Balochistan CM dismissed after Shia protests throughout Pakistan



Governor’s rule imposed in Balochistan
Dawn, Jan 14, 2013
http://dawn.com/2013/01/14/constitutions-article-234-invoked-to-defuse-tension-in-quetta-governors-rule-imposed-in-balochistan/

QUETTA: The PPP government finally yielded to the protests that had enveloped the entire country over the weekend and Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf announced in front of a gathering of representatives of Hazara Shia community late on Sunday night that the provincial government was being dismissed forthwith and governor’s rule was being imposed in the whole of Balochistan.
“After holding consultations with all the stakeholders, we have decided to invoke Article 234 of the Constitution. Governor’s rule is being imposed in the province and the provincial government is being dismissed,” Mr Ashraf announced in front of the Hazara representatives.

His announcement was welcomed by thousands of Hazara Shias who had been staging a sit-in in freezing cold on Alamdar Road for the last three days along with the bodies of dozens of people killed in bombings on Thursday.

The prime minister took a bold but extremely necessary step of visiting the place in the middle of the night to make the announcement.

Earlier in the day, leaving Interior Minister Rehman Malik to deal with the Qadri march on Islamabad, Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf rushed to Quetta as the government braced itself against countrywide protests.

As night fell the protests had gained so much momentum that when media reports came that the prime minister was considering dismissing the provincial government, they seemed believable.

Protesting the carnage caused by three blasts in the provincial capital on Thursday, Hazaras, along with the unburied bodies of the victims, took to the streets on Friday, saying that the sit-in would not end and the funerals would not take place till the government called in the military to put an end to the attacks.

By Saturday, parallel protests had begun in major cities such as Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad — organised by Shia groups and parties as well as civil society.

On Sunday, these protests seemed to have enveloped the entire country, reducing the long march, which had dominated the political scene for the past few weeks, to a side story.

From Lahore to Karachi to Islamabad to Multan in the south and Skardu in the snow-covered north, the protests drew in more and more people. From religious leaders to women and children, the Pakistanis were united in condemning the targeted killing of an ethnic community and a sect, whose deaths had dominated the stories of violence and mayhem coming out of Pakistan in 2012.

Slogans such as “End to the killings of Shias” reverberated in every city and placards that read “Am I the next victim” were pictured in the hands of men, women and small children.

In Islamabad, the civil society protest continued overnight.

The Shia groups and parties, which had dispersed late on Saturday night, re-appeared and blocked a major road connecting the twin cities. Another protest by the parties also blocked part of the Islamabad-Lahore motorway.

In the opposite end of Pakistan, one group of protesters headed for the heavily protected Bilawal House where President Asif Ali Zardari has been ensconced for weeks. Despite being threatened by water canons — a favoured SOP of the Karachi police — the protest continued.

Other protests in the city were at Malir, M.A. Jinnah Road, Ancholi in Federal ‘B’ Area and North Nazimabad. At most of the protests, women were present in large numbers.

These were not protests that were limited to a particular political party or a particular social class.

Lahore too witnessed protests.

The demonstrations and the anger behind them were so palpable that the political leadership was forced to react in an unprecedented manner. The barrage of criticism directed at the PPP at the centre and in Balochistan had sent the party leadership into feverish activity by Sunday morning.

The prime minister flew into Quetta and was holed up in the Governor’s House all day, accompanied by Information Minister Qamar Zaman Kaira.

There was no news on when he planned to return but there were multiple reports that the PPP was now going to do something it had refused to do earlier when the Supreme Court had observed in its order on the Balochistan security situation case that the
 provincial government had lost its constitutional authority to rule.

The federal government had then refused to touch the provincial government but on Sunday it could no longer hold firm.

Prime Minister Raja Ashraf met provincial ministers, conferred with the governor and Law Minister Farooq Naek on the various options available which included, reportedly, the dismissal of the government and imposition of governor’s rule.

Phone calls went back and forth.

But despite all the activity, the Balochistan chief minister, who is probably the most criticised politician in the country at the moment, and a PPP member, did not return to Pakistan.

By the evening, even politicians were echoing the protesters’ demand to remove him. The MQM, ANP chief Asfandyar Wali and PML-Q leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain demanded that he be removed.

The political leadership was also forced into action by the growing protests.

Imran Khan, the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf chief, turned up at the Quetta protest early on Sunday morning, while the rest of the political leaders also headed for protest destinations in various cities later. Some PML-N leaders showed up at a protest in Lahore while the MQM joined the protesters in Karachi. Even the local Jamaat-i-Islami representative in Islamabad spoke at the civil society protest.

Others were forced to provide sound bites to the media in a bid to show they cared. General (retd) Pervez Musharraf also spoke to news channels on the issue.

All eyes are now on the Bilawal House in Karachi and the Governor’s House in Quetta — only they can now end this wave of anger that has swept the entire country.

— Additional reporting by our correspondents in Quetta, Karachi and Lahore

Is this a Sunni-Shia conflict in Pakistan?

Much has been written on this blog as to why the attacks on the Shias, Barelwi Sunnis, Sufi/Shia/Sunni shrines, imambargahs, muharram processions, and mosques must not be thought of as a "Sunni-Shia" conflict. For one, often the same sectarian groups are behind these attacks. Moreover, there are broader political interests attached to these militant activities (consider for instance the factors involved in 2009 Karachi Ashura bombing; see here and here). Some of these sectarian groups are also linked to the anti-Pakistan Taliban groups, which have also attacked the military and police bases in Pakistan. They are said to have been involved in attacks on political parties as well. While other Taliban groups -- the "good" Taliban -- are still protected by the rogue elements of the state's security agencies. These groups have also aligned themselves with other sectarian outfits.

Within the above context, consider these two pieces of evidence.

1. An Ahle Hadith Cleric Gunned Down; One Militant Caught

This militant was not Shia. Yet in the simplistic numerical aggregations of some journalistic accounts, the killed cleric, belonging to the Sunni Ahle Hadith school, would be categoried as a "Sunni" and the event as a "Sunni-Shia" conflict. Too often this is how the so-called "sectarian" violencde has been viewed. See in this previous post how the 2006 Nishtar Park bombing was blamed on the Shias by a foreign journalist.



http://tribune.com.pk/story/475750/deserted-by-friends-fleeing-suspect-caught-by-mob/

KARACHI (Dec 6, 2012): A target killer was caught red-handed by seminary students after his accomplices escaped but his motorcycle stalled as he tried to flee after killing a cleric in New Karachi.

The prayer leader-cum-seminary teacher of Jamia Masjid-o-Madressa Islamia, Qari Ahsanullah Rasheed, was shot dead on Wednesday evening while he was teaching Quran to the students, Bilal Colony police said.

Three armed men came to the mosque on a motorcycle, witnesses said. One of the three entered the mosque and shot the victim in the head, killing him on the spot. When he went outside, he saw his accomplices had already escaped. He tried to kick-start the motorcycle but as a mob approached him, he started running. He also fired at the crowd, injuring a man in the shoulder, SP Salman Hussain, the New Karachi division police chief, told The Express Tribune. The killer was then handed over to the police.

The accused was later identified as Kashif Shakoor alias Bilal, who lives in Quaidabad. During interrogation, the assassin said he was associated with a militant outfit. “He was directed by someone from Waziristan to kill the victim on suspicion of being a police informer,” said the SP citing the suspect.

The victim, Qari Rasheed, had been associated with the mosque for the past 15 years. The killer and his victim both were from the Ahle Hadith sect, said SP Hussain.

Unconfirmed reports suggested they were also associated with the Jamaatud Dawa but its spokesperson denied, saying the organisation had no links with the mosque, its administration or the men.

