Fisk: Wikileaks and the Shaming of America

The shaming of America
Robert Fisk, The Independent, Sunday, 24 October 2010
Source

As usual, the Arabs knew. They knew all about the mass torture, the promiscuous shooting of civilians, the outrageous use of air power against family homes, the vicious American and British mercenaries, the cemeteries of the innocent dead. All of Iraq knew. Because they were the victims.

Only we could pretend we did not know. Only we in the West could counter every claim, every allegation against the Americans or British with some worthy general – the ghastly US military spokesman Mark Kimmitt and the awful chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Peter Pace, come to mind – to ring-fence us with lies. Find a man who'd been tortured and you'd be told it was terrorist propaganda; discover a house full of children killed by an American air strike and that, too, would be terrorist propaganda, or "collateral damage", or a simple phrase: "We have nothing on that."

Of course, we all knew they always did have something. And yesterday's ocean of military memos proves it yet again. Al-Jazeera has gone to extraordinary lengths to track down the actual Iraqi families whose men and women are recorded as being wasted at US checkpoints – I've identified one because I reported it in 2004, the bullet-smashed car, the two dead journalists, even the name of the local US captain – and it was The Independent on Sunday that first alerted the world to the hordes of indisciplined gunmen being flown to Baghdad to protect diplomats and generals. These mercenaries, who murdered their way around the cities of Iraq, abused me when I told them I was writing about them way back in 2003.



It's always tempting to avoid a story by saying "nothing new". The "old story" idea is used by governments to dampen journalistic interest as it can be used by us to cover journalistic idleness. And it's true that reporters have seen some of this stuff before. The "evidence" of Iranian involvement in bomb-making in southern Iraq was farmed out to The New York Times's Michael Gordon by the Pentagon in February 2007. The raw material, which we can now read, is far more doubtful than the Pentagon-peddled version. Iranian military material was still lying around all over Iraq from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and most of the attacks on Americans were at that stage carried out by Sunni insurgents. The reports suggesting that Syria allowed insurgents to pass through their territory, by the way, are correct. I have spoken to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers whose sons made their way to Iraq from Lebanon via the Lebanese village of Majdal Aanjar and then via the northern Syrian city of Aleppo to attack the Americans.

But, written in bleak militarese as it may be, here is the evidence of America's shame. This is material that can be used by lawyers in courts. If 66,081 – I loved the "81" bit – is the highest American figure available for dead civilians, then the real civilian mortality score is infinitely higher since this records only those civilians the Americans knew of. Some of them were brought to the Baghdad mortuary in my presence, and it was the senior official there who told me that the Iraqi ministry of health had banned doctors from performing any post-mortems on dead civilians brought in by American troops. Now why should that be? Because some had been tortured to death by Iraqis working for the Americans? Did this hook up with the 1,300 independent US reports of torture in Iraqi police stations?

The Americans scored no better last time round. In Kuwait, US troops could hear Palestinians being tortured by Kuwaitis in police stations after the liberation of the city from Saddam Hussein's legions in 1991. A member of the Kuwaiti royal family was involved in the torture. US forces did not intervene. They just complained to the royal family. Soldiers are always being told not to intervene. After all, what was Lieutenant Avi Grabovsky of the Israeli army told when he reported to his officer in September 1982 that Israel's Phalangist allies had just murdered some women and children? "We know, it's not to our liking, and don't interfere," Grabovsky was told by his battalion commander. This was during the Sabra and Chatila refugee camp massacre.

The quotation comes from Israel's 1983 Kahan commission report – heaven knows what we could read if WikiLeaks got its hands on the barrels of military files in the Israeli defence ministry (or the Syrian version, for that matter). But, of course, back in those days, we didn't know how to use a computer, let alone how to write on it. And that, of course, is one of the important lessons of the whole WikiLeaks phenomenon.

Back in the First World War or the Second World War or Vietnam, you wrote your military reports on paper. They may have been typed in triplicate but you could number your copies, trace any spy and prevent the leaks. The Pentagon Papers was actually written on paper. You needed to find a mole to get them. But paper could always be destroyed, weeded, trashed, all copies destroyed. At the end of the 1914-18 war, for example, a British second lieutenant shot a Chinese man after Chinese workers had looted a French military train. The Chinese man had pulled a knife on the soldier. But during the 1930s, the British soldier's file was "weeded" three times and so no trace of the incident survives. A faint ghost of it remains only in a regimental war diary which records Chinese involvement in the looting of "French provision trains". The only reason I know of the killing is that my father was the British lieutenant and told me the story before he died. No WikiLeaks then.

But I do suspect this massive hoard of material from the Iraq war has serious implications for journalists as well as armies. What is the future of the Seymour Hershes and the old-style investigative journalism that The Sunday Times used to practise? What is the point of sending teams of reporters to examine war crimes and meet military "deep throats", if almost half a million secret military documents are going to float up in front of you on a screen?

We still haven't got to the bottom of the WikiLeaks story, and I rather suspect that there are more than just a few US soldiers involved in this latest revelation. Who knows if it doesn't go close to the top? In its investigations, for example, al-Jazeera found an extract from a run-of-the-mill Pentagon press conference in November 2005. Peter Pace, the uninspiring chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is briefing journalists on how soldiers should react to the cruel treatment of prisoners, pointing out proudly that an American soldier's duty is to intervene if he sees evidence of torture. Then the camera moves to the far more sinister figure of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who suddenly interrupts – almost in a mutter, and to Pace's consternation – "I don't think you mean they (American soldiers) have an obligation to physically stop it. It's to report it."

The significance of this remark – cryptically sadistic in its way – was lost on the journos, of course. But the secret Frago 242 memo now makes much more sense of the press conference. Presumably sent by General Ricardo Sanchez, this is the instruction that tells soldiers: "Provided the initial report confirms US forces were not involved in the detainee abuse, no further investigation will be conducted unless directed by HHQ [Higher Headquarters]." Abu Ghraib happened under Sanchez's watch in Iraq. It was also Sanchez, by the way, who couldn't explain to me at a press conference why his troops had killed Saddam's sons in a gun battle in Mosul rather than capture them.

So Sanchez's message, it seems, must have had Rumsfeld's imprimatur. And so General David Petraeus – widely loved by the US press corps – was presumably responsible for the dramatic increase in US air strikes over two years; 229 bombing attacks in Iraq in 2006, but 1,447 in 2007. Interestingly enough, US air strikes in Afghanistan have risen by 172 per cent since Petraeus took over there. Which makes it all the more astonishing that the Pentagon is now bleating that WikiLeaks may have blood on its hands. The Pentagon has been covered in blood since the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima in 1945, and for an institution that ordered the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003 – wasn't that civilian death toll more than 66,000 by their own count, out of a total of 109,000 recorded? – to claim that WikiLeaks is culpable of homicide is preposterous.

The truth, of course, is that if this vast treasury of secret reports had proved that the body count was much lower than trumpeted by the press, that US soldiers never tolerated Iraqi police torture, rarely shot civilians at checkpoints and always brought killer mercenaries to account, US generals would be handing these files out to journalists free of charge on the steps of the Pentagon. They are furious not because secrecy has been breached, or because blood may be spilt, but because they have been caught out telling the lies we always knew they told.

US official documents detail extraordinary scale of wrongdoing

WikiLeaks yesterday released on its website some 391,832 US military messages documenting actions and reports in Iraq over the period 2004-2009. Here are the main points:

Prisoners abused, raped and murdered

Hundreds of incidents of abuse and torture of prisoners by Iraqi security services, up to and including rape and murder. Since these are itemised in US reports, American authorities now face accusations of failing to investigate them. UN leaders and campaigners are calling for an official investigation.

Civilian death toll cover-up

Coalition leaders have always said "we don't do death tolls", but the documents reveal many deaths were logged. Respected British group Iraq Body Count says that, after preliminary examination of a sample of the documents, there are an estimated 15,000 extra civilian deaths, raising their total to 122,000.

The shooting of men trying to surrender

In February 2007, an Apache helicopter killed two Iraqis, suspected of firing mortars, as they tried to surrender. A military lawyer is quoted as saying: "They cannot surrender to aircraft and are still valid targets."

Private security firm abuses

Britain's Bureau of Investigative Journalism says it found documents detailing new cases of alleged wrongful killings of civilians involving Blackwater, since renamed Xe Services. Despite this, Xe retains extensive US contracts in Afghanistan.

Al-Qa'ida's use of children and "mentally handicapped" for bombing

A teenage boy with Down's syndrome who killed six and injured 34 in a suicide attack in Diyala was said to be an example of an ongoing al-Qa'ida strategy to recruit those with learning difficulties. A doctor is alleged to have sold a list of female patients with learning difficulties to insurgents.

Hundreds of civilians killed at checkpoints

Out of the 832 deaths recorded at checkpoints in Iraq between 2004 and 2009, analysis by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism suggests 681 were civilians. Fifty families were shot at and 30 children killed. Only 120 insurgents were killed in checkpoint incidents.

Iranian influence

Reports detail US concerns that Iranian agents had trained, armed and directed militants in Iraq. In one document, the US military warns a militia commander believed to be behind the deaths of US troops and kidnapping of Iraqi officials was trained by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard.

Rannie Amiri: Hariri's House of Cards

Hariri's House of Cards
By Rannie Amiri, CounterPunch, Oct 1-3
Source

“Have a little mercy on the Lebanese. People were considerate with you at first because your father is a martyr, but today they have become bored with you. You are playing with the country, not with PlayStation.”

