s defence committee broke fresh ground in the country’s parliamentary history on Friday by holding a public hearing on issues of national security that were long kept shrouded in excessive secrecy.

Predictably enough, the first hearing caused considerable excitement among the participants. The speakers’ candid remarks didn’t disappoint the audience either.

Hearing experts’ views about changing nuances of the country’s nuclear doctrine, official patronage of sectarianism and how drones had been more effective than counter-militancy operations in Fata was a refreshing experience in the chambers long dominated by official narrative.

The standing committee on defence and defence production is holding a series of public hearings in the lead-up to preparation of a national defence strategy document that the committee’s chairman, Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed, intends to compile by the start of next year.

Those who testified at the committee included defence analyst Shireen Mazari (nuclear program), retired police officer Tariq Khosa (counter-terrorism) and journalist Saleem Safi (Afghanistan).

The committee’s initiative to hold public hearings comes after parliament got a say in matters related to foreign policy and defence, two areas dominated by the military establishment, earlier this year following the unfortunate Salala incident of November last year.

Public hearings by parliamentary committees, among other purposes, serve to get the opinions of experts in a particular field to supplement government-furnished reports.

The information obtained through the hearings helps parliamentarians to make informed analyses and decisions.

The National Assembly rules allow for public hearings, while Senate regulations are a bit ambiguous.

While there is no explicit provision for public hearing in Senate rules, one of the sections of the rules indirectly allows for it: “A committee may invite or summon any person or member having a special knowledge to give an expert opinion…”

Senator Mushahid, the driving force behind the new tradition, said: “We’ll all go back wiser.”

Marvi Sirmed, project manager for UN-funded project ‘Strengthening Democracy through Parliamentary Development’ (SDPD), whose organisation works for capacity building of parliamentarians and has long advocated openness in working of parliament, said the holding of first public hearing was a dream come true.

NUCLEAR PROGRAM: Ms Mazari, who recently parted ways with the Tehrik-i-Insaaf, said there were perceptible changes in the nuclear doctrine that had been necessitated by the evolving situation in the region, especially India’s cold start doctrine and development of an anti-ballistic missile shield.

Rejecting the criticism surrounding the testing of tactical short range NASR missile, she said the weapon was “strategic for us given our geographic proximity to India”.

Ms Mazari called for sustaining the position on the fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) warning that any compromise would undermine Pakistan’s deterrence capacity.

Senator Farhatullah Babar recalled how Pakistan’s doctrine transformed from deterrence to that of minimum deterrence and now credible deterrence.

He called for a debate on effectiveness of the nuclear doctrine.

TERRORISM: Tariq Khosa, a former director-general of FIA, recalled how sectarian groups like the Sipah-i-Sahaba received official patronage at the highest level in the 1980s.

Reminiscing about his early days in police force, he said when he was an ASP in Jhang district, he apprehended Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of the SSP, for delivering a provocative speech. But the then president Ziaul Haq himself intervened for his release, Mr Khosa added.

Similarly, in another incident he had hauled up a cache of weapons, but was asked to release that on directives from none other than Gen Zia.

After 9/11, Mr Khosa said, dealing with Al Qaeda and Taliban became an exclusive domain of ISI’s counter-terrorism wing.

He disclosed that a survey had revealed that 25,000 young men hailing from Punjab had been trained in Afghanistan.

Based on the findings, Mr Khosa had recommended their de-radicalisation, but during his testimony he regretted that not much had been done in that direction. The mastermind of last month’s Kamra attack was also someone who had fought in Afghanistan, the former FIA chief said.

He called for peaceful resolution of the Balochistan crisis, putting the national counter-terrorism agency under the control of prime minister, giving legal cover to ISI’s counter-terrorism wing and review of anti-terrorism laws.

AFGHANISTAN: Saleem Safi said the much criticised drone attacks were actually effective in breaking the backbone of militants in tribal areas.

He said only an all-inclusive reconciliation process would work to Pakistan’s advantage. Mr Safi said Al Qaeda had lost influence in Afghanistan, but was gaining ground in Pakistan.