Earlier, a young man was shot dead at his car showroom on Shaheed-e-Millat Road, Ferozabad police said. Two armed men on a motorcycle shot Tanvir Hussain Bangash, 28, twice, killing him on the spot, said ASP Ghulam Murtaza Malik. The victim, father of one, lived in PECHS and belonged to the Shia sect.

Suspected militants arrested

A potential attack on an imambargah in Gulshan-e-Iqbal was averted as two suspects allegedly associated with the banned religious outfit, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), were arrested on Tuesday night, Azizabad police said.

Five men in a high-roof vehicle were asked to stop by police in Block-2, Federal B Area but they started firing. After an encounter, Hafiz Hanif and Qari Chiraghuddin were arrested while three of their accomplices escaped, the police said.

The police have identified the other suspects as Qari Ghulam Mohammad, Qari Ghulam Akbar and Riaz. The law enforcers are conducting raids in different neighbourhoods in search of the other alleged militants.

During interrogation, the men admitted they were associated with the LeJ as well as Harkatul Mujahideen and were planning to attack an imambargah in Gulshan-e-Iqbal through an explosives-laden vehicle, said DSP Saleem Akhtar Siddiqui. The suspects were trained in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

The suspects were also involved in collecting funds for their organisations through donations and selling skins of sacrificial animals.

Published in The Express Tribune, December 6th, 2012.

2. A Sectarian Militant Killed in Quetta; belonged to the Levies Force

On September 30, 2012, two gunmen attacked a jewelry shop owned by a Shia Muslim, Abdul Khaliq, in Quetta’s Liaquat Bazar. Khaliq was injured in the attack. The shop's private security guard returned fire and killed one gunman, while the other escaped. The gunman was identified as Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, a sepoy in Balochistan Levies, a paramilitary force, who was posted in Balochistan's Sherani district. In another case, a gunned down attacker turned out to be a part of an anti-terrorism task force. It is rare that an attacker would be killed or captured. But these two cases are sufficient to consider that the anti-Shia outfits have deep penetration and connections. At times, those captured have also been able to "escape" from jail. For instance, two high profile militants, Usman Saifullah Kurd and Shafeeq Rind, had escaped from a tightly secured jail of Anti-Terrorist Force in the Quetta Cantonment area.

Abdul Khaliq, the shop owner in the above case, was a Qandhari Shia. In the last few years, the sectarian outfits have indiscriminately killed hundreds of Shias from Hazara, Qandhari, Punjabi, Saraeki, and other ethnic backgrounds in Balochistan. Over 100 Shias have been killed in 2012 alone.
 

Muharram and Lahore

Karbala and how Lahore was involved
November 26, 2012 by Majid Sheikh
http://dawn.com/2012/11/26/karbala-and-how-lahore-was-involved/print/

IN our school and college days we all loved to assist friends set up ‘sabeels’ alongside Lahore`s traditional ‘Ashura’ procession, providing cold drinks to the thousands who mourned. Sects and beliefs never mattered then. But then neither did one`s religion.

For well over 1,332 years, the tragedy of Karbala moves everyone who hears about it, be they Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Sikh or any other religion. This is one incident that brings out the need to support those with a moral position.

As children we attended the ‘sham-i-ghareeban’ with our Shia friends, and learnt the lesson of supporting those in the right. Everyone respected the beliefs of others. Yes, there were always a few silly chaps who wanted attention, but they were at best ignored.

The ancient city of Lahore is connected to the tragedy in no uncertain terms.

Historical accounts say seven brave warriors from Lahore died while fighting in the Battle of Karbala. It is said their father Rahab Dutt, an old man who traded with Arabia in those days, had promised the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him) to stand by his grandson in his fight to uphold the truth.

That pledge the brave Rajput Mohiyals of the Dutt clan from Lahore upheld.

Today they are known as Hussaini Brahmins, who lived in Lahore till 1947.

Then there is the fact that besides the Hindu Rajputs of Lahore, in the battle also fought John bin Huwai, a freed Christian slave of Abu Dharr al-Ghafari, whose `alleged` descendents, one researcher claims, still live inside the Walled City of Lahore.

I have been on the track of these ancestors for quite some time and have been able to trace one Christian family living inside Mori Gate. They claim to have a connection with a `Sahabi` whose name they cannot recollect. M. A. Karanpikar`s `Islam in Transition`, written over 250 years ago, made this claim, but I do not think it is a claim worth pursuing.

But the most powerful claim of Lahore as the place where the descendents of Hussain ibn All came lies in the Bibi Pak Daman graveyard, where the grave of Ruquiya, sister of Hussain ibn Ali and wife of Muslim ibn Ageel, is said to exist.

Also graves here attributed to the sisters of Muslim ibn Ageel and other family members. Many dispute this claim.

But then no less a person than Ali Hasan of Hajweri, known popularly as Data Sahib, came here every Thursday to offer ‘fateha’ at the grave, informing his followers that this was the grave of Ruquiya. The place where he always stood to offer `fateha` has been marked out, and his book also verifies this claim. Mind you detractors exist, of this have no doubt, but the supporting evidence is quite strong.

Let me begin the story of the Dutts by going through the record of the Shaukat Khanum Hospital and the recorded fact that Indian film star Sunil Dutt, who belonged to Lahore, made a donation to the hospital and recorded the following words: ‘For Lahore, like my elders, I will shed every drop of blood and give any donation asked for, just as my ancestors did when they laid down their lives at Karbala for Hazrat Imam Husain.

Makes you think -but then there is this account which says that the seven sons of Rahab Dutt lost their lives defending the Imam at Karbala. The Martyr’s List at Qum verifies this. History records when the third thrust by Yazid’s forces came, the Dutt brothers refused to let them pass. The seven Punjabi swordsmen stood their ground till they were felled by hundreds of horsemen. In lieu of the loyalty of the Dutt family to that of the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him) was coined the famous saying: ‘Wah Dutt Sultan, Hindu ka dharm, Musalman ka iman, Adha Hindu adha Musalman.’ Since then, so the belief goes, Muslims were instructed never to try to convert the Dutts to Islam.

A grieving Rahab returned to the land of his ancestors, and after staying in Afghanistan, returned to Lahore. I have tried my very best to locate their ‘mohallah’ inside the Walled City, and my educated guess is that it is Mohallah Maulian inside Lohari Gate. Later they moved to Mochi Gate, and it was there that the famous Dutts lived before 1947 saw them flee from the hate of the people they gave everything for.

The most interesting thing about the Hussaini Brahmins is that they are highly respected among Hindus, and even more amazingly it is said that all direct ancestors of Rahab Dutt are born with a light slash mark on their throat, a sort of symbol of their sacrifice. I was reading a piece by Prof Doonica Dutt of Delhi University who verified this claim and said that all true Dutts belong to Lahore.

I must point out to an amazing version of these events that an Indian historian, Chawala, has come up with. It says that one of the wives of Hazrat Imam Husain, the Persian princess Shahr Banu, was the sister of Chandra Lekha or Mehr Banu, the wife of an Indian king Chandragupta. We know that he ruled over Lahore. When it became clear that Yazid ibn Muawiya was determined to eliminate Hussain ibn Ali, the son of Hussain (named Ali) rushed off a letter to Chandragupta asking for assistance. The Mauriyan king, allegedly, dispatched a large army to Iraq to assist. By the time they arrived, the Tragedy of Karbala had taken place.

In Kufa in Iraq a disciple of Hazrat Imam Husain is said to have arranged for them to stay in a special part of the town, which even today is known by the name of Dair-i-Hindiya or ‘the Indian quarter’ The Hussaini Brahmins believe that in the Kalanki Purana, the last of 18 Puranas, as well as the Atharva Veda, the 4th Veda, refers to Hazrat Imam Husain as the avatar of the Kali Yug, the present age. They believe that the family of the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him)is Om Murti, the most respected family before the Almighty.