– Lebanese Unification (Tawhid) Movement leader Wiam Wahhab, in comments directed to Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, 27 September 2010

A war of words has erupted between Lebanon’s Hezbollah-led March 8 Coalition and Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri’s ruling March 14 Coalition, posing the greatest challenge to Hariri’s leadership yet and threatening the viability of his “national unity” government.

As indictments loom following the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s (STL) investigation into the February 2005 assassination of the late premier Rafiq al-Hariri, his now-prime minister son finds himself trapped between diametrically opposed forces. Those in his parliamentary bloc and own Future Movement back the STL—and importantly, its funding—while the March 8 opposition has called for it to either seriously consider claims of alleged Israeli involvement in Hariri’s killing or be shut down.

The STL is still expected to implicate Hezbollah elements in the murder even after Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah presented intercepted video footage obtained from Israeli reconnaissance drones revealing the path of Hariri’s motorcade and exact location of the attack. He also said Ghassan al-Jedd, a known Israeli spy, was present at the crime scene that day (Jedd later fled to Israel).

Nasrallah’s disclosures came against the backdrop of an extensive crackdown on Israeli espionage rings operating in Lebanon’s security and telecommunications sectors, including the state-owned mobile service provider, Alfa. Having worked for the Mossad for more than a decade, one agent confessed to installing computer programs and planting chips in Alfa transmitters to be used by Israeli intelligence to monitor communications, and locate and target individuals for assassination.

This is significant since the STL is expected to rely heavily on phone records in drawing its conclusions: “A preliminary report by the U.N. investigating team said it had collected data from mobile phone calls made the day of Hariri's murder as evidence,” AFP reported.

The fallout from Rafiq al-Hariri’s killing dramatically reshaped Lebanon’s relationship with Syria. Both the slain leader’s allies and son quickly pointed an accusatory finger at Damascus. Events that subsequently transpired became known as the “Cedar Revolution” and ultimately led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon after a 29-year presence in March-April 2005.

This made Saad al-Hariri’s recent about-face all the more stunning.

In an early September interview with the Saudi-owned newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat, Hariri said he had mistakenly blamed Syria for his father’s assassination. He withdrew what he called a “political” accusation and apologized.

But some would not let Hariri off the hook so easily.

Brigadier General Jamil al-Sayyed was Lebanon’s former head of general security at the time the massive bomb detonated under Hariri’s motorcade. He along with three other pro-Syrian generals were arrested in August 2005 and jailed for nearly four years—without charge—on suspicion of involvement in the crime. They were ordered released by the Tribunal in 2009 due to fabricated, recanted witness testimony and lack of evidence.

Al-Sayyed said Saad al-Hariri had “sold his father’s blood” by way of false witnesses so he could frame Syria for the murder:

“You [Saad al-Hariri], those who are with you and [former Prime Minister Fouad] Siniora know that you have been exercising falsification since the beginning … Had the false witnesses managed to cheat the court and had you accepted that, would you be apologizing today or would you be dancing in Damascus with the new leader you installed?

“But one day, I will take what is rightfully mine with my own hands if you do not give it to me …”

State prosecutor Said Mirza summoned al-Sayyed from France for the implied threat to Hariri and his call for the Lebanese people to revolt against the government. When he arrived at Beirut’s international airport, Hezbollah representatives met him in force and escorted him home. March 14 supporters said that the action amounted to an airport takeover meant to protect al-Sayyed from arrest.

The fact that fabricated witness testimony once used to incriminate Syria may now be directed Hezbollah’s way is obviously not lost on the March 8 Coalition.

Hezbollah M.P. Hasan Fadlallah said, “When we talk about this issue, we don't only refer to four or five people who gave false testimonies during the investigations in the murder of (former) premier (Rafiq) Hariri. These are only one ring of the rings of false witnesses, and maybe the weakest and smallest ring in this dossier. We want this group dismantled, the heads of this group unveiled and the case followed up at the judicial, legal and political levels in Lebanon, so that it faces trial and accountability.”

Hariri has a number of fateful decisions on his hands: to proceed with or table the STL finance bill (Lebanon pays 49 percent of the Court’s cost and Hezbollah has already vowed to block it); to enforce the summons against Gen. al-Sayyed or prosecute the false witnesses; and most significantly, to decide whether to back the STL verdict likely blaming Hezbollah despite evidence of Israeli complicity. If so, March 8 ministers (holding one-third of cabinet seats) could pull out of his administration, plunging the country into an even deeper political crisis.

Hariri’s government is now more fragile than ever; a proverbial house of cards erected on fabricated witness testimonies and one likely to be brought down by the upcoming indictments of a discredited tribunal.

Rannie Amiri is an independent Middle East commentator. He may be reached at: rbamiri [at] yahoo [dot] com.

Rannie Amiri: Bahrain - Constitutional Monarchy or Police State?

A Blurred Line in Bahrain
By Rannie Amiri, CounterPunch, Sep 24-26
Source

The situation in Bahrain has deteriorated to such an extent that it can no longer be called a political crisis; it is now a human rights crisis. And the silence of those in the Middle East and West, particularly the United States, has been shameful.

The Persian Gulf state is currently in the throes of unrest. The ruling al-Khalifa family, led by King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, is imposing increasingly draconian security measures in an effort to silence the outcry of the island’s Shia Muslim majority over sweeping arrests of opposition figures in the run-up to October parliamentary elections.

The crackdown began on Aug. 13 with the detention of Dr. Abdul Jalil al-Singace, spokesperson and head of the human rights bureau of the opposition Haq Movement for Liberty and Democracy, on charges of incitement, attempting to destabilize the country and “contacting foreign organizations and providing them with false and misleading information about the kingdom.” Al-Singace had just returned from London where he addressed the House of Lords on Bahrain’s poor human rights record. After landing in Manama, the handicapped al-Singace along with three companions were arrested and then tortured.

To better understand the root causes of Bahrain’s historically tense political climate, it is imperative to appreciate the country’s demographic makeup, the government’s endeavor to manipulate it and the disenfranchisement of Bahraini Shias. Please refer to my recent article “Bahrain Reaps the Ills of Sectarian Gerrymandering” where this pertinent background information is detailed.

Briefly, Bahrain is a tiny Gulf island kingdom with a population of 800,000. Of the 530,000 nationals, 70 percent are largely poor Shia Muslims. This is in stark contrast to the ruling, but minority, Sunni elite represented by the al-Khalifa dynasty. Although Bahraini Shias constitute more than 80 percent of the labor force, they are wholly excluded from the government, security services and public sector.

In an attempt to assuage widespread discontent at the political and socioeconomic marginalization the policy of institutionalized sectarian discrimination had wrought, Sheikh Hamad implemented some basic political reforms after ascending to the throne in 1999. This helped to quell demonstrations, riots and uprisings known as the “Bahrain intifada” that rocked the country for the better part of the 1990s.

He then created the National Action Charter in 2001 in a bid to restore the 1975 constitution and transform the emirate into a constitutional monarchy. The Charter easily passed a national referendum, but the ultimately enacted 2002 constitution fell short of what the king had originally promised.

This was highlighted in the November 2006 parliamentary elections. Al-Wefaq, the country’s major Shia political party, captured 17 of 40 seats in the Council of Representatives, making it the largest bloc. They soon recognized their ability to affect social and political change was illusory, for real power lay with the upper house Shura Council, which can approve or rescind legislation passed by the lower chamber. Shura Council members are directly appointed by the king and operate in service of monarchy goals. King Hamad had pledged it would serve strictly as an advisory body, not a legislative one.

Since al-Singace’s arrest in mid-August, there has been no let-up in the government’s drive to suppress dissent:

Twenty-three activists tied to opposition or human rights groups have been charged with being members of “a terrorist network with international support” (re: Iran) and planning a campaign of “violence, intimidation and subversion” in a plot to overthrow the regime.

The old, tired strategy of promulgating the belief that Arab Shia Muslims are fifth columnists for Iran, as the al-Khalifas intimate, is simply a way to circumvent their calls for democracy, human rights and political enfranchisement. Framing the domestic strife as a matter of combating Iranian influence and ensuring regime preservation allows Bahrain to stay in the good graces of the U.S. and ensure Manama remains home to the Navy’s Fifth Fleet.

Last month saw the detention of at least 250 activists. They have had no access to lawyers and their locations are unknown. Due to a media blackout, how many have since been imprisoned is a mystery. Although many have demanded the amendment of Bahrain’s constitution, none have called for a coup d’état.

The state has assumed control of all mosques.

As reported by AFP, Crown Prince Salman said in comments carried by the official Bahrain News Agency, “Regaining control of the pulpits so they are not hostage to incompetent politicians or clerics who have lost their way … is the staring point for developing a sound religious orientation.”

The government dismissed the board and took control of the country’s oldest human rights organization, the Bahrain Human Rights Society (BHRS).

The BHRS is the first non-governmental organization created after King Hamad’s political reforms. The Minister of Social Development alleged it had become too partisan in reporting abuses suffered by the Shia and not “all sections of Bahraini society.” The ministry appointed one of its own officials as acting head.

Shutting down the BHRS was in obvious retribution for the body’s criticism of the aforementioned arrests and detentions.

Malcolm Stewart, North African and Middle East director at Amnesty International said in a statement, “By suspending the board of the BHRS and putting its own representative in charge, the government has effectively taken control of the organization with the apparent intent of closing it down. This undermines the basic rights to freedom of expression and association, and the government should rescind its decision immediately.”

The prominent pro-democracy blogger Ali Abdulemam was arrested by intelligence services on Sept. 5 for “spreading false news” via the popular Web portal he founded, BahrainOnline.org.

Bloggers worldwide have taken up Abdulemam’s cause and demanded his release. He is regarded as a pioneer in the Arab world for advocating use of the internet as a means of political expression and social advocacy.

Ayatollah Hussein al-Najati—Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s representative in Bahrain and one of the nation’s leading scholars—was stripped of his citizenship.

It is one of the most deplorable acts yet taken by the government against the Shia clergy. The passports of al-Najati, his wife and three children were revoked on grounds their Bahraini nationality was not obtained “through legal and appropriate means.”

It is the epitome of hypocrisy. Bahrain’s notorious Citizenship Law permits non-Bahraini Sunnis throughout the Middle East and Muslim world to become expedited, naturalized citizens for the sole purpose of altering the island’s sectarian make-up. They are then given jobs by Bahrain’s largest employer—the security services.

Although al-Najati did undertake religious studies in Iraq and Iran, he was born in Bahrain. Stripping him and his family of their nationality sets the stage for their eventual expulsion from the island. Another scholar, Sheikh Abdul Jalil al-Miqdad, has been prohibited from delivering Friday prayer sermons for two weeks.

The gag order issued by the public prosecutor banning TV, radio, internet or print media from reporting on the crackdown continues as more news outlets and websites are shut down.

Press releases and statements issued by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Committee to Protect Journalists and the International Federation for Human Rights condemning the above actions can be read here.

Bahrain’s government has been touted as a beacon of democratic reform in the Persian Gulf. Its actions, however, reveal quite the opposite.

The reality is that Bahrain’s Shia are the ones holding the torch of change and reform in the face of an entrenched monarchy eager to retain its grip on absolute power.

Freedom of the press and religion, respect for human rights, ending torture, fair representation in all spheres of society, government accountability and transparency, an end to the malignant practice of sectarian discrimination; all are banners carried by Bahrain’s opposition.

The regime believes their repressive measures will temper voter turnout in the Oct.23 elections. Although many opposition groups have called for its boycott, authorities fear the Shia could still gain parliamentary seats and use this platform to more widely voice their grievances, irrespective of the inability to pass effective legislation.

What has taken place over the past month in Bahrain demands far greater media coverage. For those who have followed events, they recognize the distinction between constitutional monarchy and police state is now a blurry one.

Rannie Amiri is an independent Middle East commentator. He may be reached at: rbamiri [at] yahoo [dot] com.

Milne: US rebranding the occupation in Iraq

The US isn't leaving Iraq, it's rebranding the occupation

Obama says withdrawal is on schedule, but renaming or outsourcing combat troops won't give Iraqis back their country

By Seumas Milne, Guardian.co.uk, August 4, 2010
Source

For most people in Britain and the US, Iraq is already history. Afghanistan has long since taken the lion's share of media attention, as the death toll of Nato troops rises inexorably. Controversy about Iraq is now almost entirely focused on the original decision to invade: what's happening there in 2010 barely registers.

That will have been reinforced by Barack Obama's declaration this week that US combat troops are to be withdrawn from Iraq at the end of the month "as promised and on schedule". For much of the British and American press, this was the real thing: headlines hailed the "end" of the war and reported "US troops to leave Iraq".

Nothing could be further from the truth. The US isn't withdrawing from Iraq at all – it's rebranding the occupation. Just as George Bush's war on terror was retitled "overseas contingency operations" when Obama became president, US "combat operations" will be rebadged from next month as "stability operations".

But as Major General Stephen Lanza, the US military spokesman in Iraq, told the New York Times: "In practical terms, nothing will change". After this month's withdrawal, there will still be 50,000 US troops in 94 military bases, "advising" and training the Iraqi army, "providing security" and carrying out "counter-terrorism" missions. In US military speak, that covers pretty well everything they might want to do.

Granted, 50,000 is a major reduction on the numbers in Iraq a year ago. But what Obama once called "the dumb war" goes remorselessly on. In fact, violence has been increasing as the Iraqi political factions remain deadlocked for the fifth month in a row in the Green Zone. More civilians are being killed in Iraq than Afghanistan: 535 last month alone, according to the Iraqi government – the worst figure for two years.

And even though US troops are rarely seen on the streets, they are still dying at a rate of six a month, their bases regularly shelled by resistance groups, while Iraqi troops and US-backed militias are being killed in far greater numbers and al-Qaida – Bush's gift to Iraq – is back in business across swaths of the country. Although hardly noticed in Britain, there are still 150 British troops in Iraq supporting US forces.

Meanwhile, the US government isn't just rebranding the occupation, it's also privatising it. There are around 100,000 private contractors working for the occupying forces, of whom more than 11,000 are armed mercenaries, mostly "third country nationals", typically from the developing world. One Peruvian and two Ugandan security contractors were killed in a rocket attack on the Green Zone only a fortnight ago.

The US now wants to expand their numbers sharply in what Jeremy Scahill, who helped expose the role of the notorious US security firm Blackwater, calls the "coming surge" of contractors in Iraq. Hillary Clinton wants to increase the number of military contractors working for the state department alone from 2,700 to 7,000, to be based in five "enduring presence posts" across Iraq.

The advantage of an outsourced occupation is clearly that someone other than US soldiers can do the dying to maintain control of Iraq. It also helps get round the commitment, made just before Bush left office, to pull all American troops out by the end of 2011. The other getout, widely expected on all sides, is a new Iraqi request for US troops to stay on – just as soon as a suitable government can be stitched together to make it.

What is abundantly clear is that the US, whose embassy in Baghdad is now the size of Vatican City, has no intention of letting go of Iraq any time soon. One reason for that can be found in the dozen 20-year contracts to run Iraq's biggest oil fields that were handed out last year to foreign companies, including three of the Anglo-American oil majors that exploited Iraqi oil under British control before 1958.

The dubious legality of these deals has held back some US companies, but as Greg Muttitt, author of a forthcoming book on the subject, argues, the prize for the US is bigger than the contracts themselves, which put 60% of Iraq's reserves under long-term foreign corporate control. If output can be boosted as sharply as planned, the global oil price could be slashed and the grip of recalcitrant Opec states broken.

The horrific cost of the war to the Iraqi people, on the other hand, and the continuing fear and misery of daily life make a mockery of claims that the US surge of 2007 "worked" and that Iraq has come good after all.

It's not only the hundreds of thousands of dead and 4 million refugees. After seven years of US (and British) occupation, tens of thousands are still tortured and imprisoned without trial, health and education has dramatically deteriorated, the position of women has gone horrifically backwards, trade unions are effectively banned, Baghdad is divided by 1,500 checkpoints and blast walls, electricity supplies have all but broken down and people pay with their lives for speaking out.

Even without the farce of the March elections, the banning and killing of candidates and activists and subsequent political breakdown, to claim – as the Times did today – that "Iraq is a democracy" is grotesque. The Green Zone administration would collapse in short order without the protection of US troops and security contractors. No wonder the speculation among Iraqis and some US officials is of an eventual military takeover.

The Iraq war has been a historic political and strategic failure for the US. It was unable to impose a military solution, let alone turn the country into a beacon of western values or regional policeman. But by playing the sectarian and ethnic cards, it also prevented the emergence of a national resistance movement and a humiliating Vietnam-style pullout. The signs are it wants to create a new form of outsourced semi-colonial regime to maintain its grip on the country and region. The struggle to regain Iraq's independence has only just begun.

Dawn Editorial: Trouble in Parachinar

For background, click here.

[Edit October 21, 2010: More from Dawn: "Haqqani’s two sons mediating in Kurram"]

Trouble in Parachinar
Editorial, Dawn, Sep 20, 2010
Source

The seemingly interminable violence in the Parachinar area of Kurram Agency has spiked once again. This time a water dispute between two of the four main tribes — Bangash and Mangal — has claimed the lives of over 100 people in weeklong fighting that shows no sign of abating. Water, along with other resources such as forests, has long been a source of inter-tribal rivalry in the agency, but what makes Kurram Agency doubly dangerous is that the violence has been thoroughly infused with sectarian hatreds — starting as far back as 1982, though much of the present blame must lie with the ingress of the Taliban in the area in 2007.

For a couple of years the area remained cut off from the rest of Pakistan with the closure of a key road; however, a political agreement signed in Murree and a limited military operation in the area has helped to reopen the Thall-Parachinar road. Limited traffic continues to move on the road, though many people of the area still use the Afghan route to travel to other parts of Pakistan because of the dangers involved. (The Afghan route is no less dangerous: in July, 11 residents of Parachinar who were en route to Peshawar via Kabul were ambushed and killed in Paktia.)

Bringing an end to the violence in Kurram Agency, and the Parachinar area in particular is a matter of the state taking its responsibilities more seriously. The agreement signed in Murree in October 2008 was in part possible because of the initiative of the then political agent of the agency, who has since been replaced. That agreement remains the best hope for the return of peace to the area and as such should be implemented in all earnestness. From the return of displaced persons, some of whom have not returned home since the 1982 violence, to the payment of compensation for property damaged and destroyed to the return of property confiscated, the agreement encompasses many sensible and pragmatic measures. In addition, cellphone services should be restored in the area (at present, locals have to use Afghan SIMs and networks, which adds to the difficulties of life).

By now it should be apparent that the longer Pakistan delays resolving the crisis in Kurram Agency, the more it will slip back towards the sphere of Afghan, and by extension American, influence. Such a development may only further complicate the resolution of the troubles in the area. The sooner the Murree accord is implemented the better. Unfortunately, implementation isn’t the state’s strongest suit.