All these facts bring me back to our days as school children working hard to provide relief to the mourners on Ashura. Reminds me of our neighbour Nawab Raza Ali Qizilbash, who invited us to his ‘haveli’ every year to see the preparations before the event. Raza Bhai is no more, and neither is the tolerance that we all enjoyed so much.

1990 Election Rigged, Rules Pakistan's Supreme Court

For some background, see here

1990 Election was Rigged, Rules SC
October 19, 2012, Dawn.com
http://dawn.com/2012/10/19/asghar-khan-case-sc-resumes-hearing-3/

ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court on Friday ordered legal proceedings against a former head of intelligence and former army chief over allegations that politicians were bankrolled to stop the current ruling Pakistan People’s Party from winning the 1990 election.

It was a landmark ruling from the Supreme Court 16 years after retired air marshal Asghar Khan filed a case, accusing the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency of doling out money to a group of politicians in the 1990s.

A three-judge bench comprising the chief justice, Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja and Justice Khilji Arif Hussain issued the short order after hearing a petition filed in 1996 by Khan requesting the court to look into allegations that the Inter-Services Intelligence had financed many politicians in the 1990 election by dishing out Rs140 million to create the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) and stop Benazir Bhutto’s PPP from coming to power. The petition was based on an affidavit of Durrani.

The Supreme Court in its short order ruled that there was ample evidence to suggest that the 1990 election was rigged and that a political cell maintained by the then president Ghulam Ishaq Khan supported the formation of the IJI to stop a victory of the PPP. The ruling said Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Baig and Durrani violated the Constitution.

The Supreme Court ruled that “the general election held in the year 1990 was subjected to corruption and corrupt practices.” Moreover, “it has been established that an “Election Cell” had been created in the Presidency, which was functioning to provide financial assistance to the favoured candidates, or a group of political parties to achieve desired result by polluting election process and to deprive the people of Pakistan from being represented by their chosen representatives.”

“Late Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the then President of Pakistan, General (R) Aslam Baig and General (R) Asad Durrani acted in violation of the Constitution,” said the apex court, adding the federal government should take “necessary steps under the Constitution and Law against them.”

Stating that corruption was carried out in the 1990 election, the ruling said that the president, the army chief and the ISI’s director-general were not authorised to constitute an election cell. It added that the state should implement its authority through the elected representatives of the people.

The election cell “was aided by General (R) Mirza Aslam Baig who was the Chief of Army Staff and by General (R) Asad Durrani, the then Director General ISI and they participated in the unlawful activities of the Election Cell in violation of the responsibilities of the Army and ISI.”

The apex court moreover ruled that political cells of the ISI and the President House should be abolished and ordered the government to take legal action against former retired generals involved in the corruption as well as against Younus Habib, former president of the now defunct Mehran Bank.

The court further ordered that money that was illegally disbursed among the politicians by the then president and the ISI should be recovered and deposited in the Habib Bank along with the accumulated interest on it. Adding to that, the short order said that legal action should also be taken against the politicians who received the money.

The order adds that “legal proceedings shall be initiated against the politicians, who allegedly have received donations to spend on election campaigns in the general election of 1990”, and a “transparent investigation on the criminal side shall be initiated by the FIA against all of them.”

“Mr. M. Younas A. Habib, the then Chief Executive of Habib Bank Ltd…arranged/provided Rs.140 million belonging to public exchequer, out of which an amount of Rs.60 million was distributed to politicians,” added the short order.

The ruling further said that Federal Investigation Agency should investigate into the matter, adding that, if evidence was found against anyone, action should be taken against them.

Moreover, the Supreme Court said that political activism was not the domain of the military and the intelligence agencies. Their job is to cooperate with the government, the judgment said.

Friday’s proceedings

During the hearing, Attorney General Irfan Qadir began presenting his arguments.

Qadir said he was representing the federation and the defence ministry.

Responding to which, Chief Justice Iftikhar directed Qadir to produce the document enabling him to represent the defence ministry.

The attorney general said he would try to assist the court to the best of his abilities “in the short time that was available” to him.

Qadir criticised the judiciary upon which the bench expressed its displeasure.

The attorney general said he had reservations over comments alleged to have been made by Justice Khawaja.

“Justice Khawaja said the Pakistan People’s Party government had failed to perform in the past four years,” Qadir said.

Upon which, Justice Hussain said: “You should not name a particular judge. Those were the remarks of the bench.”

The attorney general requested the bench to exclude the concerned remarks from the record of the case.

Qadir added that judges had taken oaths under the PCO in the past and had also allowed the military to step in, in violation of the Constitution.

The attorney general moreover said that the Asghar Khan case had been pending for the past 15 years and blamed the judiciary for the delay.

He further alleged that “the present judiciary” wanted to “destabilise the government”.

The chief justice remarked that Rs140 million had been given out by Younus Habib and asked as to who was responsible for that.

He further said that evidence suggested that the money was distributed at the behest of the presidency, adding that, prima facie the President House was involved in the operation.

The chief justice reiterated that the president should be impartial and should not partake in political activity.

Responding to which, the attorney general said that the president’s oath does not restrict him from partaking in politics, adding that, the office of the president was also a political position.

The president’s oath is not any different from the oaths administered to the prime minister and the ministers, Qadir said.

Upon which, the chief justice said that the Constitution entitles the president, not the prime minister, as the head of state.

The attorney general added the parliament had on several occasions saved the judiciary from embarrassment.

Chief Justice Iftikhar said the judiciary would not allow derailment of democracy in the country.

He further said that former interior minister Lt-Gen (retd) Naseerullah Babar had also revealed that money was distributed to politicians to manipulate the country’s politics, adding that, it was allegedly done in the greater national interest.

The attorney general said those involved in the decisions of the past were important personalities, adding that, the individuals who were accused of receiving the money should also be heard.

Zia personally supported sectarian outfits in Pakistan

Yet another piece of evidence:

"Tariq Khosa, a former director-general of FIA, recalled how sectarian groups like the Sipah-i-Sahaba received official patronage at the highest level in the 1980s.

Reminiscing about his early days in police force, he said when he was an ASP in Jhang district, he apprehended Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of the SSP, for delivering a provocative speech. But the then president Ziaul Haq himself intervened for his release, Mr Khosa added.

Similarly, in another incident he had hauled up a cache of weapons, but was asked to release that on directives from none other than Gen Zia."


Senate body’s rare foray into military matters
DAWN,September 29, 2012
http://dawn.com/2012/09/29/senate-bodys-rare-foray-into-military-matters/

ISLAMABAD, Sept 28: The Senate’s defence committee broke fresh ground in the country’s parliamentary history on Friday by holding a public hearing on issues of national security that were long kept shrouded in excessive secrecy.

Predictably enough, the first hearing caused considerable excitement among the participants. The speakers’ candid remarks didn’t disappoint the audience either.

Hearing experts’ views about changing nuances of the country’s nuclear doctrine, official patronage of sectarianism and how drones had been more effective than counter-militancy operations in Fata was a refreshing experience in the chambers long dominated by official narrative.

The standing committee on defence and defence production is holding a series of public hearings in the lead-up to preparation of a national defence strategy document that the committee’s chairman, Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed, intends to compile by the start of next year.

Those who testified at the committee included defence analyst Shireen Mazari (nuclear program), retired police officer Tariq Khosa (counter-terrorism) and journalist Saleem Safi (Afghanistan).

The committee’s initiative to hold public hearings comes after parliament got a say in matters related to foreign policy and defence, two areas dominated by the military establishment, earlier this year following the unfortunate Salala incident of November last year.