Update on US "Af-Pak" Strategy

See related posts on intelligence network and special operations here and here. One way to interpret the current US strategy is that the special operations are a means to pressurize the insurgents, the old- and neo- Taliban-s that is, to come to the negotiation table. But nothing more. Not only because the US does not have the logistical capacity to get rid of the insurgency fully - the very US presence and its military operations are fueling Talibanization in Afghanistan - but also because if they could tame the beast which got out of their hands - that is, coopt the Taliban once again as they have tried several times already - the Taliban can be a useful pressure against neighboring Iran. The Saudis would like that too. The Pakistani security establishment - still wishing to develop that "strategic depth" against India - would not mind that either. The establishment's romance with the Taliban - albeit, only with the "good Taliban" now - is not over yet. Some level of turmoil in Afghanistan, moderate or extreme depending on political climate but as long as it is controllable, is also functional for the greater interests of Washington as that legitimizes the US presence in the name of combating "terrorism" - but not without raising concerns of regional powers like China.

McChrystal shifts to raids - and Wali Karzai
By Gareth Porter, Asia Times Online, May 26, 2010
Source

WASHINGTON - General Stanley McChrystal's team once talked openly about the need to remove from power Ahmed Wali Karzai, Afghan President Hamid Karzai's brother and the most powerful man in Kandahar.

Last October, as reports of Wali Karzai's role in the opium trade were circulating, McChrystal's intelligence chief General Michael T Flynn said, "If we are going to conduct a population-centric strategy in Afghanistan, and we are perceived as backing thugs, then we are just undermining ourselves."

"The only way to clean up Chicago," Flynn declared, "is to get rid of [Al] Capone." The parallel between the legendary crime boss and Wali Karzai could hardly have been clearer.

But by the end of March, Dexter Filkins was reporting in the New York Times that US officials had decided that Wali Karzai "will be allowed to stay in place".

That complete reversal on Karzai was the result of a decision by the US military to de-emphasize the much-touted promise of governance reform in the Kandahar operation and focus instead on Special Operations Forces (SOF) raids targeted against suspected Taliban leaders living in Kandahar city - operations for which McChrystal, the top allied military commander in Afghanistan, needs intelligence being provided by Karzai.

McChrystal's shift in emphasis toward the targeted raids against the Taliban was undoubtedly accelerated by the message from the Barack Obama administration in March that he had to demonstrate progress in his counter-insurgency strategy by the end of December 2010 rather than the mid-2011 deadline for beginning the withdrawal of US troops.

That earlier deadline, first reported by the Washington Post on March 31, was confirmed this month by US General Frederick Hodge, the director of operations for all of southern Afghanistan. "Our mission is to show irreversible momentum by the end of 2010 - that's the clock I'm using," Hodge told The Times of London

The Pentagon's report on the past six months of the war, written in late March and early April, reflected that shift from governance reform to night raids. It failed to mention McChrystal's "population centric" strategy as a factor in putting pressure on the Taliban but touted the "removal" of many "lower level" Taliban commanders, mainly by "special operations forces".

After a few weeks of watching the results of the Marjah operation, the officials of McChrystal's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command conceded that the Afghan government had taken too long to put representatives of relevant ministries into the two key districts of Helmand province. They doubted that it would do any better in Kandahar, as The Times reported on May 11.

Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, who frequently registers the latest thinking of the military leadership, wrote a column on April 1 clearly reflecting the downgrading of governance reform in the McChrystal war plan for Kandahar and the new emphasis on targeting the Taliban.

"Shaking up the power structure might put the United States on the side of the Pashtun man in the street," wrote Ignatius, "but it would open up a power vacuum that could be exploited by the Taliban."

For US commanders, Ignatius revealed, "There isn't time for risky experiments in Kandahar."

What Ignatius didn't say is that McChrystal had already ordered a major intensification of SOF raids in Kandahar city and that those raids are dependent primarily on intelligence supplied by organizations controlled by Wali Karzai.

In an interview with The Times published on May 7, Karzai boasted that he alone has supplied "the majority of intelligence in this region", adding, "I'm passing tons of information to them."

A former NATO official had confirmed that reality a few weeks earlier. "Most of our intelligence comes directly or indirectly from him," said the official, according to Time magazine on March 19.

Neither the ISAF commanders nor US SOF commanders have well-developed intelligence networks of their own in Kandahar.

Karzai has dominated the flow of intelligence to NATO forces by gaining control over both the police and official Afghan intelligence agency in the province, according to a new study of the power structure in Kandahar.

The study, published last month by the pro-war Institute for the Study of War, shows how Karzai completed his consolidation of political control over the national police in Kandahar after using the Karzai private militia used by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Kandahar Strike Force, to kill the province police chief and the chief of criminal investigation, who had been independent of his influence, in a June 2009 gunfight.

Even more important, Karzai controls the Kandahar branch of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), which combines the intelligence and secret police agencies, as the study reveals. NDS has by far the largest network of informants in the province and has long taken the lead in carrying out the raids against the Taliban in Kandahar city, because of the ineffectiveness of the national police.

In an e-mail to Inter Press Service, a spokesman for McChrystal, Lieutenant Colonel Tadd Sholtis, acknowledged that the command accepts intelligence from Karzai, and said it would be "foolish" to refuse it.

Sholtis said he could not comment on how much weight the ISAF command put on intelligence from Karzai but asserted that the command has "multiple methods and sources for collecting intelligence" in the province, and that "we evaluate all human sources with respect to self-interest or bias".

ISAF can presumably draw on Afghan army intelligence in the province, but its assets are believed to be minimal compared with that of the NDS. The command also uses information from drone reconnaissance aircraft to supplement what it gets from Karzai-controlled networks.

Reliance on drones for targeting, however, leads to constant mistakes by US troops. Carlotta Gall reported in the New York Times on March 26 that drone strikes had killed farmers digging ditches and bringing goods home from market on three different occasions in recent weeks.

The ISAF command's dependence on Karzai for intelligence allows him to use US power against his political enemies. Time's Tim McGirk reported on March 19 that critics in Kandahar said Karzai had threatened to call down NATO air strikes or night raids by US SOF units on any tribal elders who defied him.

Karzai is widely believed to have used raids by security forces under his control to target a number of tribal opponents, according to the Institute's study. Karzai is deeply engaged in intervening in tribal politics across the province, creating new alliances and making new enemies, the analysis said.

The reaffirmation of ties between the US and Karzai ensures that the whole military effort in the province is locked into Karzai's political strategy for maintaining his grip on power. But McChrystal, the former commander of the Joint Special Operations Command in Iraq and Afghanistan, has made it clear he is ready to sacrifice the possibility for political change in order to be able to do what he does best.

Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing in US national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published in 2006.

Malalai Joya: 'TIME distorts truth about US occupation in Afghanistan'

Reminds me of a similar story about Malalai Joya discussed earlier: see here.

"TIME distorts truth about occupation"
PressTV, May 11, 2010
Source

Afghan political activist Malalai Joya has criticized TIME magazine, saying it has "painted a false picture" of her.

At the end of April, TIME named Malalai Joya one of the 100 most influential people in the world in 2010, but the write-up in the issue where the annual list was published did not mention her struggle against the US and NATO occupation of Afghanistan and even went so far as to lecture her and advise her that she should begin supporting the occupiers.

"I am very angry with the way they have introduced me. TIME has painted a false picture of me and does not mention anything at all about my struggle against the occupation of Afghanistan by the U.S. and NATO, which is disgusting. In fact every one knows that I stand side-by-side with the glorious anti-war movements around the world and have proved time and again that I will never compromise with the US and NATO, who have occupied my country, empowered the most bloody enemies of my people, and are killing my innocent compatriots in Afghanistan. What TIME did was like giving an award to someone with one hand and getting it back with another hand. I have sent my protest through my Defense Committee, but TIME did not bother to even answer the protest letter. Perhaps this is the kind of freedom of expression exercised by TIME and the US. But I'm happy to see that many of my friends and supporters have objected to the write-up and expressed it by posting their comments on TIME's site or sending me many emails," Joya said.

She made the remarks in an interview with Sonali Kolhatkar on Uprising Radio, which is broadcast on KPFK, the Pacifica network's radio station in Los Angeles.

The interview was posted on the internet on May 3.

The Defense Committee for Malalai Joya published the following response to the TIME magazine write-up:

"We strongly object to the inaccuracies in the write-up by Ayaan Hirsi Ali on Malalai Joya here.

"We believe it is disrespectful of Ms. Joya not to make clear her consistent and vocal opposition to the NATO occupation of Afghanistan. In fact, it is her opposition to war which has made her influential throughout the world, since in the vast majority of NATO countries public opinion is also opposed to the war.

"Hirsi Ali criticizes Ms. Joya's views on the NATO occupation of Afghanistan without ever actually letting the reader know what they are. Surely the TIME 100 honorees have all earned the right to have their own views represented in a non-patronizing, accurate manner to your readers.

"The very first sentence — 'To be a woman growing up in Afghanistan under the Taliban and to survive is in itself a major feat' — betrays an unfamiliarity with the subject's biography.

"In fact, Ms. Joya grew up in refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan. The Taliban only came to power in the period of 1994-1996, and Joya only returned to her homeland in 1998, at the age of 19.

"The whole tenor and content of the write-up plays into the common misconception in the United States that the only fundamentalist, reactionary political forces in Afghanistan are the Taliban.

"There is no reference to the civil war and the massacres carried out by fundamentalist warlords — many of whom have been returned to power under the Karzai regime."

Elsewhere in the Uprising Radio interview, Ms. Joya said:

"The U.S. Embassy in Kabul has an office that carefully monitors all media in Afghanistan and if they find any of them reporting against U.S. interests, they try using different means to stop it. Bribes are a very common means used. For the U.S. it's not just fighting a war through military means, but also on the propaganda front. I think propaganda plays a major role. They are trying to show the war is justified. When they kill civilians they immediately deny it and say that all the people killed are Taliban. When there is no chance for any independent confirmation, the lies are the only things reflected in the world media. There are only a few cases where some brave and justice-loving journalists like Jerome Starkey have come forward to unmake their shameful lies."

"But I will continue the struggle as long as these criminals are in power, these sworn enemies of democracy, women's rights, human rights, and as long as these occupation forces are bombing from the sky, and supporting the enemies of my people and killing innocent people of my country," she added.

Dawn: Militancy in Punjab

Militancy in Punjab
Dawn Editorial, March 17, 2010
Source

Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif has been excoriated by all right-thinking individuals across Pakistan for his shocking comments about the PML-N sharing a common cause with the Taliban.

But away from the politics of the war against militancy, on the security front alarming new trends are emerging in Punjab. Here’s what is known. Earlier this month, the names contained in the FIA’s ‘red book’, a list of the country’s most-wanted criminal suspects, were made public: 25 of the 119 names on the list were of suspects from Punjab, the highest number for any province.

The key suspects in many attacks on security targets in recent months are southern Punjab-based members of four militant groups: Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Jaish-i-Mohammad, Sipah-i-Sahaba and Harkatul Jihad al-Islami. The increase in fidayeen-style attacks (in which death is likely but not inevitable as with suicide attacks) has in particular caught the eye of investigators. Fidayeen attacks are the bread-and-butter tactic of Punjabi militants. Then in the last two days alone several tonnes of explosive materials and other weapons favoured by terrorists have been found in raids in Lahore.

Everything points to the terrifying reality that Punjab has a home-grown terrorism problem that appears to be growing by the day. And yet some elements have mischievously tried to play down the Punjab-militancy nexus by pointing to the fact that the groups involved are not ‘Punjabi’ because they have members who belong to other provinces too. There is no doubt that the other provinces also have a terrorism problem in their midst and they need to beef up counter-terrorism measures rapidly. But the violence in Punjab is real, it is present and it shows no sign of abating. Quibbling over whether there is such a thing as the Punjabi Taliban is beside the point: there are militants who live in and are from Punjab, these militants are attacking the state and the people, and they must be captured or eliminated.

It is true that the Punjab government is doing something to fight the threat: despite Mr Sharif’s stomach-churning comments, the provincial administration he oversees has deployed significant law-enforcement and intelligence resources to track down the Taliban. But the authorities appear to be approaching the problem as a narrow counter-terrorism issue. The wider problem is the infrastructure of hate and religious intolerance that is thriving in the province, often under official patronage. No matter how many militants the state captures or kills, there will always be more if the pipeline of hate continues to churn out brainwashed foot soldiers. The Punjab authorities must find a way, and the will, to shut down the pipeline of hate and intolerance.

Musharraf's Report Card

Soon after General Musharraf's departure, against the multitude of pressures and turmoils in Pakistan, there were some calls of bringing him back, or at least, attempts to romanticize his era. Lest people forget, here is a good reminder that succinctly points out that many of our current turmoils have their roots in General Musharraf's policies. For other contributing factors, see a previous IS post here.

Musharraf's brazenness
Editorial, Daily Times, March 17, 2010
Source

A news report of Seattle Times made it sound as if Musharraf was heading back home the moment he was sure that support and applause await his return. While talking to journalists in Seattle, where he is on a lecture tour, he dropped a hint that a party with the name of All Pakistan Muslim League had been registered. Whether the former president, now mostly referred to as the dictator, is seriously planning on entering politics in the near future or not, we have the following advice and observations to make to him.

Musharraf is a coup-maker who should have been held accountable for his actions. He overthrew an elected government, violated the constitution, tampered with the political process by creating a king’s party, instituted a local bodies system that suited his purposes, and rigged the 2002 general elections. He subverted the judiciary and initiated a process whose legacy will haunt us for years to come. Sane observers feel that the over-assertiveness of the judiciary that has been restored after Musharraf’s departure is a reaction to the en masse dismissal of judges and the movement that followed, a phenomenon that may not be in the long term interests of the institution of the judiciary or the country.

Musharraf extols his contributions to the economy. However, the economic situation today is merely a reflection of the kind of unsustainable consumer demand-led economic model his managers devised. We all know how his government failed to manage the energy sector and upgrade its capacity, which has ruined the economy.

He dares comment on the Taliban and al Qaeda culture in Pakistan when he himself made the fundamental contribution in promoting it by following a dual policy post-9/11. Pakistan caught hundreds of al Qaeda operatives and handed them over to the US, but provided sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban. The Musharraf regime banned the extremist organisations in 2002, but allowed them to continue their nefarious activities under new names. We are reaping the bitter harvest of Musharraf’s policies now, which have resulted in the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban. Today Pervez Musharraf has the temerity to call Nawaz Sharif a ‘closet Taliban’. This transcends the limits of brazenness, because he himself acted more like an ‘open Taliban’ during his years in power.

Many of Musharraf’s crimes come in the category of ‘High Treason’ in the Constitution of Pakistan and are punishable by death. He had been let off the hook as a quid pro quo because of an understanding with the PPP, and partly because the institution he headed would not allow its former chief to be dragged over the coals. But it seems that his ambition is undiminished. This talk of a party and a contribution to Pakistan cannot be without reason. Does he once again want to present himself, this time out of uniform, as a saviour? If it is true, he does not seem to realise that the immunity against criminal proceedings ensured by his powerful connections could unravel and he may be held accountable for the wrongs that he has committed.

Therefore our advice to the former General Musharraf is that he should count his blessings and enjoy his safety while lecturing around the world, and lay his dream of returning to politics to rest. It will only make the murky waters of politics in Pakistan murkier.

GEO Documentary: Security Failures in Karachi Muharram Blasts

See below for GEO-TV's investigative report in Urdu on the security failures before and on the day of Ashura in Karachi. My comments can be seen here: "Six Talking Points About the Ashura Blast in Karachi" and "Muharram Blasts in Karachi: Why The Government is Implicated". Further, "On Militant Extremists in Pakistan and their Supporters."


Part 1


Part 2


Part 3


Part 4


See a similar investigative report by Dunya News that was released soon after the Ashura blast (December 28, 2010). It was very timely and insightful.

Tackling Pakistan's Problems: Where to Start?

See related posts here and here.

Below see a thoughtful perspective on tackling Pakistan's fundamental problems. Here I only want to comment on one causal factor (without discounting other contributing factors). I disagree with the part about "culture" when the author defines "anti-Americanism". I have the materialistic aspects of the American mainstream culture in mind here. Effective at the roots of many environmental, social, and economic problems, this materialism is corroding the American society itself and is part and parcel of American hegemonic expansionism in the world. It especially targets the middle and elite classes, who (often) get in the way of a meaningful social transformation with their materialistic self-indulgence, apathy, and/or active opposition. Not saying that these classes were not apathetic or exploitative before (other causal factors were definitely effective), but the problem amplified with corporate globalization (among other things, with the neo-liberal market reforms and hyper consumerism that it promoted).

In order to truly resist the American imperialism, we also need to resist the cultural imperialism. Toward the end of her famous 2002 speech, Arundhati Roy said it well: "Meanwhile down at the mall there's a mid-season sale. Everything's discounted - oceans, rivers, oil, gene pools, fig wasps, flowers, childhoods, aluminum factories, phone companies, wisdom, wilderness, civil rights, eco-systems, air - all 4,600 million years of evolution. It's packed, sealed, tagged, valued and available off the rack. (No returns). ...The American way of life is simply not sustainable because it doesn't acknowledge that there is a world beyond America." (See part of that speech here).

I would frame the argument this way that the fight is not against American people or religions but against American imperialism - political, economic, cultural. Resisting this cultural imperialism is also about resisting Orientalism and the colonial ("brown sahib") mindset that develops at the receiving end.

I believe that any meaningful and sustainable change in Pakistan (and in the US and elsewhere) has to start with change of hearts, with a re-vision of individual and cultural values and priorities, and a re-definition of our interaction with fellow human beings and the environment. Of course, the challenge lies in defining the actual contours and details of this kind of vision.

The New Left revisited
By Asha Amirali, Dawn, Mar 09, 2010
Source

The much-maligned and weakened Pakistani Left often comes in for more than its fair share of prescriptive remedies.

One such critical dose appeared on these pages on March 3 in which Mr Muhammad Ali Siddiqi expressed a cautious optimism about the recent merger of a handful of leftist groups, which has resulted in the formation of the Workers Party Pakistan (WPP).

He also, however, advised the ‘New Left’ to ‘not jump on the anti-American bandwagon’, recognise that the real enemy facing Pakistan today is religious militancy, welcome foreign investment, and follow the lead of New Labour in the UK and repackage itself given the realities of the post-Cold War world.

To start with the anti-Americanism aspect, I completely agree with Mr Siddiqi that a new leftist political formation in Pakistan must not limit itself to hollow slogans. There is an urgent need to objectively analyse the contradictions that exist within Pakistani society and put together a political programme that responds to them.

Not all of Pakistan’s problems can be blamed away, and Mr Siddiqi is right that there is an immediate need to debunk the anti-American hate-mongering of the right, with all its emphasis on waging war against kufr. But what most liberals and others who decry the Left’s anti-Americanism fail to see is that the Left is not anti-American, it is anti-imperialist. Those are two completely different political positions — the Left’s fight is not with a particular culture but with any state that seeks to destroy, coerce and manipulate others to its own advantage.

Most Pakistani people, and indeed people the world over, resent American interventionism in their affairs. The Left can only be a force for genuine emancipation if it heeds this sentiment and builds and articulates an alternative vision which privileges the democratisation of the global order. And while it is obvious, there is no harm in repeating a truth: without genuine democratisation of the global order, democratisation within national boundaries is impossible.