Public hearings by parliamentary committees, among other purposes, serve to get the opinions of experts in a particular field to supplement government-furnished reports.

The information obtained through the hearings helps parliamentarians to make informed analyses and decisions.

The National Assembly rules allow for public hearings, while Senate regulations are a bit ambiguous.

While there is no explicit provision for public hearing in Senate rules, one of the sections of the rules indirectly allows for it: “A committee may invite or summon any person or member having a special knowledge to give an expert opinion…”

Senator Mushahid, the driving force behind the new tradition, said: “We’ll all go back wiser.”

Marvi Sirmed, project manager for UN-funded project ‘Strengthening Democracy through Parliamentary Development’ (SDPD), whose organisation works for capacity building of parliamentarians and has long advocated openness in working of parliament, said the holding of first public hearing was a dream come true.

NUCLEAR PROGRAM: Ms Mazari, who recently parted ways with the Tehrik-i-Insaaf, said there were perceptible changes in the nuclear doctrine that had been necessitated by the evolving situation in the region, especially India’s cold start doctrine and development of an anti-ballistic missile shield.

Rejecting the criticism surrounding the testing of tactical short range NASR missile, she said the weapon was “strategic for us given our geographic proximity to India”.

Ms Mazari called for sustaining the position on the fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) warning that any compromise would undermine Pakistan’s deterrence capacity.

Senator Farhatullah Babar recalled how Pakistan’s doctrine transformed from deterrence to that of minimum deterrence and now credible deterrence.

He called for a debate on effectiveness of the nuclear doctrine.

TERRORISM: Tariq Khosa, a former director-general of FIA, recalled how sectarian groups like the Sipah-i-Sahaba received official patronage at the highest level in the 1980s.

Reminiscing about his early days in police force, he said when he was an ASP in Jhang district, he apprehended Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of the SSP, for delivering a provocative speech. But the then president Ziaul Haq himself intervened for his release, Mr Khosa added.

Similarly, in another incident he had hauled up a cache of weapons, but was asked to release that on directives from none other than Gen Zia.

After 9/11, Mr Khosa said, dealing with Al Qaeda and Taliban became an exclusive domain of ISI’s counter-terrorism wing.

He disclosed that a survey had revealed that 25,000 young men hailing from Punjab had been trained in Afghanistan.

Based on the findings, Mr Khosa had recommended their de-radicalisation, but during his testimony he regretted that not much had been done in that direction. The mastermind of last month’s Kamra attack was also someone who had fought in Afghanistan, the former FIA chief said.

He called for peaceful resolution of the Balochistan crisis, putting the national counter-terrorism agency under the control of prime minister, giving legal cover to ISI’s counter-terrorism wing and review of anti-terrorism laws.

AFGHANISTAN: Saleem Safi said the much criticised drone attacks were actually effective in breaking the backbone of militants in tribal areas.

He said only an all-inclusive reconciliation process would work to Pakistan’s advantage. Mr Safi said Al Qaeda had lost influence in Afghanistan, but was gaining ground in Pakistan.

Shia Killing in Quetta - CNBC Pakistan's program in Urdu

Pakistan's CNBCTv program about Shia Killing in Quetta -- Part I CNBCTv program about Shia Killing in Quetta -- Part II CNBCTv program about Shia Killing in Quetta -- Part III

On Media Partisanship in Pakistan

Syed Talat Hussain, a senior journalist, speaks on the partisanship of the news media in Pakistan.

Large part of media is associated with political groups: Talat Hussain

See a related post here

BBC Urdu Blog: Scratching the Shias from Pakistan?

 

میں سچا مسلمان کیسے بنوں؟

 

ایک سنی دیوبندی گھرانے میں پیدا ہونے والا وسعت اللہ خان خود کو ایک اچھا مسلمان ثابت کرنے کے لئے کہاں تک جائے، کیا کرے ؟؟؟

شاید شیعوں کو مارنے سے میرا کام نہیں چلے گا۔ شائد اور بہت کچھ کرنا پڑے گا۔

تو کیا بو علی سینا کی قبر پر جا کے تھوک دوں؟

بابائے الجبرا الخوارزمی کے فارمولے جلا دوں؟

بابائے کیمیا جابر بن حیان کی ہڈیاں زمین سے نکال لوں؟

بابائے فلکیات البیرونی کے مزار کو آگ لگادوں؟

مورخ المسعودی کی تاریخِ اسلام حرام سمجھ لوں؟

حضرت معروف ِ کرخی کے تصوف، ملا صدرا کے نظریہِ وجودیت اور سیّد علی ہمدانی کی تبلیغ کو شرک کے خانےمیں رکھ دوں؟

عمرِ خیام کی رباعیات چھلنی کر دوں؟

شاہ نامہ والے فردوسی کا تہران یونیورسٹی میں لگا مجسمہ گرا دوں؟

ڈاکٹر علی شریعتی کو مرتد مان لوں؟

جو بھی قلی قطب شاہ، میر، غالب، انیس، دبیر، اکبر الہ آبادی، جوش، علی سردار جعفری، کیفی اعظمی اور جون ایلیا کے شعر پڑھے، پڑھائے یا حوالہ دے، کیا اس کا منہ نوچ لوں؟

اردو کا سب سے بڑا ناول آگ کا دریا، دریا برد کردوں؟ خاک اچھا ہوگا ایسا ناول جسے قرت العین جیسی شیعہ نے لکھا ہو۔

اور صادقین نامی شیعہ کی قرانی کیلی گرافی کسی تہہ خانے میں چھپا دوں؟

کیا جہانگیر کی ایرانی محبوبہ نور جہاں کو بھی ذہن سے مٹا دوں؟

تاج محل کو ڈائنامائیٹ لگا دوں جس میں سنی شاہ جہاں کی شیعہ اہلیہ ممتاز محل سو رہی ہے؟

نادر شاہ کا تذکرہ صفحات سے کیسے کھرچوں؟

بتائیے حیدر علی شیعہ اور شیر کی ایک دن کی زندگی گیدڑ کی سو سالہ زندگی سے بہتر ہے والے فتح علی ٹیپو سلطان کے ساتھ کیا کروں؟

جنگِ آزادی کی ہیروئن بیگم حضرت محل کا تذکرہ کہاں لے جاؤں؟

جس شخص کو بانیِ پاکستان کہا جاتا ہے اس پر سے شیعت کا دھبہ کیسے مٹاؤں؟ اسے تو غالباً سنی علامہ اقبال نے ضد کرکے انگلستان سے بلوایا تھا نا۔

اور یہ راجہ صاحب محمود آباد اپنی شیعت بھول بھال کر پاکستان کی نوزائیدہ مملکت پر دامے درمے کیوں قربان ہوگئے۔ شاید وہ پاکستان کو شیعہ ریاست بنانا چاہتے تھے ۔تبھی تو !!!!