A second but related point is the policy regime that the international financial institutions have championed in Pakistan over the past three decades. The claim that the Pakistani people will benefit from uninhibited flows of foreign capital and technology has amassed little evidence in its favour.

Throughout the tenure of Musharraf and Shaukat Aziz, Pakistan experienced an extraordinary influx of capital and new information technologies. The result was a temporary bubble of growth which burst, leaving in its wake sharpened inequality and an economy teetering on termite-ridden stilts. The global financial crisis followed soon after and made clear just how viable and pro-people the radical free market capitalist model is.There is no doubt that Pakistan needs to employ its unemployed millions and increase productivity across all sectors, but the trickle-down effects from foreign capital have yet to show themselves in most of the Third World. So instead, why should the Left in Pakistan not look at the experiments being attempted in Latin America which reject the neo-liberal paradigm and emphasise growth and integration strategies that put people and the environment first? It seems the logical thing to do.

Finally, and very crucially, the greatest problem facing Pakistan at the present time is not religious militancy, but fragmentation along ethnic lines. Balochistan is (still) burning and a wide cross-section of the Baloch people are increasingly drawn towards separatism. Sindhi nationalist sentiment, while currently muted because the PPP is in office, is nevertheless simmering below the surface. A large number of Pakhtuns view the unfolding civil war-like situation in Pakhtunkhwa as a war in which a conspiring and duplicitous state treats Pakhtuns as nothing more than pawns on its chessboard.

Historically the Left and ethnic-nationalists struggled together against the unitary state. Today, the Left — particularly in Punjab — must make clear its commitment to a new social contract in which all nations within the state of Pakistan are considered equal and given rights and resources accordingly.

Religious militancy is growing, yes. It is instilling hatred and violence and negating all that progressive forces want to see realised in Pakistan. However, I believe it is essential for the Left to move beyond the liberal refrain about the Islamists constituting an existential threat to the Pakistani state. Islamism has established roots in parts of Pakistani society largely because of its historic patronage by the military establishment. Today it sustains these roots because of continued support by the state, the presence of western troops in the region, and the end of imagination that afflicts society.

Military operations against people who have been alienated from the social and political mainstream will not reduce the appeal of radical Islamist ideology. We must focus on causes rather than react to symptoms: the ‘real enemy’, as Mr Siddiqi put it, is not religious militancy, rather, it is the militaristic state and its Islam-centric ideology, the nastiest but perfectly logical manifestation of which is the Taliban. The ‘New Left’ in Pakistan will do well to create consensus amongst progressive forces on these most basic of issues. However, the clear differences between Mr Siddiqi’s point of view and the one propounded here indicate that such a consensus might be difficult.

Those who, in Mr Siddiqi’s words, are not sure how they “feel about the word ‘Left’”, are unlikely to support a strongly anti-imperialist, anti-neoliberal programme. Unfortunately though, meaningful change is only possible if we travel this difficult path. There are no shortcuts.

Jundullah and the Washington Connection

See related posts here and here.



Is the Obama Administration Supporting Violent "Regime Change" in Iran?
by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
Source

Excerpt:

"We were in Tehran on February 24 -- the day when Iranian authorities announced the capture of Abdol Malik Rigi, the head of Jundallah. Jundallah (the name in Arabic for "soldiers of God"; the group is also known as the People's Resistance Movement of Iran) is a Sunni Islamist group that claims to be fighting for the rights of Sunni Muslims in Iran. Its activities are focused on Sistan-Baluchistan, which is the Islamic Republic's only Sunni-majority province. In recent years, the group has carried out a number of high-profile terrorist attacks in Iran. These include a 2005 attack on President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's motorcade in Sistan-Baluchistan (one of Ahmadinejad's bodyguards was killed); a 2006 attack on a bus in Sistan-Baluchistan that killed 18 members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC); the abduction and execution of 16 Iranian policemen in 2007; a car bomb attack on a security installation in Sistan-Baluchistan in 2008 that killed at least four people; a 2009 ambush in Sistan-Baluchistan that killed 12 Iranian policeman; and a 2009 bomb attack on a mosque in Sistan-Baluchistan that killed 25 people and injured 125.

Most recently, on October 18, 2009, Jundallah carried out a suicide bomb attack in Sistan-Baluchistan that killed 42 people, including several senior IRGC officers. We wrote on this attack at the time, as did Ben Katcher; we also published a guest post on the incident by Jasim Husain Ali.

Two days after his capture was announced, Rigi appeared on Iranian television, where he said, among other things, that Jundallah receives financial and military support from the United States; U.S. Government officials have denied such support on the record (though they have not denied any relationship with Jundallah). Some media reports claim that U.S. support for Jundallah is "indirect," in that the support is channeled through Pakistan and Gulf Arab states allied to the United States. Iranian officials have charged for several years that Jundallah receives support from the United States, as well as from Pakistan and Sunni Arab states allied to Washington.

Our impression in Tehran last week was that the idea the United States has some sort of ties to Jundallah and other groups considered "terrorists" by most Iranians seems to be widely accepted in Tehran as a "social fact," at least. We observed a genuine, deep, and strongly positive popular reaction to the news of Rigi's arrest that seemed to cut across class and political divides in Iranian society. When news of Rigi's capture broke, it was around midday in Tehran. We were at the University of Tehran's Faculty of World Studies, meeting with graduate students in a conference room that was equipped with a large-screen television. We were interrupted by an incoming flow of students and faculty, who apologized for the intrusion but explained that there was an urgent news story which they wanted to see on television. The television was turned on, and we watched the nationally broadcast press conference at which the Islamic Republic's Intelligence Minister recounted Rigi's arrest. As we went through subsequent meetings and conversations over the course of the afternoon, it seemed clear that the news of Rigi's arrest was a source of considerable popular satisfaction. That evening, in some residential neighborhoods, there were impromptu parties, with individuals distributing cake to their neighbors and other similar gestures of celebration. We were told that one of the senior IRGC officers killed in the Jundallah attack last October was a widely known and admired hero of the Iran-Iraq war.

Iranian officials are not the only sources claiming that U.S. intelligence is linked to groups carrying out terrorist operations inside the Islamic Republic. Some Western media reports -- citing former CIA case officers -- say that there are links between Jundallah and U.S. intelligence; for example, see this widely noted story published by Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker in July 2008. Some of these reports say that Jundallah is one of a number of ethnic separatist groups (including Arab, Azeri, Baluch, and Kurdish groups) receiving covert support from the United States, as part of a covert campaign authorized during the George W. Bush Administration to press Tehran over the nuclear issue and destabilize the Islamic Republic. (For a recent discussion of the issue by a retired CIA officer, see here.) As we ourselves have written, there is considerable evidence that President Obama inherited from his predecessor a number of overt programs for "democracy promotion" in Iran, as well as covert initiatives directed against Iranian interests.

Obama has done nothing to scale back or stop these programs -- a posture that has not gone unnoticed in Tehran. We understand that, last year, the Obama Administration reviewed whether Jundallah should be designated a foreign terrorist organization, but decided not to do so. Why was that? And, even though the Muhahedin-e Khalq (MEK) retains its designation as a foreign terrorist organization, the Obama Administration continues to push the Iraqi government not to consider a longstanding Iranian request that MEK cadres in Iraq -- who were granted special protective status by the George W. Bush Administration -- be deported to Iran. Why is the Obama Administration trying to protect members of a U.S. government-designated terrorist group?

Could it be that at least some elements of the Obama Administration believe that U.S. connections to groups like Jundallah and the MEK are potentially useful policy instruments vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic? Based on our conversations in Tehran, it seems clear that the perception of continuing U.S. involvement with and support for groups carrying out violent attacks inside Iran is having a corrosive effect on Iranian assessments of the Obama Administration's seriousness about strategic engagement with Iran and its ultimate intentions toward the Islamic Republic."

See the full text here.

Ahmadinejad meets Nasrallah and Assad in Syria: What is the significance?

Here is one perspective. See here if this video does not play.

BBC on Security Establishment's new Taliban strategy

See a related post here.

What lies behind Pakistan's Taliban arrests?
By M Ilyas Khan, BBC News, Feb 25, 2010
Source

Islamabad: A succession of senior Afghan Taliban leaders have reportedly been seized in Pakistan in recent weeks. The world has been left guessing as to what might lie behind these arrests.

But answers will take time in coming.

At least four Taliban "shadow governors" of provinces in Afghanistan were arrested in Pakistan in February, reports say.

But for the moment the Pakistani military has only confirmed one arrest: that of the Taliban's top military commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was detained in the southern city of Karachi.

Yet they have not issued any categorical denials about the other alleged arrests.

And the US media has been quoting unnamed Pakistani intelligence officials when reporting them.

Shift in attitude?

It is normally unlikely that such leaks could occur without discreet authorisation. Pakistan's policy of ambiguity when it comes to confirming these arrests could be down to the sensitivity of being seen to follow a US agenda.

Indeed analysts have long suspected senior Taliban leaders of finding shelter and sympathy in Pakistan, although the Pakistani authorities have consistently denied this.

So what are Pakistan's reasons for this sudden stream of arrests?

One group of analysts is of the view that the Pakistanis have finally started seeing the Taliban as a threat to their society and have decided to co-operate with the West's efforts to contain the movement.

Some say it is partly a quid pro quo for the US drone strikes that eliminated the leadership of the Pakistani Taliban, responsible for hundreds of bomb attacks in recent years.

But whether this amounts to a shift in Pakistan's security paradigm is unclear.

The arrests also coincide with the onset of a major military offensive in Afghanistan's Helmand province, long considered a Taliban stronghold.

Many believe that Pakistan's powerful security establishment, which is widely perceived to be a supporter of the Taliban movement, has come under considerable pressure from the US to make adjustments in its policy.

The Pakistani military heavily depends on the US for funds and equipment.

President Obama's troop surge in Afghanistan is also an issue for Pakistan. Analysts say that in the event of non-cooperation, Pakistan fears losing the chance of salvaging its "legitimate" interests in Afghanistan.

Countering India

The Pakistani move to arrest top Taliban leaders has also come as the first peace talks between India and Pakistan were held.

India halted all talks with Pakistan after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which India says was carried out by Pakistan-based militants.

Pakistan, which already disputes India's territorial claim to the northern part of Kashmir, is wary of its growing influence in Afghanistan.

Over the last 20 years, the Pakistani military is believed to have backed a number of militant groups launching attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir.

In this time it has also been accused of training and funding the Afghan Taliban with a view to having a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul.

In the years since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the Pakistani military has been repeatedly blamed for "double-crossing" the Americans - protecting the Taliban and other militants while at the same time playing its role as the frontline state in the US-led "war on terror".

Since 2008, Pakistan has also resisted mounting Western pressure for more troops to be deployed in its north-western tribal badlands, on the Afghan border. It has said it needs troops on the eastern border with India.

With the Indians finally coming to the dialogue table and the US going for a troops surge in Afghanistan, options for Pakistan may well be shrinking.

And affirming its own influence in a new Afghan order will be important.

Reduced Afghan role?

But there is another interpretation of the latest events.

The argument goes that the recent arrests are part of an American strategy to drive a wedge in the Taliban movement and engage the more "moderate" elements for some kind of a power-sharing deal.

The arrests of top Taliban leaders will hurt the morale of their foot soldiers, and minimise their ability to regroup if they disperse in the wake of the US-led offensive.

These leaders could then be set free as part of a deal with the Taliban, and allowed to lead the movement into a process of integration with the wider Afghan society.

If peace is held and reconstruction begins quickly, analysts say the influence of Taliban may shrink drastically as they would be forced to compete with tribal, regional and political entities.

If that happens, Pakistani influence in Afghanistan will also decline. Is Pakistan ready for this?

Others argue that the leaders reportedly arrested so far have all been close to Pakistan's ISI intelligence service, and as such are more pragmatists than ideologues.

If they have not been arrested with negotiations in mind, their detention may not only close down crucial channels of communication with the Taliban, they may also leave the movement in the hands of more rigid and brutal second-generation leaders.

The fine print here is that Pakistan is unlikely to be naive enough not to see that by eliminating their proteges in the Taliban movement, they will be cutting off their influence over the only group they can hope to befriend in an otherwise hostile, pro-India Afghanistan.

The arrests may just be indicative of a Pakistani decision to settle for a reduced role in Afghanistan.

The fate of the detained Taliban leaders and a close watch on any further arrests may cast some light on Pakistan's strategy - in the absence of official comment.

NYTimes on CIA-ISI relations

See a related post from yesterday, here.

C.I.A. and Pakistan Work Together, but Do So Warily
By Mark Mazzetti and Jane Perlez, NYTimes, Feb 25, 2010
Source

Excerpts:

"In strengthening ties to the ISI, the C.I.A. is aligning itself with a shadowy institution that meddles in domestic politics and has a history of ties to violent militant groups in the region. A C.I.A. spokesman declined to comment for this article.

Officials in Washington and Islamabad agree that the relationship between the two spy services has steadily improved since the low point of the summer of 2008, when the C.I.A.’s deputy director traveled to Pakistan to confront ISI officials with communications intercepts indicating that the ISI was complicit in the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.

The spy agencies have built trust in part through age-old tactics of espionage: killing or capturing each other’s enemies. A turning point came last August, when a C.I.A. missile killed the militant leader Baitullah Mehsud as he lay on the roof of his compound in South Waziristan, his wife beside him massaging his back.

Mr. Mehsud for more than a year had been responsible for a wave of terror attacks in Pakistani cities, and many inside the ISI were puzzled as to why the United States had not sought to kill him. Some even suspected he was an American, or Indian, agent.

The drone attack on Mr. Mehsud is part of a joint war against militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas, where C.I.A. drones pound militants from the air as Pakistani troops fight them on the ground.

And yet for two spy agencies with a long history of mistrust, the accommodation extends only so far. For instance, when it comes to the endgame in Afghanistan, where Pakistan hopes to play a significant role as a power broker, interviews with Pakistani and American intelligence officials in Islamabad and Washington reveal that the interests of the two sides remain far apart.

Even as the ISI breaks up a number of Taliban cells, officials in Islamabad, Washington and Kabul hint that the ISI’s goal seems to be to weaken the Taliban just enough to bring them to the negotiating table, but leaving them strong enough to represent Pakistani interests in a future Afghan government.

This contrasts sharply with the American goal of battering the Taliban and strengthening Kabul’s central government and security forces, even if American officials also recognize that political reconciliation with elements of the Taliban is likely to be part of any ultimate settlement.

Tensions in the relationship surfaced in the days immediately after Mullah Baradar’s arrest, when the ISI refused to allow C.I.A. officers to interrogate the Taliban leader. Americans have since been given access to the detention center. On Wednesday, Pakistani and Afghan officials meeting in Islamabad said that a deal was being worked out to transfer Mullah Baradar to Afghan custody, which could allow the Americans unrestrained access to him.

Besides Mullah Baradar, several Taliban shadow governors and other senior leaders have been arrested inside Pakistan in recent weeks.

A top American military officer in Afghanistan on Wednesday suggested that with the arrests, the ISI could be trying to accelerate the timetable for a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government."

...

"The ISI gets millions of dollars in United States aid from its American counterpart (which allowed the Pakistan spy service to develop a counterterrorism division), yet is suspicious that the Americans and the Indians might be playing their own “double game” against Pakistan.

In Islamabad, officials are nervous about the intensification of the C.I.A.’s drone campaign in North Waziristan against the network run by Sirajuddin Haqqani, whom the ISI for years has used as a force to carry out missions in Afghanistan that serve Pakistani interests.

C.I.A. officials believe that Mr. Haqqani’s group played a role in the killing of seven Americans in Khost, Afghanistan, in late December, and since then have carried out more than a dozen drone strikes in the Haqqani network’s enclave in North Waziristan.

The ISI, an institution feared by most Pakistanis, is used to getting its way. It meddles in domestic politics and in recent months has been suspected by Western embassies in Islamabad of planting anti-American stories in Pakistani newspapers.

It has also been criticized in reports by international human rights organizations of using brutal interrogation tactics against its prisoners, though the same could certainly be said of the C.I.A. in the period of 2002 to 2004. The annual human rights report of the State Department in 2007 said “there were persistent reports that security forces, including intelligence services, tortured and abused persons.”

The head of the Pakistani military, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, said in a recent briefing that it was doubtful that a centralized government would work in post-conflict Afghanistan, making it more important for Pakistan to continue to influence the Taliban in the years to come.

As a result there remains a belief among American intelligence officials that Pakistan will never completely abandon the Taliban, and officials both in Washington and Kabul admit that they are almost completely in the dark about Pakistan’s long-term strategy regarding the Taliban.

“We have a better level of cooperation,” said one top American official who met recently in Islamabad with General Kayani. “How far that goes, I can’t tell yet. We’ll know soon whether this is cooperation, or a stonewall and kind of rope a dope.”

Pir Zubair Shah contributed reporting."

Israel's strategy of "sabotage" and "attack" on global justice movements

Below see excerpts from two pieces on this issue.

Since its pre-emptive war of 1967, Israel had maintained an aura of "invincibility" and "legitimacy". The first got bitterly crushed in the Summer of 2006 and later in the 2008-9 aggression on Gaza (where Israel failed to neutralize the resistance). The crack in that aura began in 2000 when Israel was forced to withdraw from South Lebanon. As for legitimacy, for Israel it matters most of all in the US. Israel however paid a high price for its inhumane massacres in Lebanon and Gaza especially because it failed to achieve a clear and tangible victory in these military campaigns (the "birth pangs" of Condi Rice did not yield the desired outcomes which could have been used as justification for Israeli atrocities.) Especially during the Gaza massacre, Israel's image was severely damaged by graphic images and information that got disseminated over internet and through hundreds of protest gatherings in North America and Europe. Israel still had a tighter control on information flow in the corporate media. Now Israel feels further threatened by the potential popularity of a BDS movement. Due to all of these developments, the entity of Israel is in a deep crisis right now, struggling to survive with whatever means it can, and it may resort to unrealistic steps, including another military warfare. However, what's becoming clearer with every passing day is that it probably won't take too long before this racist entity is finally dismantled like the Apartheid South Africa.

Israel's new strategy: "sabotage" and "attack" the global justice movement
Ali Abunimah, The Electronic Intifada, 16 February 2010
http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article11080.shtml

An extraordinary series of articles, reports and presentations by Israel's influential Reut Institute has identified the global movement for justice, equality and peace as an "existential threat" to Israel and called on the Israeli government to direct substantial resources to "attack" and possibly engage in criminal "sabotage" of this movement in what Reut believes are its various international "hubs" in London, Madrid, Toronto, the San Francisco Bay Area and beyond.

The Reut Institute's analyses hold that Israel's traditional strategic doctrine -- which views threats to the state's existence in primarily military terms, to be met with a military response -- is badly out of date. Rather, what Israel faces today is a combined threat from a "Resistance Network" and a "Delegitimization Network."

The Resistance Network is comprised of political and armed groups such as Hamas and Hizballah who "rel[y] on military means to sabotage every move directed at affecting separation between Israel and the Palestinians or securing a two-state solution" ("The Delegitimization Challenge: Creating a Political Firewall, Reut Institute, 14 February 2010).