اور ایوب خان کو کسی راسخ العقیدہ نے بروقت کیوں مشورہ نہیں دیا کہ ایک سنی اکثریتی نظریاتی ملک کی حسّاس فوجی قیادت ایک ہزارہ شیعہ جنرل موسی کے حوالے نا کرے۔ اور دیکھو ایوب خان نے مزید کیا غضب کیا کہ پینسٹھ کی جنگ لڑنے کی ذمہ داری بھی جنرل موسی کو تھما دی۔

اور سادہ لوح سنیوں نے یہ کیا کیا کہ ذوالفقار علی بھٹو کو کندھے پر اٹھا لیا۔ کیا انہیں کسی نے نہیں بتایا کہ وہ شیعہ ہے اور سینہ زوری دیکھو کہ خبردار کرنے کے باوجود بھی اس کی بیٹی کو دو دفعہ وزیرِ اعظم بنا لیا ؟؟؟

شاید گلگت اور بلتستان کے شیعوں کو بالکل ٹھیک سزا مل رہی ہے۔ آخر کس نے کیپٹن حسن، صوبیدار میجر بابر اور ان کے ساتھیوں کو کہا تھا کہ خود ہی بندوق اٹھا لیں، خود ہی کشمیر کی ڈوگرہ حکومت کی غلامی کندھوں سے اتار پھینکیں اور آزادی کمانے کے لگ بھگ بیس روز بعد ہی پاکستان سے آئے ہوئے پہلے پولٹیکل ایجنٹ کو سیلوٹ مار کےگلگت بلتستان کی چابیاں اس کے حوالے کردیں۔ آج بھی ان کی نسلیں اس پر اتراتی ہیں کہ باقی پاکستان تو میز پر بنا۔ ہم نے اپنا حصہ بندوق سے آزاد کروایا۔ مگر ان نسلوں کو اتنی عقل نہیں ہے کہ قومی شناختی کارڈ پر اپنا نام ہی تبدیل کروالیں۔

اور یہ نگر اور ہنزہ کی اسماعیلی شیعہ ریاستیں کس برتے پر پاکستان میں مدغم ہو گئیں؟

جانے کیا سوچ کر حوالدار لالک جان انیس سو ننانوے میں کارگل کی چوٹیوں پر جان دے کر نشانِ حیدر والوں کی صف میں شامل ہوگیا۔ تو کیا میں یہ مطالبہ کردوں کہ اس شیعہ سے نشانِ حیدر واپس لیا جائے اور اسے شہید نا کہا جائے اور یہ نشانِ حیدر کس نے نام رکھا؟ کیا پاکستان کے اعلی ترین فوجی اعزاز کا نام نشانِ صحابہ، نشانِ جھنگوی، نشانِ جیش، نشانِ طالب یا نشانِ قاعدہ رکھتے ہوئے ہتک محسوس ہوتی ہے ؟؟؟

مجھے پانچ سال کی عمر میں انگلی پکڑ کے اے بی سی ڈی سے متعارف کرانے والے استاد کے سنگِ مزار پر سے حمید حسن نقوی کا نام کھرچوا کے دلاور خان یا خورشید صدیقی یا اسلم فاروقی یا بابر بلوچ یا پھر بھگوان داس لکھوانے سے کیا کام چل جائے گا ؟؟؟؟

بتائیے نا! آخر کیا کروں خود کو ایک اچھا سچا مسلمان ثابت کرنے کے لئے ؟؟؟؟

 

 

Just a quick clarification: Nagar is a Twelver Shia populated region in Gilgit-Baltistan. Across Nagar is the Ismaili Shia region of Hunza.

 

Karachi Ashura Bombing Revisited

In parts of his new book, Instant City (2011), NPR’s Steve Inskeep investigates the Ashura bombing of December 28, 2009 against Karachi's urban, cosmopolitan context. I haven’t read the whole book yet except for the parts on the Ashura bombing. In these parts, Inskeep engages different theories and evidence about the perpetrators. Some of these theories and evidence were shared on this blog after the said bombing. Inskeep’s investigative narrative provides some additional insights and evidence, which if taken with a grain of salt, would be relevant for any evaluation of the (so-called) “sectarian” violence in Karachi.

Before I copy the relevant excerpts, it is important to note that Karachi’s politics – or Pakistan’s politics, for that matter – is not Inskeep’s specialized area, so it is not surprising that Inskeep makes some blatant errors in his narrative. One such error is his suggestion that the 2006 Nishtar Park bombing of the Sunni Tehreek gathering was carried out by Shia militants (p. 17). Inskeep seems to assume that if the blast is on a Sunni gathering, it must have come from the ‘opposite’ side – the Shias. Anyone familiar with the politics on the ground knows that that political gathering of this Barelvi Sunni group, Sunni Tehreek, on the 12th of the Islamic month of Rabiulawwal was targeted by the same criminal elements who had been targeting the Shias for many years. Many Sunni Tehreek leaders have also publicly pointed the finger at these criminal elements (See here, here, and here, in Urdu).

Looking closely at the text of Inskeep’s allegation, it appears that he felt compelled to insert some reference to Shia militants in order to create a journalistic ‘balance’ or ‘objectivity’ – ‘if you point out “Sunni” “extremists”, then you must also mention some “Shia” “extremists” to create that balance.' Inskeep imposes this 'balance' regardless of the asymmetry of Shia killing in Pakistan, and regardless of the fact that in the case of the Nishtar Park bombing, the same criminal elements may have been involved (the criminal elements who were killing both Sunnis and Shias).

Consider Inskeep’s text:

“One of the first stories I covered as a reporter in Karachi involved the Shia community: in 2002, men on motorcycles were following Shia professionals and community leaders – doctors, lawyers, engineers – and shooting them in the head. The killings had become normal. They happened all the time. Presumably the culprits were Sunni extremist groups who considered the Shias to be apostates.

The Shias had their own militants. In 2006 a gathering of Sunnis was bombed in Nishtar Park, around the corner from Abbas Kumeli’s home.

As accustomed as he was to sectarian violence, Kumeli sensed something different in December 2009...” (p. 17)

Note in the middle short para above how Inskeep connects the Nishtar Park bombing to the presumed Shia militancy: not by directly stating it, but by having the two sentences in the same paragraph. Some would consider this sleight of hand a lazy journalistic “balancing”; others would see this serious and unfounded charge as quite unethical.

In the above quoted text, Inskeep also mixes the description of violence with the explanation of it when he reduces the motivation of the “extremists” to be about doctrinal dispute ("Shias to be apostates"). This implied explanation (that focuses on sectarian-religious impulses) undermines the politics of such violence, such as the ethnic politics of Karachi; the interests and support of the country’s security agencies and their rogue elements; the security establishment’s “Good Taliban, BadTaliban” policy; and the involvement of foreign powers, their interests, and their spy elements in Pakistan (for instance, see here and here).

Another more subtle error could be seen in the way Inskeep describes the Muharram/Ashura procession. It sounds like the procession is exclusively a Shia gathering where the Sunnis are largely spectators. However, anyone familiar with the history and culture of these gatherings in South Asia would know that the reality is more complicated than this simplistic dichotomy. Muharram commemorations are attended by Muslims from various backgrounds and even by non-Muslims. The Ashura blast itself provides an indication of this complexity. As a previous post pointed out, 15 of the 50 killed were Sunnis; two were Bohra Shias; and one was Christian; and the rest were Twelver Shias. Some of these were participants and some were also part of volunteer services (as indicated in this partial list here). A senior reporter for the Geo News, Fahim Siddiqui, was also among those hit by the blast on that day. His son and niece who were with him died in the blast. In the simplistic, Sunni/Shia classifications, Fahim Siddiqui would be considered a Sunni, and yet he (along with his son and niece) attended the said procession on that day, and not as a spectator but as a participant. I think there is a more nuanced story to be told here about Muharram commemorations.

Excerpts from the book, Instant City (2011), starting form page 17:

Shortly before the procession, Pakistan’s interior minister visited Karachi. “He met with me in this room where we are sitting,” Kumeli said. The interior minister brought along the governor of Sindh, the province of which Karachi is the capital; each man represented a leading political party – one came from the mayor’s party, known as the MQM, and the other from the rival People’s Party. Both parties had joined an uneasy coalition that was attempting to share power in the province as well as the national government. And today these two officials were delivering a carefully calibrated message to Shia leaders around the city. “They were saying that they had made foolproof security arrangements, and also expressing the satisfaction they were hopeful that no such thing would take place.

“But they were expressing their fears as well.”