Furthermore, the "Resistance Network" allegedly aims to cause Israel's political "implosion" -- a la South Africa, East Germany or the Soviet Union -- rather than bring about military defeat through direct confrontation on the battlefield.

The "Delegitimization Network" -- which Reut Institute president and former Israeli government advisor Gidi Grinstein provocatively claims is in an "unholy alliance" with the Resistance Network -- is made up of the broad, decentralized and informal movement of peace and justice, human rights, and BDS (boycott, divestment and sanctions) activists all over the world. Its manifestations include protests against Israeli officials visiting universities, Israeli Apartheid Week, faith-based and trade union-based activism, and "lawfare" -- the use of universal jurisdiction to bring legal accountability for alleged Israeli war criminals. The Reut Institute even cited my speech to the student conference on BDS held at Hampshire College last November as a guide to how the "delegitimization" strategy supposedly works ("Eroding Israel's Legitimacy in the International Arena," Reut Institute, 28 January 2010).

The combined "attack" from "resisters" and "delegitimizers," Reut says, "possesses strategic significance, and may develop into a comprehensive existential threat within a few years." It further warns that a "harbinger of such a threat would be the collapse of the two-state solution as an agreed framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the coalescence behind a 'one-state solution' as a new alternative framework."

...

Reut does not recommend to the Israeli cabinet -- which recently held a special session to hear a presentation of the think tank's findings -- that Israel should actually change its behavior toward Palestinians and Lebanese. It misses the point that apartheid South Africa also once faced a global "delegitimization network" but that this has now completely disappeared. South Africa, however, still exists. Once the cause motivating the movement disappeared -- the rank injustice of formal apartheid -- people packed up their signs and their BDS campaigns and went home.

Instead, Reut recommends to the Israeli government an aggressive and possibly criminal counter-offensive. A powerpoint presentation Grinstein made to the recent Herzliya Conference on Israeli national security actually calls on Israel's "intelligence agencies to focus" on the named and unnamed "hubs" of the "delegitimization network" and to engage in "attacking catalysts" of this network. In its "The Delegitimization Challenge: Creating a Political Firewall" document, Reut recommends that "Israel should sabotage network catalysts."

The use of the word "sabotage" is particularly striking and should draw the attention of governments, law enforcement agencies and university officials concerned about the safety and welfare of their students and citizens. The only definition of "sabotage" in United States law deems it to be an act of war on a par with treason, when carried out against the United States. In addition, in common usage, the American Heritage Dictionary defines sabotage as "Treacherous action to defeat or hinder a cause or an endeavor; deliberate subversion." It is difficult to think of a legitimate use of this term in a political or advocacy context.

At the very least, Reut seems to be calling for Israel's spy agencies to engage in covert activity to interfere with the exercise of legal free speech, association and advocacy rights in the United States, Canada and European Union countries, and possibly to cause harm to individuals and organizations. These warnings of Israel's possible intent -- especially in light of its long history of criminal activity on foreign soil -- should not be taken lightly.

-----------

Behind Brand Israel: Israel's recent propaganda efforts
Ben White, The Electronic Intifada, 23 February 2010
http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article11093.shtml


Delegitimizing the delegitimizers

There is also an "offensive" element to Israel's strategy, one that is currently less developed than Brand Israel tactics, yet likely to come increasingly to the fore. In a 14 December 2009 Jerusalem Post article, Shimon Samuels, the director of international relations at the Simon Wiesenthal Center, suggested that "propagators of deliberate slurs targeting Israel and, by association, world Jewry, must realize that they may incur a price." He urged that "a consortium of the best Jewish and pro-Israel legal brains should be on call," and ready, among other things, "to use the courts in ad hominem defamation."

A key strategy discussed at the Herzilya conference and the MFA's Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism is "delegitimizing the delegitimizers." In addition, the "soft warfare" working paper presented at Herzliya included the recommendation that "research to identify all the key players that initiate and generate hate (as compared to those that disseminate it), with a breakdown by country, religion and ethnicity, in order to analyze their motivations and objectives, estimate the threat and consider possible ways of handling each" ("Delegitimization of Israel: 'Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions'" (Word document)). One of the purposes of this kind of "systematic, ongoing research, of all anti-Israeli publications, including media analyses, reports, boycotts and on campus activities" is to facilitate the "identification and exposure of and levying pressure on the sponsors of the inciters." The paper also endorsed legal action "by the Israeli government and by independent entities in Israel and abroad, against media networks, publications, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and individuals that make defamatory reports."

This aggressive dimension was also included in the Global Forum's BDS Working Group document, which included in its vision for a five year plan the proposals to "name and shame" nongovernmental organizations, and meeting "lawfare" with "lawfare." (In that regard, see "The Lawfare Project" and its upcoming conference in March, where neocon and right-wing Zionist lobbyists, academics, and diplomats, will discuss how to shield Israel from the "abuse" of human rights law: http://www.thelawfareproject.org/about/program.) There is also the idea to form "groups of Jewish/pro-Israel professionals within various national and international professional association/organizations/unions," in order to pass "anti-discrimination bylaws within the organization that are general in nature, and that do not mention Israel per se, but rather oppose discrimination on the basis of race, religion, nationality, etc."

Students on campus

Unsurprisingly, given the increasing strength of the Palestine solidarity movement amongst students, campuses are a target of the anti-BDS battle plan. One element of this is the role played by Zionist "ambassadors" like the Jewish Agency's emissaries (or "shlichim") scheme. In a 16 December 2009 Jerusalem Post article, Natan Sharansky, head of the Jewish Agency, expressed his desire to increase "the number of young Israelis sent to communities in the US and especially the more than 100 shlichim based at universities there." He also raised the possibility of the likes of Irwin Cotler and US lawyer and Israel advocate Alan Dershowitz "teaching the shlichim before they go [to the US]."

The Herzilya "soft warfare" paper also discussed university campuses (and schools) as the subject of a suggested "proactive public relations" drive. It added that "such public relations should cover both the subject of Israel and its history, and the subject of radical Islam and the dangers it unfolds." Yet as has been evident for a while now, the anti-BDS push on campus is just as -- if not more -- likely to emphasize "dialogue" and "narrative-sharing," as opposed to openly pushing an "Israel first" line. In other words, instead of far-right former-MK Effie Eitam we'll have the dovish pro-Israel advocacy group J Street "Invest, Don't Divest" campus programming and two-state solution-peddling One Voice tours.

The reported response of campus Zionists in Canada to Israeli Apartheid Week is instructive and encouraging. Apart from promoting Israel's "global renown in science, medicine, technology, business, humanitarian aid" and culture, public talks are being scheduled ("Students get ready to counter 'apartheid lie,'" The Canadian Jewish News, 18 February 2010). There are apparently talks scheduled in Toronto by a Sudanese human rights activist, Arab reporter Khaled Abu Toameh of the The Jerusalem Post, and a self-proclaimed "ex-terrorist" whose mission is to "wake up the body of Christ" to the danger of "radical Islam" ("Students get ready to counter 'apartheid lie.'"

It is also worth noting the Global Forum's BDS Working Group's recommendation that "more money needs to be spent on the programs that already exist in countries like Canada to send non-Jewish student leaders (members of student government, campus organizations, campus newspapers etc.) to Israel to learn the facts on the ground."

A call for coordination

A common theme in the recently intensified discussion by the Zionist lobby is the perceived need for improved, and centralized, organization and coordination. The Reut Institute's "Delegitimization Challenge" report pointed to the imperative of reorganizing "the foreign policy establishment" in Israel, including "comprehensive reform within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

The "soft warfare" paper urged the creation of "a state-led, integrated capability," reflecting what they described as a "broad consensus that a sufficiently-funded government agency is required in order to manage the battle against hate incitement." The two specific options put forward were "a special unit under Israel's National Security Council" to run a public relations strategy in association with "pro-Israeli organizations and activists abroad," or "an entity within the Israeli intelligence community, which would collect, analyze and distribute information, and initiate 'operations' in areas relevant to Israel's public relations campaign." This latter "entity" could cooperate with groups like Middle East Media Research Initiative (MEMRI), as well as "direct the intelligence agencies to thwart anti-Israeli propaganda efforts."

The Global Forum's anti-BDS group talked of the "Jewish community" needing "a war room" that would be "tracking this movement, sharing best practices, coaching communities." It mentioned that "in North America, the Federation system is talking about launching a coordinating body to fight BDS." One of the group's co-chairmen, McGill professor Gil Troy, commented on his blog on The Jerusalem Post's website earlier this month that there was a new initiative "rumored to be in the works in North America and Israel to help galvanize and centralize pro-Israel sentiment."

For all those involved in some capacity in the international campaign for justice in Palestine/Israel, and the growing BDS movement, these state-backed efforts can appear rather daunting. The Israeli government and its allies in lobby groups are not short of powerful contacts and money, and there is now a concerted effort to think "strategically." However, for all the research, conferences and working papers, there is a comical ignorance shaping these responses. A great example of this is can be found in the Global Forum's BDS paper, which includes the idea to "circulate information on Muslims acting contrary to Islam." This is on the basis that "if the people of countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia knew their 'pious' leaders were really alcoholics, gamblers and perverts, they might hasten regime change." As if the people in the Middle East are not fully aware of the corruption of their autocrats and dictators -- many of whom, of course, enjoy US and Israeli support for their antidemocratic "moderation."

Moreover, all of this strategizing and energy is needed in order to avoid the manifestly unimaginable truth -- that Israel is increasingly unable to maintain a regime of ethno-religious exclusion, apartheid separation and colonial violence without paying a price. Its supporters are also unable to see that it will prove to be unsustainable.