The visitors didn’t say exactly why they were afraid, but the list of plausible suspects was well known, starting with Sunni extremist groups that targeted the Shias. Then there were Taliban insurgents, who were bombing Pakistani cities that year in response to an army offensive against their mountain sanctuaries. Karachi politicians who showed up for the parade could become targets for enemies or rivals. And as Kumeli mulled the possibility of attack, he learned of the explosions at two smaller Shia processions on the two days before the climactic march. The blasts increased the tension, even though police blamed one of the explosions on gas from an open sewer line.

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One the day of the Ashura procession in 2009, many Karachi residents of other sects and faiths volunteered their time to ensure the safety and comfort of the Shias as they marched. And chief among them were scores of young men who turned up now and again in the city’s security videos, often wearing distinctive khaki uniforms. They were Pakistan Boy Scouts, including Sunni Muslims, Hindus, even Christians…

[A] metal box stood next to a light pole. It was a box of considerable size, more than six feet high on metal legs, with a sloping metal roof. If anyone should come across a damaged Koran, or discarded paper with a Koranic inscription, people were supposed to drop it though a slot in the box so that no one would throw the holy words in the garbage or trample them underfoot. The book stood near the banyan tree, and it was inside that box of wayward scripture that someone had planted a bomb. (p.24)

[My notes: Since Koran (Quran) is considered sacred by all Islamic schools of thought, and perhaps equally by the religious “extremists,” the choice of the place to hide the bomb should complicate any analysis of the motivations and background of the perpetrators.]

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The city surveillance video includes no sound.

The camera looks silently down on Jinnah Road from the old city hall. The banyan tree is visible in its little triangular park, across the street and maybe a hundred yards away.

The video recording shows the mourners coming into sight, walking toward the camera. The lead ranks, including the Shia scouts, have just passed the tree, which is visible behind them. They calmly pass in front of the blue-and-white sign of the Subhanallah Bakery.

Then the explosion rips into the body of the crowd. Within two seconds, thick gray smoke has risen as high as a five-story building…

Survivors affirmed later that there were two explosions. The first was sharp and small, like a firecracker, coming from near a water barrel. It may have been designed to startle people, fix them in place. Then the main explosion knocked Najeeb Ilyas to the ground…

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We have only begun to recount the multiple events of December 28, but the Ashura bombing alone demands some explanation. Authorities made their first efforts to assign some meaning to the blast well before the day reached its disastrous conclusion. Early media reports quoted government officials who blamed a “suicide bomber.” Pakistan’s interior minister Rehman Malik said the bomber had links to two militant groups, including Pakistan’s version of the Taliban. The Taliban soon claimed responsibility, also describing it as a suicide attack. Evidence, however, began pointing in another direction. Federal investigators studied steel nuts that were strewn on the road, the same ones Faisal Edhi had noticed, and the nuts made them doubt that a suicide bomber was responsible. Hundreds of nuts were too heavy to carry as shrapnel. When choosing a final wardrobe, investigators believed, the discriminating suicide bomber would prefer lightweight ball bearings… (p. 27)

Even more proof came in the form of torn metal fragments. They originated from the box of Koranic scripture. Video images from before the blast showed an Edhi ambulance parked beside the box. Images taken afterward showed the ambulance crumpled like an aluminum can, but still parked in place. The box was gone, blown apart, with pieces flung outward in all directions. The explosion could only have come from inside it, likely detonated by remote control.

A dead boy who had been mistakenly described as a suicide bomber was identified as a Boy Scout.

Police eventually dismissed the Taliban as suspects, instead linking the attack to a little-known Pakistani militant group with ties to al Qaeda [the police and news sources named this group as Jundallah. This group is known to have links with Washington]. We will see as our story unfolds that this militant group was originally organized to punish Pakistan’s government for cooperating with the United States in hunting down militants. So if the police were correct, we can read the attack as one bloody episode in al Qaeda’s long war with the West.

But on another level, the Ashura bombing had little to do with the West. No Americans were targeted. The bombers did not even directly strike America’s allies in the Pakistani government, instead wiping out common citizens on the street. People in the United States barely noticed the attack, which received only brief coverage in the midst of the American holiday season…. The Ashura bombing was instead an atrocity staged for a local audience, in which attackers and victims alike were Muslims. We may better understand it as part of a long battle within Islam [Is Inskeep calling it a “sectarian” battle between the “Shias” and “Sunnis”?], as well as a struggle for power in Pakistan. The details of the attack – the targeting of a vulnerable minority, the state’s failure to provide effective security, and explosives placed with awful symbolism in a box of damaged Korans – reflected disturbing trends through much of the modern Muslim world. [Inskeep needs to read the history of Taliban and al Qaeda and their creators once again; for instance, see here] They also reflected Pakistan’s own peculiar problems….

Karachi also faces a diversity of conflicts, which came into play after the Ashura bombing. [Why only after the bombing? Why separate the two incidents - bombing and fires? Is it possible that the pre-pared arsonists did not know about the bombing? If they did, were they and their interests then not involved from the beginning?] A second event extended the day’s destruction, and revealed more of the competing pressures that shape the instant city. Rival politicians, businessman, soldiers, and thugs jostle for power and land. Religion, while often invoked, is just one of several social divides; people are at least as likely to be split by their class, the location of their ancestral village, or the language they speak at home. Few people trust the government to mediate their differences. All these conflicts combine and intensify one another, like pouring chemicals on a building that’s already on fire, creating unpredictable conflagrations that define life and death in Karachi. (p. 29)

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The fires spread along the route we have just traced, beginning at the banyan tree.

Minutes after the Ashura blast, people began breaking into the closed stores in the Lighhouse Bazaar. They pried open the corrugated metal gate to a store selling bolts of cloth and shiny men’s suits. The shop reached far back into the building; the men set it all on fire. Other shops were torched the same way. Some people crossed the street from the bazaar to the old city hall. They smashed the windows of the city fumigation trucks parked by the building and torched them one after another. Soon the flames reached a portion of the building itself. Fire trucks began arriving within minutes, but the crews were quickly driven away by the enraged survivors…

[Compare the above text in which Inskeep describes the scene at the Lighthouse area in terms of an “enraged” crowd that had lost control or gone mad, to how he describes (just four paragraphs later) the scene at the Bolton Market and its coordinated and pre-planned logic. Bolton Market was just a mile away from the Lighthouse area.]

“There was fire all around,” remembered Faisal Edhi of the ambulance service. “I was there about one and a half hours. We were asking the fire brigade to fight against the fire, but they were not present there, they were afraid to come.” They only came later, and “the markets were burned by that time.”

The thousands of police and paramilitary troops along the route made little effort to control the situation, choosing instead to make a tactical retreat.

In the video room at the Civic Centre, Bobby Memon and the police officials saw the chaos unfolding and made no effective response. In Memon’s view, it was a simple lack of coordination. “We always talk about that in a city like Karachi, there should be a central command system; they should have a camera working; and that should be linked to the barricade – should be linked to the ambulances – linked to the hospitals. And that’s only where you can respond to a crisis situation,” he said. Any police officer watching those scenes “was just in there watching. If something happened, what were they going to do?”

Other accounts suggested that the chain of command worked only too well – and that it restrained the police from acting. A Pakistani newspaper, the News International, reported that police requested permission to shoot the arsonists and were refused. Officials feared that if they responded to the violence with force, the situation would escalate and the whole city would explode.

During that first hour after the blast, two dozen or more men appeared on Jinnah Road. Many were about a mile ahead of where the parade had stopped – on the far side of the old city hall. Here they stood between long grand buildings of yellow stone – Gizri stone, it was called, after the location of the quarry that produced it. This was the wholesale district, known as Bolton Market.

The men broke into National Arms, a store that had sold weapons on this spot since 1948, and made off with Chinese- and Turkish-made handguns. They broke into a second gun store. Some men had torches. Soon entire buildings were in flames.

Television crews broadcast much of this live, which was how the shopkeeper learned of the destruction of his property… (p. 31)

Once the fire crews felt secure enough to operate, they moved from one burning building to another, yet the fires did not die. Mustafa Kamal, the younger mayor of Karachi, moved among the firefighters, offering exhortations and encouragement. It was much too late. The fires burned all night and for several days afterward. Hundreds of shops were destroyed. More than a dozen people were killed in the chaos on the streets.

“Who do you think did all the burning?” I asked Rashid, the plastic seller.

“I just don’t understand,” he replied. He reminded me that the fires in the Bolton Market only seemed to have spread to one side of Jinnah Road. “You will see that all the shops on the right side are affected. Not a single shop on the left side was burnt. Not a single shutter was broken.” That was one of many observations that shopkeepers made to each other as they speculated that certain buildings or blocks might have been deliberately targeted.

A question began forming in their minds – a question without any firm foundation [??], but one shopkeeper after another was asking it.

Was someone trying to clear off certain properties for later use?

Their question was spreading like the fires. (p. 32)

Flames and smoke still rose over Bolton Market, visible for miles through Karachi’s haze, as police began to investigate. Agents from Pakistan’s equivalent of the FBI arrived up the street at the Lighthouse Centre; we have already glimpsed them, peering at steel nuts and dead bodies. They were joined by the special investigations unit of the Karachi police, which handles terrorism cases.

The antiterrorism specialists who focused on the bombing case did not examine the fires at all, classifying them as, essentially, unrelated crimes. “There were two different things,” said Raja Umer Khattab, a senior superintendent of police, when we talked about the case. “One is the blast, and the second is after the blast.” He told me that separate investigators were assigned to the fires, and their examination produced only the arrests of a few Shia Muslims, in line with the policy theory of the case: the fires were set by people in the procession who were enraged by the bombing.

This explanation appeared to satisfy almost nobody outside the police force. Abbas Kumeli, the Shia Muslim leader, argued that the theory made no sense. Granted, the Shia marchers were standing there at the Lighthouse Centre, where some of the fires took place, but the marchers were nowhere near the Bolton Market. Why had the worst fires been set there? Why would angry Shia marchers walk past a mile of buildings and leave them all untouched, then start lighting fires again?

In the absence of a convincing official explanation, people were already supplying their own. (p.33)

In search of more information, I visited the local office of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan… In the commission’s offices… [t]he man I had come to see led the way to a conference table in the breeze near an open window. His name was Abdul Hai. In the days after the fires, he was part of a Human Rights Commission team that conducted its own interviews with shopkeepers and others. Their report released on January 9, 2010, included this provocative paragraph:

“After interviewing and listening [to] the sufferers points of view, the team was of the opinion that the burning and looting was preplanned and was done by 25 to 30 persons who were fully trained and were possessing steel cutters, tools, fire arms and chemicals. It is very important to note that [the] procession of mourners after the bomb blast passed away and there was none of them at burning and looting sites.”

An operation that was preplanned? It was a strong statement in an otherwise carefully worded report. A covering note minimized its key finding: “This report is a mere compilation of the views of people affected directly by the attack.” Not, in other words, any sort of official conclusion.

Abdul Hai made a copy of his report on the Ashura bombing and gave me a chance to look it over. He emphasized again that the report simply passed on the claims of shopkeepers. “I have no opinion,” he said, gradually becoming more vague and evasive, or so it seemed to me.

I pressed him politely. He was a professional; he knew Karachi, he had talked with victims, some of whom may have witnessed the fires; he had even issued this report. What did he think might have happened? Who was responsible for burning several blocks of the city?

Some kind of mafia, he said.

And who might that be?

“Ah,” he said, in a tone that suggested: Now there’s the hard part. “Everybody knows, but nobody will tell you,” he said. “These mafias are all under the shelter of the police.”

As I moved across the city asking questions, it sometimes seemed that Abdul Hai had it right: everybody knew, but nobody would tell. Usually, however, it seemed to be the other way around. People across the city opened their lives and their hearts to me. Many were eager to tell me what happened that day.

I just wasn’t sure if anybody knew…

After the Ashura fires, everybody seemed to have a conspiracy theory. One came from Faisal Edhi. “I think it was a conspiracy to cause a clash between Shias and Sunnis,” he told me. He believed that the burned shops belonged to Sunni Muslims, who were deliberately attacked in tandem with the bombing of the Shia procession. Maybe so, though I later met a Shia shop owner who had also lost everything.

Other theories implicated the city’s two leading political parties. The major parties had armed wings as well as links to various criminals. One notion pointed to the city’s ruling party, Mayor Kamal’s [Altaf Hussain's] party, the MQM. Some hypotheses said the MQM destroyed the shops of political opponents, or tried to repossess the land for the city’s use [“city’s use”??]. No proof emerged.

Another theory blamed arsonists under the protection of the MQM’s political rivals, the Bhutto family’s Pakistan People’s Party, or PPP. That wasn’t proven either, although the police and Rangers, who failed so miserably to stop the fires, were under the authority of PPP government ministers.

When I met with Raja Umer, the police investigator, I asked about the claims of storekeepers and other witnesses, who believed that chemicals had been poured on the fires to accelerate the burning. People traded stories of arsonists wearing gloves and holding weapons. “No, no, this is wrong,” said Raja Umer. “Totally wrong. People said those who were burning the shops were wearing gloves they kept with them so they would not leave fingerprints. But after investigation it was decided that there was a medical store that was broken into.”

“They were wearing surgical gloves?”

“Yes,” he said. And the fires burned so fiercely not because of chemical accelerants, but simply because the buildings and their contents were so flammable. “It was a chemical market, a plastic market, clothes market, so it can burn easily. There is no evidence we can get about chemicals used for burning.”

Raja Umer’s assurances did not prevent members of Karachi’s elites from casting their own suspicions. One of the more chilling theories came from Yasmeen Lari, a woman who was well connected to Karachi’s political establishment and among the city’s most distinguished architects – she was known as “the first woman architect in Pakistan.” She led Pakistan’s Heritage Foundation, dedicated to preserving historic buildings and other artifacts; when thousands of old documents were found in that giant pile in the city hall clock tower, it was Yasmeen Lari’s foundation that organized an effort to begin preserving and archiving them. She also went into action after the fires. She rushed to the ruined markets, many of which were in buildings dating back to colonial times. City officials were inclined to tear down what little of buildings remained, but she sought to save historic facades. And this work led to her theory: she, like the shopkeepers, believed that somebody wanted the land beneath the stores.

“I’ve come to this conclusion,” she told me, “because M. A. Jinnah Road is now prime commercial land. These buildings are three or four stories high. They were burned down to try to see if, you know, a multistory tower could be put up in their place. Because as soon as we got to the site, within a few days, although we were offering that we would try to raise money for them to restore buildings, these owners kept on saying to me, ‘Don’t worry, we have no problem of money, we have people who are sitting there saying they will build it for us.’ So the question is how come?” Many of the buildings were full of shopkeepers whose families rented space at exceedingly low rates, having held on to their shops for generations. It would not be unprecedented for real estate owners to seize a chance to burn out tenants. “There is a huge mafia in this city,” Yasmeen Lari said, “which really wants to get this prime piece of land to build these multistory towers. I have no doubt in my mind there was great conspiracy.”

I heard an even darker version of this theory from Arif Hasan, a Karachi urban planner and architect who was writing a five-volume history of his city. Hasan was a broad-faced and solid man, whose stern expression somehow carried with it a hint of mirth. Sitting behind the white table in his home office, Hasan spoke in his quiet and precise voice. “Land mafias” had been growing in power for many years, he said, seizing real estate by any means and maximizing its value. “Our politicians became a part of it,” Hasan said. At first the politicians were in control of the mafias, or imagined that they were. “But then the Bolton Market tragedy happened,” he said, “and that showed our politicians that the mafia was stronger than them.”

Hasan had identified something that drove a city when it grew this rapidly – drove its economy, its politics, its conversation, its dreams and its nightmares. Real estate was the heart of the instant city in the early twenty-first century. It was a swiftly growing city’s true faith, a source of passion, hope, mystery, and superstition. Even if all the conspiracy theories were completely wrong (and certainly none was ever proved), the political result was the same. The abruptly vacant land took center stage in the political debate.

Even the bombing of the Shias prompted less comment than the real estate. A reporter for the News International wrote a few days later, “Within an hour of the Ashura blast, which tragically was quickly forgotten, the battle for prime real estate of Karachi began in earnest.” Shias were always being killed in Pakistan. But real estate on Jinnah Road did not become available every day. The question of what to do with the Bolton Market land instantly became a problem for everyone, including Karachi’s mayor, Mustafa Kamal. It even attracted interest and money from the United States.

When I thought about Arif Hasan’s theories of the Bolton Market fires, I recalled something he’d told me a couple of years before. He compared the situation in Karachi to man’s ancient lust for gold.

“Land has replaced gold,” he said. “Everything that was done for gold, is now done for land.” (p. 37)

:
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Fire crews put out the last of the flames after hundreds of shops were destroyed, but it would be harder to tamp down the political debate. The People’s Party claimed the MQM had failed to properly mobilize the fire crews, which were under the control of MQM politicians. The MQM said the People’s Party had failed to unleash the police. This distraction came at a moment of great tension, when the People’s Party, the MQM, and other political parties were maneuvering against each other for the long-term control of Karachi. The provincial law that had created the local government was about to expire. The parties disagreed on whether and how to renew it, and their indecision raised the possibility that the mayor, the city council, and every other elected official could see their offices changed or even abolished. The moment was even more dangerous because Karachi’s political parties were generally divided between ethnic groups – or more precisely language groups, because each major group had its own tongue, such as Urdu, Sindhi, Punjabi, Baloch, and Pashto, and language was the way many defined themselves. A man’s political rival was also his blood enemy, implicated in ethnic warfare that gone on for decades… [I feel that Inskeep is overgeneralizing from the “ethnic” warfare of particular political parties.]

They year of 2009 was an unusually deadly one for politicians and activists, hundreds of whom were killed [in many cases these were common, innocent persons who would be killed in this warfare and later claimed by one political party or the other as its member], but the monthly pace actually increased in January 2010, according to the figures compiled by the Human Rights Commission. During that month thirty-seven deaths fell under the heading of “targeted killing,” which was the typical phrase for the shootings by gunmen who rolled away on motorcycles. Twenty-six more deaths were labeled “political workers killed.” These figures included a political worker who was beheaded in early January. Were the killings related? Unrelated? Who really knew? Many people had theories, but few of the crimes were ever solved. (p. 38)

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My notes: Considering the footage of arsonists and their preparation, among other pieces of evidence, the Ashura bombing was clearly a pre-planned and well-coordinated crime. There is a penchant among many international news reporters of dismissing the possibility of hidden hands and their interests by citing lack of evidence or calling such a possibility a conspiracy theory, instead of uncovering these hands. What this often does (although Inskeep’s account is more nuanced than this) is that the ‘obvious’ causes are taken as the real and only causes – the extremists and their fanatic mindset in the case of the Ashura bombing. The discerning observers who are familiar with Karachi’s politics know which political “ethnic” groups have connections to land mafia in that particular area on the M. A. Jinnah road. And, which “ethnic” political groups have connections to the extremist militants, and which groups have tried to use the specter of Talibanization to target other political groups, their constituencies, and property. And the discerning observers also know the politics of the statements (of condemnation of such crimes and condolences to all bereaved) released to the news media by the same political groups. With such  background information, it is not that difficult to reduce the possibility of the hidden hands to one to two equations - as opposed to throwing this possibility into the basket of “conspiracy theory”. Many local journalist know the hands behind the Ashura bombing, but they would not name these perpetrators because of the risk to their life (and other reasons). But international journalists have more room and security. They should present some conclusions, instead of calling this pursuit as doing conspiracy theory.

A Letter from Quetta - On the Plight of the Shia Hazaras

Letter from Quetta: ‘I too had a dream, but being a Pakistani Shia, it will remain a dream’
Written by S. Batool, July 13, 2012
Source

It takes a thousand voices to tell a single story, but today here’s the single voice to represent the thousand voices.

Unlike routine days, my phone beeped several times that made me wake up while I was asleep. I checked my phone and my breath was taken away, ‘Plz ask —- If she is alright, Did — go to university today? , Is —- Alright? Make sure if —- is alright…’

The darkest day to be remembered in the history of Pakistan; it was a remote control bomb blast on BUITEMS University Bus. This blast took away 6 lives leaving behind 25+ severely injured talents.

University faculty didn’t utter a single word in condemnation, this was not enough to cut apart an already wounded community that within a two-day gap, another University ‘Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s University, Balochistan’ arranged a separate University bus for Shia Hazara students.

I was in the University that day, rumors circulated that Hazara Shia students are supposed to travel by a separate bus – this was ordered on the call of other communities’ request to the VC of the University. I didn’t doubt VC to be such a sap-head to act upon the call, however, my expectations dusted and we were asked to travel by the separate bus.

Agony hooked my mind. I felt very much alone, was over-whelmed by grief, and I expected sympathy. I found no sympathy; I saw only faces of my co-Hazara Shia students as badly mangled as mine. I looked around, hundreds of eyes were staring. Cruel, pitiless stares. Angry stares, unfeeling cold stares.

You are alone here! I murmured to myself and got on the bus provided. That day ended with utter chaos as we then landed to our places with a bang on our heads. Can they be this selfish? I could have never imagined.

Nevertheless, the next day’s sun arose with which I witnessed courage that ran chills up and down my spine because by then I had decided not to give up and stand against the melting pot of apparent Muslims, but actually terrorist jihadists attacking my faith and those cruel stares leaving me alone the previous day.

“University Buses are jammed for Alamdar Road (where Shia Hazara students reside) “was yet another blow within 2 days. This cracked up my nerves. No transport-No University-No Education, Period.

I frozed, dazed and pinned down. My mind screamed, No! Education is my right!

It was 18 June, 2012 and today it is 11 July 2012 and we are still sitting at homes as no transport facility is provided to us. Is there anyone who could show up a fraction of humanity? , Who could feel that we are also Pakistani and we have the rights to enjoy equal freedom in Pakistan?

Hear me O’ the failed Government; jailing us is not the solution, why don’t you jail those Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) rats whose residents are all known to you? They attacked on the University bus, you jammed it for us. They attacked the Passenger bus for Iran, you jammed that. Tomorrow they will attack us at our homes; will you then shift us to some mountain cage?

O the silent spectators/Government/ISI agencies , wake up, wake up from deep slumber, Today it is us, Tomorrow it will be your own daughters and sons , it is only the matter of interest – This is the only cry of my soul, a deep rumble, shattering the predawn silence.

I once had a dream, a dream of being among the graduates marching around the pavilion in caps and gowns – But being a Shia, it seems it will remain a dream.

Pen it down and know it, we are motivated to exist and resist before the inhuman acts of all the veiled and un-veiled terrorists.

I am leaving now to slay the foe
Fight the battles, high and low
I’ve grown my wings, I want to fly
Seize my victories where they lie
I want to shake the dead souls
though there are dangers , there are fears
Carve my niche, sew my seams.

A hopeful and hopeless Shia Hazara student.